

# EUROPEAN POLICE SCIENCE AND RESEARCH BULLETIN



**ISSUE 6  
WINTER  
2011/12**

ISSN 1831-1857

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Published Online: [www.cepol.europa.eu](http://www.cepol.europa.eu)

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## RESEARCH ARTICLE:

# MALMÖ CITY PROBLEM-ORIENTED-POLICING-PROJECT ON MICRO CRIME PLACES

By

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### Abstract

*Malmö police department has undertaken an innovative approach to its crime prevention work. An implemented problem-oriented policing project at identified micro crime places showed a significant decrease in crime by 28 % in the target area and a 23 % decrease in the project area's buffer-zones. This result comes from a targeted measurement of displacement and possible diffusion of benefits.*

**Keywords:** *problem oriented policing project, micro crime places, problem places, targeted measurement of displacement and diffusion of benefits*

### The policing of problem places

The importance of place isn't unknown in policing, although it must be considered unexplored within the context of Swedish policing. Building on the foundations of routine activity theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) and crime pattern theory (Brantingham and Brantingham, 1993), the research of David L Weisburd about the importance of place in policing earned him the Stockholm Prize in Criminology 2010. Policing of problem places takes the existence of temporally stable hot spots as its starting point (Weisburd et al., 2010) and the crime triangle as the model of analysis and responses (Weisburd and Braga, 2010). With the help of the crime triangle the places, offenders and victims of crime are identified as well as the place managers, handlers and guardians who can respond to the crime problem (Weisburd and Braga, 2010).

Furthermore, the temporal stability of hot spots makes the place a stable point of intervention for the police. A study conducted by Weisburd in Seattle showed that 50% of the crime within the city was reported on only 4.5% of the street junctions, in hot spots that were stable over time (Weisburd et al., 2010). During a period of 14 years there was a 20%

reduction in crime that was concentrated in 14% of the street junctions in the city, emphasising the importance of smaller street segments, junctions, squares and parts of neighborhoods as the target of police intervention. The study emphasised that crime is stable over time at smaller street segments, and that overall crime reduction is concentrated to a small amount of previously stable micro hot spots (Weisburd et al., 2004).

By shifting focus from person to place, on the analytical level and on the design of intervention, the police effort is focused on disrupting the activity space of the criminal, thereby denying the offender the opportunity to commit a crime. On the analytical level the place becomes the starting point and main focus of the analysis. For the police intervention, control and management of the place becomes the main objective. The situations that arise out of the coincidence of offenders and victims activity spaces and the underlying conditions of the place becomes the main target of the police effort (Weisburd and Braga, 2010).

With the development of situational crime prevention the problem-oriented policing model has evolved since its foundation by Herman Goldstein in 1979. The model, which strives to make police departments move away from the standard model of policing, emphasises that responses to crime problems should be thoroughly analysed and interventions aimed at underly-

ing conditions that give rise to the problem. Problem-oriented policing should follow the steps of the SARA-process: Scanning (problem identification and definition), Analysis (data collection and collation to create understanding), Response (response design and implementation), Assessment (re-examination and evaluation of the problem and response) (Weisburd and Braga 2010; Ratcliffe 2008). High activity crime places usually involve multiple problems, creating a complex mix of crime types (Weisburd and Braga, 2010). This condition tends to make problem-oriented policing challenging when faced with high activity crime places (ibid).

When applying problem-oriented policing on the policing on problem places, the aim of crime analysis is to identify those places that continuously show up as hot-spots and determine the causes of the problem. Thereafter the response has to focus accordingly on the causes of the problem and the dynamics that give rise to it. In the implementation of problem-oriented policing responses, the strategy and tactics can be either enforcement-oriented or oriented towards situational prevention, or both (Weisburd and Braga, 2010). Enforcement-oriented responses can include directed patrols and crackdowns, while situational prevention can include alternative responses, such as community engagement and collaboration with local partners (ibid).

### **Scanning and analysis of Sevedsplan**

The purpose of the Malmö Police department with this problem-oriented policing project was to test place-based policing, too see if the theories were applicable to the local environment within the city. The first step in any problem-oriented policing project is the scanning phase. It had been known to the police for quite some time that Sevedsplan was an area of large crime problems as well as fear of crime. Furthermore, the residential area was geographically isolated from other distinct problem areas, making an evaluation of the effort easier and more reliable, as spill-over effects from adjacent areas could be expected to be low. The crime prognosis also indicated that November was expected to have the most reported crime during the whole year, which also contributed to the decision to choose Sevedsplan as the target area.

Sevedsplan is a fairly small residential area within Södra Innerstaden, one of ten districts within Malmö municipality. The residential area is no more than 200 x 400 meters and consists of several family apartment houses, a small square and there are several smaller shops located on the ground floors of the apartment buildings in the area. Out of the 4451 inhabitants, about 65% have a foreign background, which is higher than the average in Malmö municipality. The area is characterised by the inhabitants' multi-cultural background, with the largest communities coming from Iraq,

the former Yugoslav republic, Poland and Somalia. Of the ninth grade students, 40% didn't reach the national qualification standard in maths and 56% didn't reach the national qualification standard in Swedish, in 2009. The disposable income in the area is about 52000 SEK below municipality average and 200 households are dependent upon economic support throughout the year. Sevedsplan is in a district which has one of the highest levels of fear of crime in Sweden.

The analysis of the micro crime places at Sevedsplan was conducted in three steps:

- 1) Analysis of the spatio-temporal pattern of crime in the area
- 2) Analysis of the micro places that contributed to the crime problem
- 3) Analysis of the potential targets within the criminal environment that were active at the micro places

### **Spatio-temporal pattern**

Crime at Sevedsplan and its adjacent residential areas had been fairly stable during the last four years. To determine the geographical stability of crime patterns in the area, the geographical mean, median and center of minimum distance was analysed. The use of the three centro-graphic statistics shows the tendency in the crime data and can point towards the point where all crime is centered (Levine, 2004). By following the centro-graphic statistics movement over time, possible movement of hot spots can be detected (Chainey and Ratcliffe

2005; LeBeau 1987). The analysis of Sevedsplan showed that all of the centro-graphic statistics, mentioned above, moved less than 100 meters from 2006 - 2009. Therefore, the conclusion was drawn that hot spots in the area could be considered to be stable, as well as specific problem places.

According to the crime prognosis LUPP (Local monitoring and prognosis procedure; BRÅ 2001:13) the highest seasonal crime rates were expected in October and November in Sevedsplan. A further kernel density hot spots analysis of Sevedsplan, showed that crime was concentrated to three junctions within the residential area and one junction outside of the residential area. The three junctions within the residential area were situated on three sides of one residential quarter. One of the junctions (Rasmusgatan/Sofiagatan) was a part of the road on which most crime and disturbances in the area were reported, and was therefore considered to be more important than the other two junctions. The problems included stone and egg throwing at residents, personal robberies and assaults by multiple assailants.

One of the crime facilitators was found to be a local grocery store with very long opening hours, serving as a focal point for local youth engaged in criminal behaviour. There was also an old café that was closed, but its outdoor seating could still be used, which at least if the weather permitted could be used by local criminal youth.

With a high number of reported crimes and a high frequency of crimes (Clarke and Eck, 2006), the junction could be considered to be a crime attracting place. The response would therefore need to discourage youth to gather in the area in the short run, and in the long run the factors attracting the youth would need to be changed. Furthermore, residents who opposed the youth, trying to correct them, who lived close to the junction also became targets of crime, further complicating the situation around the junction.

The junction outside of the residential area (Rolfsgatan/Bragegatan) is situated in such a manner that it is a natural spot to pass by when you are walking or bicycling towards the city center or towards the local elementary school. This is probably a contributing factor in making the junction a problem place. It is mostly personal robberies, assaults and vandalism reported around the junction. A comparison of perpetrators at the first junction in Sevedsplan and at the junction outside of Sevedsplan, confirmed that it was to a large extent the same youth, who operated in the area. Furthermore, a bicycle path (Heleneholmsstigen) passed by very close to the junction contributing to the criminal problem. Thereby, the junction could be used as the pick-up point for personal robberies and purse snatchings conducted along the bicycle path. The junction had a high crime rate but with a low frequency, making it a

crime creating place (Clarke and Eck, 2006). The bicycle path on the other hand had a high rate of crime and a high frequency, which reinforced the notion that the junction worked as a pick-up point for crime.

A temporal analysis, using a day-of-the-week/time-of-the-day diagram, (Chainey and Ratcliffe, 2006; Helms 1999) showed that crime was most frequent as follows below:

Working days	Weekend
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07:45-09:30	00:00-01:00
-------------	-------------

15:00-18:00	18:00-20:00
-------------	-------------

22:00-00:00	22:00-00:00
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The results indicate that most crime happens prior to and after school during the working days of the week. In the spare time most of the crime is concentrated to late evening both during working days and weekends.

### **Offenders**

An analysis of active criminal offenders in the area was also conducted. The results showed that a loosely connected group of youth offenders were the most criminal active in the area. Furthermore, several of them had been suspected of personal robberies and assaults in and around the four junctions. The most common crimes of the group were narcotics, personal robberies, burglary and assaults, showing a similarity to the crime at the problem places. The youth were also those who had been suspected of crimes against the residents who had opposed them. The number of youths in the group varied from five - 20 over time. Six influential prolific offenders were identified all between 17 - 20 years of age, all of whom had conducted numerous crimes before. Furthermore, among them the six influential prolific offenders had several ties to criminals active in serious organized crime, which probably contributed to their position of power within the loosely connected group of offenders.

### **Implemented measures**

The level of focus was on the identified micro crime places (Braga and Weisburd, 2010; Eck and Weisburd, 1995) which received treatment in line with contemporary research on effective policing with a diversity of approaches (Weisburd and Eck, 2004; Weisburd et al., 2010). Mainly, the police used hot spots policing in combination with so called third-party policing (Weisburd and Braga (eds), 2006) where representatives from Malmö municipality took an active part in the crime prevention work. Identified hot times facilitated the crime prevention process (Helms, 1999; Ratcliffe, 2002).



In light of a study by Smith, Clarke and Pease (2002) anticipatory benefits were pursued by announcing the up-coming intensified police presence in the local bulletin for the neighborhood where the measures were to be implemented. In addition, with the help of the municipality, the neighborhoods' streetlights were changed to reduce the fear of crime and reach additional crime prevention value (Ramsay, 1991; Pease, 1999).

### Methodology

The project was implemented with regard to a targeted measurement of displacement and possible diffusion of benefits (Hamilton-Smith, 2002). With a non-experimental design, a process and impact evaluation was undertaken. With regard to the project areas' socio-demographic characteristics, a control area was chosen for the evaluation (Eck, 2002; English et al., 2002). Both the project and control areas' "buffer-zones" were clearly defined and measured.

### Results

Using the median of the last three years' reported offenses with regard to the following crime-categories: thefts, violence and crimes inflicting damage on property, a prognosis of the anticipated reports on the above mentioned crime-categories was compared to actual reported crimes for the time of project implementation. A 28 % decline in reported offenses in the project ar-

ea and a 23 % decline in the project area's buffer-zones were measured, both results statistically significant ( $p < .05$ ). When compared to the control area and the city of Malmö in general no such declines could be measured.

Also, a self-report survey measuring the public's fear of crime is undertaken yearly in the county of Skåne. The survey's results post-project implementation measured an increase in the sense of safety and a decrease in the fear of crime in the project area, as well as in the project area's "buffer-zones", this in comparison to the results of the survey pre-project implementation.

### Lessons learned

The impact evaluation showed the above mentioned results. To the authors' knowledge this is the first evaluation in the Swedish context of a problem-oriented policing project at micro crime places, with regard to a targeted measurement of displacement and possible diffusion of benefits.

The process evaluation showed that the police department of Malmö has a long way to go when it comes to documenting its measures. A conclusion which is supported by an audit on a national level of the Swedish Police Crime Prevention work made by the Swedish National Audit Office (RiR 2010:23). Also, guidelines could be established for coming projects which is now underway.

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# RESEARCH REPORT:

## CROSS-EUROPEAN APPROACHES TO SOCIAL MEDIA AS A TOOL FOR POLICE COMMUNICATION

By



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### Abstract

*Based on interviews and a series of four focus group discussions, we outline systematic differences in the approaches currently adopted by European police forces in their use of social media as communication tools. We identify variations in the implementation, integration, selection and communication use. Our objective is to inform a European dialogue on social media as a tool for police communication.*

**Keywords:** Social Media, Police, Europe

### Introduction

Facebook, Twitter, Youtube: The rise of social media in the context of the Web 2.0 is dramatically changing the way we live. People create text messages, photos and videos and share them over a variety of Internet services. They chat with friends, send birthday wishes, get to know new people, arrange dinners or ask for help. And they do so in skyrocketing numbers. During the time it took to read the previous sentences, people wrote about 11 000 tweets and commented 90 170 times on Facebook. Social media systems have become closely interwoven with people's everyday lives, be it work or private. Such a prominent social development cannot be ignored by police forces, which in increasing numbers follow the public to the net. In this report we showcase the range of current approaches to the use of social media by European police forces—demonstrating how little consensus exists amongst them on how best to integrate social media into existing practices. By outlining the differences we aim to provide a basis for a broader cross-European discussion to this challenge.

## Study Context and Methods

This report is a result of systematic investigations into technological changes in European police forces, conducted as part of COMPOSITE, a large-scale research project investigating change processes in European policing. A first trend analysis, based on 72 interviews with ICT police and industry experts in 10 European countries, identified social media as a major technological challenge across Europe. At the same time we found considerable variations in the acceptance and use of social media. In a consecutive step, we therefore set out to capture this variation in a more systematic way. In June 2011 COMPOSITE organised a workshop with police officers from forces in Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium and researchers from academia and industry (13 participants) to discuss strategies and approaches of social media as a tool for police communication in form of concrete examples from each force. The discussions were captured in notes and flipcharts. The qualitative analysis of this data refined the typology of controversial issues and commonalities developed from the trend report. This data was then presented to police officers from the 10 countries participating in the advisory board of the COMPOSITE project<sup>2</sup>, a symposium at the 2011 CEPOL conference, and a second COMPOSITE workshop in November 2011 with officers from the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, U.K., and Austria (23 par-

ticipants). The consecutive feedback from disparate groups refined and validated our initial results leading to a systematic overview of approaches for a broad range of countries and contexts.

## Results

We found cross-European variations in (1) implementation strategies, (2) media selection/integration, and (3) communication with the public.

### *Implementation strategy: bottom-up versus top-down*

Social media are generally a bottom-up phenomenon: People adopt the technology as needed, figuring out how to use it on the way. Some police forces follow this **bottom-up** approach: Officers can use e.g., Twitter or Facebook largely without restrictions. General rules may make them aware that information sharing on social media is very similar to 'shouting out loudly in a public space full of strangers', but usage generally depends on local efforts and on personal standards. This approach provides officers with a high degree of freedom. Yet it also allows little control over who uses social media and how. Instead forces rely on the personal discretion of officers. Other forces prefer a **top-down** strategy: They first create general guidelines before social media are rolled out. These guidelines target the entire force and prescribe how officers can (or should) deal with social media in their daily work. Their objective is to safeguard

police against the potential threats of unfettered and uncritical use. On the downside, such guidelines can take a long time to develop and require continuous updates to keep in line with social and technological developments. Moreover, so far forces often lack the comprehensive experience to ground these policies in practice.

*Dealing with the diversity of the social media landscape: selective, centralized and modular approaches*

The social media landscape is constantly changing; networks that are popular today may not be popular tomorrow. Moreover, the choice of services also differs across user groups. Given this variety, police forces need to select the social media they work with and decide where to put their content. Police forces in our study generally decided for a *selective approach*, picking only the most popular services such as Twitter, Facebook or Youtube. The rationale is to reduce the effort of maintaining disparate services, while reaching the broadest number of users. In individual cases the selection can also include alternative services to target specific groups (e.g., a Dutch officer's presence in the child-focused 'Habbo hotel'). Forces in our sample differed in the degree of restrictiveness, some concentrating on one channel, others on three or four; yet none of them aimed for a comprehensive approach, i.e., targeting as many services as possible.

Variations also existed in the integration of

social media into existing communication channels. Some police forces use social media in a *centralized approach*. This group regards their own website as the central hub for all important information with links to social media content. On their own website police forces stay in full control. They can thus more easily integrate new systems with information systems that are already in place. An alternative is the *modular approach* in which each tool has its own purpose and communication strategy; e.g., Twitter for real-time information or personal interactions, Facebook for long-term campaigns. We also found the conscious non-adoption of social media. These forces instead rely on communication through their website. Their objective is to stay in control of the content and presentation of information and to avoid dependence on private corporations which run social media services. For instance, commercial advertising next to crime reports can easily come into conflict with the messages and credibility of police forces (e.g., how acceptable are chain saw ads next to a message on a chain saw murder?).

*Interacting with the public: informational versus relational use*

The most common purpose of social media is still the dissemination of information to speed up and broaden the scope of traditional police work (*informational use*). The police inform citizens in real-time about recent crimes, traffic accidents, missing



people, stolen vehicles, suspects or arrests made. Generally, these messages are linked to requests for help from the public—with often very positive results. Yet, informational use is largely unidirectional ignoring the possibilities of direct public participation and feedback. Bringing the concept of community policing to social media, some forces therefore choose to interact with the public on a more local and personal level (*relational use*). For instance, many Dutch and British community officers have Twitter accounts on which they continuously report about their work and react to individual enquiries by citizens. Other police officers open offices in virtual space; they act as neighborhood officers in virtual worlds, such as Habbo Hotel or Second Life, and thereby become a personal contact point in both virtual and physical environments. Police officers report that relational use increases the public perceptions of transparency and accessibility and improves relationships with the public.

### Discussion and Implications

The complexity police forces face in entering the social media space is high—forcing difficult decisions internally as well as in relations to the public. The overview presented in this paper shows that there is little consensus across European police forces how to approach this problem. Despite this complexity, leaving the social media space entirely unoccupied is not an option. Bogus Twitter channels or Facebook

pages demonstrate only too clearly that if the police leave a gap, others will fill it. Also, public usage of social media will grow, whether or not police forces choose to deal with the phenomenon. The power of sharing in social developments and having a strong voice in popular public discussions should not be underestimated. We do not advocate a one-size-fits-all approach in dealing with social media. Yet given the need for European integration, we hope our report will support a more informed discussion of possible ways to approach social media in Europe's police forces.

### Outlook

In this report, we limited ourselves to an overview of current approaches to social media. In future studies we also aim to focus on the *impact* that disparate approaches have for police work. We further concentrated on social media as a means of communication. Yet, increasingly it is also a tool for investigations. These aspects will be part of future workshops and studies within COMPOSITE.

### Acknowledgements

We would like to thank our project partners for their contribution in this work and the police officers who participated in interviews, workshops and discussions. This research is partially funded by the European Commission in the context of the COMPOSITE project (FP7 contract no. 241918).

## RESEARCH REPORT:

# THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN

By



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**Keywords:** perception of crime, professional attitudes, public safety

Intrusion-safe security doors, CCTVs placed in parking lots, hallways and even in lifts. People resort to all sorts of security devices, they want to feel safe. But how can safety and security be defined? Why do people link some phenomena more than others to the perception of this asset? Trying to answer these questions, at least partially, can contribute to understand a very complex phenomenon – the fears that affect our society and that sometimes lead to unjustified alarmism or, even worse, to the constant search for an enemy.

Starting from the idea that knowledge makes things less ‘awesome’, I have conducted a study at Rome’s University La Sapienza (“Safety, security and the police forces - The opinions of a sample of police officers belonging to the Polizia di Stato”). The main innovation of this study is that it is centred on the analysis of the viewpoints of a group of police officers from the police headquarters in Bologna, the railway police in Milan and the traffic police in Rome, in their capacity both as police professionals and citizens.

Researchers, local and national policymakers, police forces and the public have been widely debating the issue of security for some time both in Italy and abroad. Our times are characterized by what some sociologists describe as ‘the paradox of contemporary societies’: although these are the safest times ever, the demand for safety and security keeps growing. In line with this increasing demand, the types of services requested and provided have changed on the basis of different needs at community level. Cities and neighbourhoods have become places where security - as distinct from traditional policing - has been reconsidered and tailored to the local needs.

### Bauman's three dimensions

In this time of change, one of the most prolific contemporary sociologists, Zygmunt Bauman, identifies three different aspects: *safety*, which has to do with personal safety and the risk of victimisation; *security*, which is linked to economic and social security, and *certainly*, which has to do with one's own beliefs as well as moral and ethical background. Based on this classification, Bauman suggests that it is necessary to adopt a comprehensive approach without focusing on either *safety* or *security*.

Based on the idea that the need for safety and security is typical of contemporary societies, this complex and multifaceted concept can be studied by analysing the many insecurities which characterize modern life. This means probing into the fears of contemporary society, the alarmism that spreads in larger cities and small towns, in a continuing process of deconstruction and reconstruction of the 'society of (in) security'. Feeling unsafe means facing a variety of social phenomena: crimes that jeopardize personal safety and property; phenomena undermining the people's existential certainties; the instability of the global market and rising unemployment, the anxieties linked to social change affecting the traditional family, education and social protection systems.

Most research concerning insecurity as perceived by the public, its causes and its possible connections to other phenomena is

not matched by studies involving security professionals such as judges, fire fighters or police officers. For this reason, we asked police officers to fill in a questionnaire and to take part in interviews in order to identify the phenomena (from petty crime to social unease) that are linked to the perception of insecurity in the cities (see table).


The study reveals that police officers have a balanced picture of insecurity, halfway between *safety* and *security*. In particular, their answers show that they are able to go beyond the mere policing approach, recognizing that not only crime but also urban decay, vandalism or antisocial behaviour are among the major causes of perceived insecurity.

### Petty urban crime, immigration and narcotic drugs

The preliminary analysis of the data reveals that the police officers point of view is in line with national surveys on perceived insecurity targeting citizens, according to whom petty urban crime (96.7%), illegal immigration (96.7%) and drug dealing and abuse (93.1%) are the main causes of social alarm.

Police officers in the study indicate illegal immigration as a major issue but distinguish between proper crimes and cases of social exclusion which often lead to migrants being recruited by criminal organizations. Petty crime and drug dealing and abuse are widespread products of modern





life and are the main concerns of the public. These offenses are more widespread in larger cities as compared to other crimes (such as murders) and are mostly committed by young people, thus causing increased social alarm.

### **Roma people, vandalism and urban decay**

Among the phenomena associated by police officers to perceived insecurity (over 90% in the table), three show very high percentages (over 80%), confirming that insecurity is not exclusively linked to crime but also to social behaviours that are typical of urban and local settings: Roma people (89.8%), vandalism and antisocial behaviour (83.8%) or urban decay (80.2%). In connection with the issues of Roma people and urban decay, police officers complain about the lack of social integration policies rather than expressing the need for further repressive and judicial measures. In their opinion, social exclusion can lead to offending. Moreover, vandalism and antisocial behaviour are not crimes, strictly speaking, but they are considered to be relevant for measuring perceived insecurity.

This trend is confirmed by other data in the study: mafia organizations (75.3%), international terrorism (61%) and prostitution (57.5%) show percentages that are similar to job insecurity (71.7%), economic crisis (67.2%) and loss of shared values (69.5%). In relation

to the latter, the analysis shows that for police officers social insecurity is more alarming than international terrorism or prostitution.

### **Terrorism, prostitution and violence in the media**

Almost ten years after 9/11 and the Madrid and London attacks, it should be highlighted that police officers no longer consider international terrorism as an impending threat but rather as part of routine prevention. This does not mean that the terror threat is being underestimated but rather that a terror attack is not considered as very likely and as something to be tackled on a daily basis. Noteworthy is the low percentage attributed by police officers to prostitution which usually is the subject of local government policies and campaigns. With respect to this, while the results of our study do not conflict with citizens' surveys according to which prostitution is never considered as a major cause of fear, they collide with the opinions of local policymakers.

For police officers, violence in the media (71.7%) is also closely linked to insecurity, a result which contradicts the surveys on public opinion. The breakdown of the family (46.8%), the crisis of politics (46.8%) and above all environment-related threats (36.5%) are not felt as alarming.

What these results reveal is that police officers, rather than focussing only on policing, tend to have an integrated approach to security. An approach that takes into account the various aspects of safety and security as well as the different needs of the citizens and the marginalised people and that engages different institutional actors. In fact, police officers are convinced that while petty crime is a police matter, urban decay requires good policies, although both phenomena fall within the scope of urban security.

This is an English version of the article published in *PoliziaModerna* n.11-2010, a journal of the Polizia di Stato.

# RESEARCH REPORT:

## THE GODIAC PROJECT

By

**MARIANNE HILTON**, GODIAC PROJECT MANAGER AND SWEDISH NATIONAL POLICE BOARD (RETIRED)



GODIAC stands for “*Good practice for dialogue and communication as strategic principles for policing political manifestations in Europe*” (GODIAC). This is a pan-European project, with financial support from the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union. The Swedish National Police Board is the project coordinator. There are 20 partner organizations in 11 European countries actively participating in the GODIAC project. These consist of 12 police organizations and eight research/educational organizations. The project runs from 1 August 2010 until 31 July 2013.

### Background

In recent years, several countries have seen an increase in the use of research-based knowledge in policing major events. The Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) and conflict reducing principles have shifted police focus from the use of equipment and vehicles towards contact building and negotiations between the police and demonstrators in order to facilitate peaceful political manifestations. In Denmark, “event-policing- and dialogue” is being developed; in Sweden there are dialogue police units; the German state of Lower Saxony uses anti-conflict managers; and, in the UK, engagement with the demonstrators is developing. This project was conceived during the CEPOL Research seminar on Public Order Policing in June 2009 as a means of increasing the exchange between different countries and between researchers and the police. At call for partners was announced at the seminar and also published in the first edition of the CEPOL Research Bulletin.



The project is run with the financial support from the Prevention of and Fight against Crime Programme of the European Union European Commission-Directorate-General Home Affairs HOME/2009/ISEC/AG/182

### Purpose

The purpose of the project is to identify and spread good practice for dialogue and communication as strategic principles in managing and preventing public disorder at political manifestations in order to uphold fundamental human rights and to increase public safe-

ty. The project aims to ensure that every perspective is represented and the project therefore integrates operative police work, research and training, making use of specific professional knowledge from these areas of expertise. This will support reaching a deeper understanding of the challenges in policing public disorder at political manifestations and help to build international and institutional networks.

### Research questions

The GODIAC project focuses on a set of overall research questions. These are:

- How can communication and dialogue strategies contribute to the prevention of public order disturbances or help to defuse tense situations in demonstrations?
- What are the motives of different kinds of protest groups? What are the different tactics and strategies that they use?
- What are the good examples of police strategies and tactics?

### Activities

One of the project's main activities is to carry out 10 field studies during political manifestations in different participating countries. During autumn 2010 and spring 2011, four field studies were carried out in Germany, Portugal, Austria and the UK. More field studies will be carried out in the coming year.

The GODIAC field study groups are made up of commanders, dialogue police, researchers and trainers from different partner countries. In this way, all the different perspectives that are represented in the project also work together in the field. The field study members are trained in the peer review method, a user-focused evaluation method and in modern crowd psychology, which means that all the participants have of the same level of understanding. One of the most interesting field observations so far has been the impact that the increasing use by demonstrators of mobile phones and different social media, like Facebook and Twitter, has on the outcome of the events. This is something which will be addressed and analysed further within the project.

In addition to field studies, the GODIAC project also organizes seminars and workshops for project participants in order to discuss results and developments. There are seminars for partner researchers and an interactive course for field study members on policing dissent in the globalised Europe is in development.


In order to facilitate the exchange of information and communication, project partners have access to the GODIAC platform, which has been developed on CEPOL's Internet based electronic environment.

## Results

The project will result in a number of reports that can be used for planning and training: field study reports, a booklet of European examples of good practice for dialogue and communication as strategic principles for policing political manifestations, research reports and a paper on peer-review methodology. Through these activities a European dimension of policing crowds at political manifestation will emerge.

A final conference will also be organised in Stockholm in the first half of 2013. All the partners as well as other international experts will be invited to the conference to discuss the project results and findings.

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## ESSAY: THE EVOLUTION OF THE HOME AFFAIRS POLICY AREA AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING: (N)EVER CLOSER UNION?

By

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### Introduction

The European Union has indeed gone far in giving itself institutions and bodies tasked with addressing various policy areas in which the Member States have chosen to cooperate and delegate sovereignty to varying degrees. The policy area of Home Affairs, which essentially addresses the issues of Security and Migration, is one of the most recent; while cooperation began more than 30 years ago through mechanisms of informal cooperation and information exchange networks, it has only recently become more in line with the “Community Method” as we had known it under the previous institutional (pre-Lisbon) configuration.

Moreover, this area has gained a tremendous prominence in recent years both in terms of the political agenda and in terms of its relevance in the domestic debates within Mem-

ber States; European integration has moved into areas which Member States feel as their basic prerogative: the provision of security.

In this context, law enforcement training as one of the ways by which European integration in the home affairs area can be achieved is a topic that needs to be analysed not only from a technical or scientific perspective, but also from a policy one. One of the purposes of this paper is an attempt to draw some preliminary conclusions on the state of affairs in this sector, and point out some of the more immediate challenges for and around law enforcement training.

Positions around Home Affairs issues appear however to be polarized in a manner which is not factual and even misleading: the pro-European rhetoric and its mantra somehow exaggerate the actual powers of the Union in this area on the one hand and often adopt resounding written statements of intent which are difficult if not impossible to apply in practice; on the other hand, the flag-wavers of national interest utilize the limitations and shortfalls of the EU (which obviously do exist) and use it to label the entire EU apparatus as a bureaucratic monster, hungry for more power, led by unelected technocrats and ontologically inefficient, thus making it the obvious scapegoat for all that is wrong in Europe at any given time. The result is the revival of populism and the withdrawal within national borders, which is exactly what the Union was founded to avoid. In the latter optic, multilateralism and Union-level instruments of law enforcement cooperation are just means to utilise occasionally as long as they are functional (or often subordinated) to the immediate national interest, while EU funding is perceived as a way to achieve national objectives with European money.

Truth evidently lies in none of these two extremes. With this paper, I intend to explore to what extent the "Integration Fatigue", which seems to have become almost an open insufferableness vis a vis the idea of an Ever Closer Union, has affected the Home Affairs policy area and its sub-areas. I will point out that a revision of EU mechanisms and even of the Treaties may be necessary; in a dedicated section, I will also try to outline the implications- and possible risks- associated with the ongoing debate over the future of European law enforcement training in light of Lisbon, the Internal Security Strategy and the Stockholm Programme. The attempts to strike a balance between an EU which is effective and one which is based on consensus has proven inadequate, in the eyes of many, to tackle the challenges of a world characterised by deeper and deeper interdependence.

The main question underpinning this paper remains whether, in the area of home affairs and in some of its specific articulations, we have actually got so close to the core of na-

tional sovereignty that new decision making mechanisms will have to be devised - or whether a regress to purely intergovernmental dynamics is instead appearing on the horizon. While circumstances suggest that the current model of integration has shown most of its limits in the sphere of home affairs, I will argue that there is still room for gradual progress in applying the existing instruments, perhaps rendering some of them more compatible with the former 1st Pillar decision making and model of administration before a further delegation of sovereignty by Member States is necessary. However, I will in parallel argue that, in order for the EU to be a real and effective player in the area of global security, such further delegation of sovereignty will in the near future be necessary, and that a significant forward leap is advisable even at this very stage in some selected areas of the policy domain under examination. This is evidenced when we look at the home affairs area from both an external and internal perspective: Europe will either step up to the challenge, or step off.

### **Brave New World, Not-So-Brave Institutions?**

On 1 January 2011, the new European External Action Service (EEAS) of the European Union came into existence after a long and much debated incubation phase which featured extensive negotiations between Member States, the European Commission, and the European Parliament. It was, undoubtedly, a major institutional development, possibly the most relevant reshuffling within the EU institutional architecture for decades.

The EU has given itself a new structure, a sui-generis Service which lies somewhere between an Institution and an Agency, whose staff is a mixture of the various staff types which populate the European public administration: permanent and temporary officials, contractual agents, national diplomats and seconded national experts; The new EEAS is meant to give more "punch" to the stated political aspirations of the EU as a political community and as a global power; among its functions is also the projection of the EU acquis in the area of justice and home affairs, which has become a policy area of growing significance since the Maastricht Treaty first formalized its existence as a domain of European integration.

However, the political profile of the EU during these first few months of a very tormented 2011 has been minimalistic to say the least. Four months which have seen natural catastrophes accompanied by an unseen wave of political turmoil in the Middle East (including a military intervention), measured against the already grim landscape of continued conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and waves of irregular migration are scaring Europeans and their governments. Growing international crime and its financial and po-



litical consequences, an ever galloping economic crises which has shaken the very lifestyle of Europeans, and a growing disaffection towards an EU which is schizophrenically accused of being a gigantic bureaucratic monster with Federalist ambitions and at the same time of being incapable of making itself be heard in times of crisis, are pushing the European integration paradigm as we have known it so far deep into a corner.

The European Commission Directorate-General for Home Affairs (DG HOME) was created on 1 July 2010 from the division of former DG Justice, Freedom and Security (DG JLS) into two Directorates-General, a move determined by the growing importance of policies related to this area in the work of the Union and the need for further specialisation and better division of labor - and a move which inherently recognises the need to develop, in parallel to greater security integration, a stronger approach to the safeguard of fundamental rights (for which the new Directorate General for Justice is responsible).

DG HOME focuses (in its own words) on two main priorities: ensuring European security and working towards an effective European migration policy encompassing the principle of solidarity. The Stockholm Programme 2010/2014 and its Action Plan constitute the main policy documents to implement these priorities, which of course include law enforcement cooperation in the

fight against crime and in particular organised crime. The mission statement of DG HOME specifically recognises that all home affairs policies have two dimensions, an internal and an external one; for this very reason the Directorate-General places great emphasis on enhancing dialogue and cooperation with third countries, to strengthen the position of the Union as an effective, active and reliable global player. Far from being solely a policy player, DG HOME manages a not negligible portion of the EU budget devoted to this area, amounting to approximately 6500 million euros, mostly however dedicated to migration, with over 749 million euros devoted to security.

The EEAS and DG HOME are of course only two of the key actors which help determine and execute the collective will of the EU; while the impact of DG HOME can be evaluated on the basis of its longer track record, it is indeed very early to even attempt a first evaluation of the EEAS' impact on EU foreign policy, including the external aspects of Home Affairs.

The signs are, however, not really encouraging at this stage: for example, the recent nominations (2010) of a significant number of heads of EU delegations, the first operated under the Lisbon framework, caused significant media concerns over the excessive politicisation of the appointments, with many national diplomats "parachuted" to delegations which seemed to be too immediately identifiable with the



sending state's foreign policy interests rather than dictated by competence or aptitude. As delegations manage a significant amount of EU cooperation funds (many dedicated to building the capacity of beneficiary country law enforcement agencies, both in terms of soft and hard assistance), this raised concern over a possible politicization of external aid.

In spite of this, the historical role of EU delegations (which were detached offices of the European Commission until Lisbon) has largely been a positive one also in the sphere of home affairs: in the area of enlargement, programmes such as PHARE, CARDS and IPA have contributed significantly in helping candidate countries fulfill the political criteria set out in 1993 in Copenhagen, which includes the creation of stable institutions capable of upholding the rule of law. Through the years, a plethora of EU advisers have been deployed in third countries under the umbrella of technical assistance projects managed by the Commission such as the Police Assistance Mission of the European Community to Albania (PAMECA), Council-led missions such as the various operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL PROXIMA, EUPAT etc), or "hybrid" operations such as EUBAM in Moldova and Ukraine. The vast majority of these non-military operations had the nature of integrated Rule of Law/Security Sector Reform projects with a significant training compo-

nent. PAMECA for example had, in its latest II and III editions, a specific portion of its budget dedicated to criminal investigations (with a prosecutor attached to the mission team heading the criminal justice component) or civilian/military cooperation with an expert tasked with reinforcing civilian control over maritime borders.

While not all of these projects or operations can be regarded as fully successful, they clearly indicate that home affairs has become increasingly important in the EU's external action, and that training and education have gained a fundamental relevance in the way the Union projects itself out of its geographical borders.

Taking a look at home affairs and its external projection represents a useful starting point to examine how the EU struggles to find a new balance in the post-Lisbon environment, as well as a general indication of the EU's prospective successes and failures in this area. An examination of home affairs and some of its specific sub-sectors also provide an opportunity to highlight strengths and weaknesses in what is often referred to as the "new European security architecture" in a changing world characterised by the fact that internal and external security are deeply intertwined.

### **Home Affairs: from Intergovernmentalism to the Community legal order**

It would be profoundly unfair, and even scientifically inexact, to downplay the importance of Lisbon in bringing justice and

home affairs in line with the general policy and lawmaking process of the Union. While many of the concrete effects and their magnitude are yet to materialize, progress is nevertheless evident in a historical perspective. When we examine, if briefly, the evolution of this policy area since the Treaty of Maastricht, we cannot help but realise the magnitude of the changes it introduced into our everyday lives; free movements of people within the Union being possibly the most visible of these changes. By taking a look at the early stages and the development of cooperation in this policy area, I will attempt to identify the tension between the perceived need to closely cooperate on one hand, and the reluctance to do so when Member States perceive a potential impact on sovereignty- or much more simply, when they perceive a loss of control over the decision making process over issues which are deemed closer to the "reserved domains" of Member States, notably security. A brief study of the early stages of home affairs integration will also highlight that those very tensions are far from gone, and they are in fact one of the key factors today preventing Europe from acting with one voice - or at least in vocal harmony - on internal and external security issues. The underpinning theme which can be derived from the available sources on the work of TREVI (mostly reports to parliamentary committees and a lesser number of other public documents)

is that while cooperation is indeed desirable, the prevailing tendency remained to favour intergovernmentalism and informality over the Community legal order even after the official introduction of the JHA policy area into the competence of the EU.

The blueprint for integration in the home affairs policy area is normally identified with the work of the TREVI Group created in December 1975 in Rome by the European Council, when Justice and Interior Ministry senior officials started gathering informally or on a "network" basis, at the margins of the EU to share information primarily on terrorism (sources related that the acronym itself stood in French for Terrorism, Radicalisation, Extremism and International Violence) as a reaction to an outburst of terrorist attacks affecting then Western Europe. While the concrete achievements of TREVI are rather difficult to measure due to the secrecy of its proceedings and outcomes (the existence of the group itself was not publicly revealed until 1989 with the *Palma* document), it had two noticeable effects, the first one being the "sparking" of a debate over how to best cooperate at the European level on questions inherent to justice and security by bringing for the first time those issues into the European agenda, at least procedurally; the second being the initiation of a slow spillover effect as TREVI expanded its competence (or rather, its interests) to wider

issues such as transnational security threats including organised crime.

It is interesting to note that TREVI functioned fundamentally on an intergovernmental basis through a structure of working groups underpinned by a secure fax communications system and included, *inter alia*, a working group on police training (disbanded in 1992, its work redistributed) and an ad-hoc group on EUROPOL was founded in 1992. These latter two groups could be considered as the historical precursors to EUROPOL of course, and CEPOL as well (which retained, to a great extent, the "networking" character of its early predecessor). TREVI's structure, though largely informal and intergovernmental, was far from minimalistic; it included in fact five working groups, respectively on terrorism (group 1), scientific and technical knowledge including police training (group 2); air transportation security (group 3, which in 1985 was restructured and its role redefined to take charge of aspects relating to organized crime and drug trafficking); nuclear safety and security (group 4); civil emergency (natural disasters and firefighting). Of these, only two were active since the inception of TREVI, notably groups 1 and 2, group 3 started working in 1985 under its new configuration, while groups 4 and 5 never met.

Particularly worthy of notice is the work of group 3, if not in terms of concrete deliverables, at least in terms of the themes it dealt

with and the contribution it has given to closer formal integration.

Group 3 was in fact given the competence to deal with many of the issues which have either been later incorporated into the former Third Pillar and the policy remit of DG Home Affairs, or have become the competence of EUROPOL from an operational (not executive) perspective.

Very interestingly, the Commission was invited to participate as observers to TREVI proceedings only from 1992 onwards; often, only to sections of the proceedings and in particular those held at a ministerial level every six months. The formalisation or incorporation of TREVI into stable EU structures had to wait until the entry into force of the Treaty of Maastricht, with the period 1992-1994 being a transitional one leading to the new pillar institutional architecture. Amsterdam and Lisbon changed of course the landscape, even dramatically.

### **After Lisbon: Working or Networking?**

Those readers familiar with the current set-up of home affairs within the European institutions will for sure realise how far the Union has gone from the TREVI days. These informal mechanisms have now been largely replaced either by creating new services within the European Commission or by delegating some of the tasks to executive and regulatory EU agencies staffed by a mixture of permanent, temporary or national seconded officials.

Some have argued that while networks are essentially preferable to hierarchical organizations and this is particularly true in the private sector or in highly technological environments, they are less suited to satisfy the needs (both operational and administrative) of public administration, which acts according to the principles of authority, leadership, and accountability; while this may or may not be among the key considerations that have led to the creation of agencies such as EUROPOL or FRONTEX, it is indeed a fact that this is what the landscape of home affairs has become in the European Union - and it is not because of the twisted aspirations of Eurobureaucrats wanting to create layers and layers of administration one on top of another; it is simply a natural dynamic that networks, as...networking intensifies and becomes a daily feature, needs to evolve into some form of more permanent structure which is able to supply the necessary degree of support, continuity and adherence to sector policies for its constitutive elements. The conversion of CEPOL from an essentially intergovernmental network based on an "associative" model into a fully-fledged EU agency is one of the examples of this; EUROPOL being another more recent one.

However, as recent events have shown, the "days of wine and roses" are yet to be forthcoming. The new powers afforded to EU institutions have not yet translated into a more coherent action on the ground. Ac-

tually, recent and current events indicate a certain degree of incapability of the EU to even apply those powers it already had prior to the changes introduced by Lisbon. Serious challenges still lay ahead, and the institutions themselves are still finding their own place - and a new *modus vivendi* - in the new political amphitheater that home affairs has become; while the co-decision procedure and qualified majority voting (with the noticeable exception of operational policing and the opt-outs of certain Member States) have now become the default decision mechanism for almost all policy areas, thus giving new powers to block or amend legislation on the side of the European Parliament, this mechanism appears to have become more and more often an occasion for institutions to flex their muscles; in addition, the preferred voting mechanism in the Council remains consensus, and the current rules do not encourage the disclosure of individual Member State positions. Already in February 2010, the European Parliament blocked the so-called Swift agreement between Europe and the US; it was approved only in July of the same year with substantial modification which however left many disappointed with some of its provisions which do not appear to be in line with EU data protection and privacy standards. While Lisbon was supposed to provide the famous "telephone number for Europe" which Henry Kissinger asked for more than 30

years ago, there is still a wide degree of discontent versus the issue of speaking with one voice in international fora when security matters are discussed. The noticeable absence of a unified position on the crisis in Lybia from the side of the EU is indeed a matter of concern, if we assume that the aspirations of the EU as a political entity go beyond expressing concern and consulting with stakeholders. The role of the permanent President and that of the High Representative for Foreign and Security policy are still much overshadowed by the role of the rotating presidency on one side, and of the European Commission on the other. The role of the EU home affairs agencies has surely grown in significance, but they are yet to be given the powers and the resources to be effective actors.

Ultimately, in spite of the renewed institutional framework and array of strategies elaborated to concretise the idea of a “European Security Model”, the anticipated “leap forward” is not yet visible. The operationalisation of the elaborated policy instruments appears to be painstakingly slow; a certain lack of substance in those documents would seem to indicate that consolidating the existing achievements shall be a more realistic target than embarking in new initiatives; however, recent debates over the inflow of refugees from the Middle East seems to indicate that even the Schengen Agreement (a pillar of one of the Four Freedoms on which the post-Maastricht Europe was built upon) is at serious risk.

### **The challenges and implications for European law enforcement training**

Again, taking a look at the history and pre-history of the home affairs policy area indicates a clear trend of integration from many angles- going from informal and intergovernmental to formalised and “communitarised” cooperation; from networks to a web of specialised agencies dealing with one or the other specialist field.

The simple change in the official language in EU documents as well as the denomination of some of its administrations. Whoever has ever handled any document with EUROPOL letterhead will immediately notice that while the official name in the EUROPOL Council Decision includes the word Police, the organization chooses to identify itself as the European *Law Enforcement* office). This denotes a shift that is at the same time operational and cultural. In many instances, and especially in the context of security, the word “police” has been substituted with the words “law enforcement”. Not casually, the Stockholm Programme explicitly utilises the word “Law Enforcement Training Scheme” to indicate the set of skills, knowledge and values which should form the common grounds for (again) a genuine European law enforcement culture. When reading the recently approved EU Internal Security Strategy (Council of the EU, February 2010), one would be relatively sur-



prised to even find the word "police" in the text- it is actually mentioned four times, versus 22 references to law enforcement.

A semantic or historical dissertation on the differences and similarities is way beyond the scope of this paper, which intends to remain mostly a policy one and not a research one; in addition, while the expression is understood across jurisdictions in an intuitive manner, in fact it cannot be translated with the same impact as its "older sister" in many languages; for instance, it is hardly possible to translate it into French or Italian. For the purpose at hand, it will suffice to say that law enforcement refers to that area of security which encompasses, in functional terms, the maintenance of public peace and order as well as the investigation and prosecution of crime; in organisational terms, it is normally understood as encompassing the police, customs, correctional services, border police or border guards, as well as the security services insofar as they deal with crimes which are also a national security threat. The prosecution services are normally excluded from this categorisation as they are often part of a distinct and autonomous order, whose independence is enshrined within national constitutions or basic laws; however, it is without a doubt that functionally speaking, it is hard not to include them, as their work is closely intertwined with those of the "proper" law enforcement agencies, which in turn are often

hierarchically or functionally subordinated to them in the performance of criminal investigations. Other providers of security as a service to the citizenry, such as the private sector and certain social services are normally excluded from this categorisation, as the "enforcement" component of this term normally refers to the exercise of coercive force, an element which is present in those actors to a much lesser extent. This however does not prevent us from involving those and other actors in a dialogue on law enforcement *training, research and education*, which must be more inclusive. The term "Police" has also of course evolved through the centuries, and even though in many EU Member States police services are in fact complex agencies involving multiple components and even contain security services or fire brigades within their organizational structures, it still denotes fundamentally those services tasked with the maintenance of public order and the investigation of crime.

A certain degree of confusion and assimilation between the two is not only understandable, but will remain for some time. However, it is becoming more clear, at the European level, that the policy accents are being increasingly put on the concept of law enforcement as an integrated area, in line with the working definition I have just highlighted; and while, again, some may be led to believe that the difference lies only in the semantics, the shift from police to

law enforcement is far from insignificant and is absorbing most of the cooperation efforts at the EU as well as the wider multilateral level. This of course is underpinned by the fact that our policy makers have realized - individually or institutionally - that as threats to the security of our states comes in multiple forms; the obvious response would sound more or less like "fighting organised crime through organised legality".

It is the job of our security structures - however we choose to call them - to adapt to reality, and not the other way around.

From the viewpoint of training design and delivery, there have been multiple signs of change through the years. Joint training sessions between police and prosecutors are becoming more and more frequent if not the norm, also given the growth of the role of the prosecutor in the management and conduct of investigations even in common law jurisdictions; the expression "Police polices, Prosecutors Prosecute" has become more and more obsolete if not irrelevant.

Customs and police cooperation have become the cornerstone of integrated border management, which is in turn one of the key EU policies at home and abroad; even in the UK, which cherishes its well-functioning, tried-and-tested law enforcement architecture, the Immigration Service has become the UK Border Service

and a National Crime Intelligence organisation has been created already years ago (NCIS, later SOCA). Financial intelligence units across Europe have often evolved into fully fledged law enforcement agencies with powers of judicial police.

At the EU level, as highlighted by the Director of CEPOL in his speech to the High Level conference on the future of European Law Enforcement Training in Brussels (18 May 2011), the creation of multiple legal and operational instruments with a distinct integrated outlook has grown significantly in the past few years and gives a very clear indication of the choices Europe has already collectively made, though not yet put fully into practice.

Critics of this approach would normally contend that police training at the EU level, of which CEPOL is the natural and historical prime actor, already features the participation of several agencies and are inherently multidisciplinary in their nature. While this thesis could be shared (to an extent), it remains without doubt that both CEPOL and European law enforcement training remain essentially police-centred in their decision making mechanism, conceptual approach, scope and target groups of the activities.

It is reasonable to estimate that opening the doors to the new training policy directions decided collectively by the EU, and specifically the design and implementa-

tion of a European law enforcement training scheme (once its outline and general content is identified) will indeed require much more work than simply extending more invitations to outsiders; it will require a new and somehow revolutionised approach both in conceptual and organisational terms; in spite of the well-known fact that law enforcement methodologies, approaches and skills are and will of course remain fundamentally characterized by national dynamics, the EU law enforcement official of 2030 will have a much different profile, and presumably, a new package of skills, knowledge and behaviours which will be much more harmonized with those of his colleagues across the continent.

One of the fields in which the necessity to create of a more harmonized European law enforcement professional culture is indeed evident is civilian crisis management, as I briefly touched upon in previous paragraphs. Police officers from the EU have been deployed around the globe in their thousands for many years; their tasks are now becoming less and less those of observers and increasingly identified with those of mentors and trainers for local police and law enforcement officers in the host countries or areas. The scope of EU "Peacekeeping" has expanded to include civil administration, police, military, and civil emergency; civilian crisis management missions are assuming the default shape of

rule of law missions, such as those in Kosovo (with a strength of almost 3000 personnel) and Iraq or Afghanistan; in those missions which remain essentially military ones such as the anti-piracy operation off the Somali coast (EUNAVFOR, with almost 1500 troops deployed) have significant civilian implications.

However, while a multiplicity of actors is already involved in pre-deployment training for law enforcement officers about to be dispatched to missions, there is no systematic approach at the EU level to equip those officers with a harmonized set of skills and values in order to ensure that EU policies, which especially senior mission staff is called to implement, are applied consistently across the board. In addition, the various missions are at the moment left alone in devising and implementing post-induction training for field staff. While the use of "Lessons Identified" is indeed increasing within the former Council units now transferred "en bloc" to the EEAS, there seems to be a lack of a unified approach in recascading those lessons back to the field and incorporating them into the mission planning process. European law enforcement training necessarily will have to take into account the above scenarios.

Consequences this cultural shift from police to law enforcement can also be reasonably expected to affect the somehow still mysterious domain of police science, de-



defined in 2007 by CEPOL as "the scientific study of Police as an Institution and Policing as a Process"(Final Report- Perspectives of Police Science in Europe). If we accept the principle that, at the European level, the emphasis shall be placed on law enforcement, the consequences may go beyond the semantics; at a minimum, this may require expanding the field of research and study to a wider range of disciplines and institutions, with an emphasis on the plural.

The question of whether all existing police academies in the Member States are either equipped or prepared at a comparable level for such a step, is another issue for debate: while many academies have for years embraced a scientific approach mixing education, research and training, others remain essentially training institutions (within the meaning outlined the CEPOL Glossary in 2005); while certain academies have the possibility of acting as a "focal point" bringing together all or most of the law enforcement community for the purpose of devising training strategies and products, it is realistic to believe that many others do not have the capacity or the mandate to do so. To the same end, the ongoing debate over the future of European law enforcement training may imply a recasting of the CEPOL decision to render the agency more apt at translating EU policy into practice, building of course on the achievements of the past, but giving itself a new governance and programming platform. In particular, a renewed drive for innovation and a faster and more efficient capacity to conceive and implement programmes shall be given proper consideration.

Of course, the changes described above cannot happen overnight and will not happen without some sort of stimulus, taking into consideration the inclusion of a much wider range of contributors to the conception of programmes and a much wider target audience benefiting from European schemes, again in line with the "predictions" of CEPOL in the study previously referred to (p.148), for example mixing law enforcement and non- law enforcement students; as well as other categories identified in the Stockholm Programme). The time to start preparations is now- if indeed the collective will remains that of a European Union funded on collective security.

### **Conclusions: towards a real Political Entity on Security issues?**

It is self-evident that the European Union can only be what its Member States want it to be – this is a truth that not even the most fervent Eurofederalist could ever deny. Human society has not yet devised another form of organization which is more suited than nation states; it has however progressed so much in terms of making sure that all these

nation states are tied together in a web of relations which, in the majority of the cases, forces them to act according to commonly accepted behaviors. Furthermore, post-1945 institutions such as the United Nations have created a new series of customary and codified legal norms and instruments which regulate the peaceful existence of communities. The question for Europe is whether this is enough, and the question is even more urgent when discussing security, one of the fundamental human needs at societal and individual level. Furthermore, a matter of values is also involved here; and values are also, if not primarily, transmitted through training and education.

The EU is indeed the creation of the independent and sovereign will of its Member States. But the corollary to this statement of facts is that sovereignty can be limited and portions of it delegated to a superior or external entity; it can indeed be a scary perspective for many, and the full implications of it are not fully understood until they are actually put to the test. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the mechanism will actually work: like all forms of societal organizations, cohesion and survival are assured by a mix of adherence to written norms, spontaneous self-constraint and a belief in the inherent values of the society we elect to join. Yes, it does imply a leap of faith, and like citizenship at its best, it requires full participation. "Decisions are taken by those who show up", in the words of Josiah Bartlett, a famous fictional American president interpreted on screen by actor Martin Sheen.

While there are many intermediate steps yet to be taken before the EU can say for certain that another revision of the Treaties is necessary, the signs are there already - they just need to be read with an open mind. The risk of not doing so is to revert to pre-Maastricht scenarios or even worse, creating a "Europe on Paper" made up of rhetorical statements and no drive towards the Ever Closer Union designed by our founding fathers. An EU that exists only on paper, given the current threats of economic decline, security challenges and continued internal fragmentation on fundamental political and operational choices, and being the EU hostage of turf wars between its institutions and menaced by the re-vamping of intergovernmentalist tendencies, is perhaps more damaging than a Europe which actually functions as it is currently designed to- with all its imperfections.

*ESSAY:***RESEARCH AND SCIENCE - STRENGTH OF CEPOL?<sup>1</sup>****By**

**RISTO HONKONEN**, DR., HEAD OF RESEARCH, FINISH POLICE COLLEGE, TAMPERE, FINLAND, CHAIR OF CEPOL RESEARCH AND SCIENCE WORKING GROUP (UNTIL DECEMBER 2011)



In the headline of this article there is a pinch of paradox. How could research and science be a strength of CEPOL since it is not the task of CEPOL to do research? In his recent writing (2011), however, János Feherváry referring to the CEPOL's five year external evaluation report says that research and science activities are accepted as essential elements of CEPOL's core business. Actually, I feel the same, but let's take a closer look on these issues.

There is not one homogenous and unanimous police force. Instead there are different tribes, different mindsets, and different ways of actions. Also the conceptions about the needed vocational knowledge and about the role of academic education and research as a part of it vary considerably. Thus, the core activity of CEPOL, educating senior police officers, is a contradictory matter too.

In a study that was carried out in the Finnish Police College few years ago experienced senior officers were interviewed about the knowledge base that is needed in the senior officer's work. We noticed that there exist roughly two alternative ideas of the senior officer's competence. On one hand, some of the experts emphasised experiential knowledge saying that inherent traits and experience are of crucial importance for a senior officer. Training should not be theoretical, but emphasis should be in existing work practices and detailed sector knowledge. They also took the view that basically the work remains more or less the same as before.

On the other hand, many of the experts strongly stressed theoretical knowledge. They said that higher education is of crucial importance for a senior officer. Knowledge becomes obsolete fast and thus it is not important to teach detailed practical knowledge

<sup>1</sup> This article has been also published in: CEPOL (ed.): Anniversary Reflections — a decade of European cooperation in police training. Bramshill 2011

but larger theories. Thus more general knowledge is needed. There is constant need to learn more and abilities to find, create and use new knowledge are needed.

Naturally, this is a simplification. The aim of higher education, also in the field of the police, is to improve practice - not to replace it. In real life (often tacit) knowledge from practice and more theoretical academic knowledge complement and sometimes challenge each other. Anyway, proper higher education seems to be impossible without a steady scientific basis.

### **What is this thing called Police Science?**

In their excellent book del Barrio Romero et al. (2009) analysed the background and nature of European Police research. The book is a final report of the CEPOL Project Group on a European Approach to Police Science that is also known as the Jaschke Group according to its chairperson professor Hans-Gerd Jaschke. Here I would like to add something about the context where police research and science is carried out. Namely, CEPOL itself does not carry out research (The Council Decision (2005) establishing CEPOL). Instead, the research within CEPOL is realised in the Member States' education and research institutions. As it is mentioned in the book, there are certain differences depending on whether the research is realised within the police organisation or at universities and research institutions outside the police.

The traditional police training or education institutions are nowadays often also research institutions. That is the case regarding the Finnish Police College too. On the grounds of my experience as a researcher and research director in the College, I can say that doing research within police organisations is often challenging. The people working in a police organisation naturally have often limited knowledge about empirical science and the basic nature and values of the scientific activity. The need for and justification of research is often questioned, which I (naturally) have never experienced when working in my academic home, the Tampere University.

So, police research is often done in an unconventional environment which often has almost no scientific tradition. Gibbons et al. (1994) call the research that is carried out in non-university environment as Mode 2 knowledge production. By this they want to embody the difference to traditional university research that they call Mode 1 research that is generated in disciplinary context.

In a university setting problems are set and solved in a context governed by the, largely academic, interests of a specific community. By contrast, outside universities knowledge production is carried out in a context of application. The context includes a heterogene-

ous set of practitioners, collaborating on problems defined in a specific and localised context.

Due to the context, the access to existing data is often easier near the practice (Mode 2) compared with academic environment. The knowledge produced outside the university is intended and expected to be rather directly useful to somebody whether in industry, or government, or society more generally.

The question of quality control is essential in science. For example, in the Finnish Police College, to large extent we determine quality by traditional academic standards such as peer review judgements. However, we have other more practical criteria too, such as if the knowledge produced serves practical needs. Thus quality control becomes more context- and use-dependent. Scientific truth is crucial, but also usefulness in terms of contribution to the practice.

This does not, however, mean that research is not theoretical. According to Gibbons et al. (1994) there is lot of evidence that theories are often developed in the context of application. Actually, research near practice is characterised by a constant flow back and forth between the fundamental and the applied, between the theoretical and the practical.

Thus, for a researcher it is an advantage to have the chance to work near practice.

However, we have to be aware of the risks too. What will happen to the traditional academic independence that is precondition for the existence of critical approaches that are essential especially in social sciences? Does the, often very positive and necessary, close contact with practitioners and need for applicable knowledge blur the eyes of researchers and cause near-sightedness that becomes an obstacle for creativity and innovation?

One solution to these problems or challenges would be to have and maintain close contacts and large networks with the traditional, disciplinary and academic researchers and institutes. This is something that might be borne in mind when developing CEPOL research related activities too.

As far as I have any understanding of the nature of police research and science, it does not belong either to Mode 1 or Mode 2 type. Instead it is situated between them trying to combine the benefits of being near the practice with the good traditions of the academic world.

### **Member State Research Unit Perspective**

In line with the conclusion above, in the recent Research Strategy the Finnish Police College expressed its wish to become an internationally respected and credible research institute. We are aware of the challenges that we will have ahead of us. However, I dare to say that in many respect we

already have a strong potential to realise the goal.

In order to reach the target, three main factors have been pointed out. Firstly, we want to actively develop the know-how and resources of the research activities in the College. We, for example, strongly stress the academic qualifications in the recruitment of new research personnel and also want to encourage our teaching and research staff to improve their academic qualifications.

Secondly, we strongly rely on academic standards and want to maintain a high scientific level. As a part of the national police organisation, we are often reminded of the practical nature of the police work, which naturally is very true. We however believe that high quality research gives more added value to the practice than would a less ambitious approach. In practice maintaining the high quality means for example high ethical standards, independence regarding the research results, openness and quality assurance, peer-reviewed publications, and co-operation with other high level research institutions.

Thirdly, we want actively contribute to the practical usefulness of research and application of the results in the practice. The means for this aim, we are developing the research agenda (doing the right things); increasing the use of the European police research approach, and developing communication about the research results.

In realisation of these ideas and goals CEPOL will be, and has already been, very useful. For a small country that does not have a strong tradition and networks in police research, such an agency working as a network is a great resource. As Fehérváry (2011) pointed out in his aforementioned publication, during the ten first years CEPOL has been able to bring research units/departments and researchers closer together, disseminating findings and transferring them to training and policing, and developing European police science approach. All this is essential from the point of view of a police education and research institution such as the Finnish Police College and respective institutions in many other countries.

### **Research and Science Working Group**

My contribution to CEPOL has mainly taken place through Research and Science Working Group (RSWG). This is an expert group that was set up 2007 consisting of 10 research experts from various EU Member States. The group has a clear and defined remit. Every now and then there has been discussions on the need for such standing working groups. No organ is an end in itself. This is true regarding the CEPOL Research and Science Working Group too. Actually, there are always good reasons to critically reflect the existing ways of doing things. Thus, the discussion is a positive phenomenon showing the vitality and adaptability of the organisation.



When writing this, the administrative structure of CEPOL is under reconstruction. At the moment, however, it seems or at least this is my feeling that Research and Science Working Group or another body as a standing expert (not representative) group will be considered to be necessary in the future too. Since the research and science expertise in the CEPOL secretariat is limited, it seems that such a group will be needed to serve CEPOL and facilitate police research activities in Europe. Despite the important achievements so far, there is still a lot to be done. At the moment we are only on the first steps.

### **Future Agenda**

Before going to the concrete future assignments, a few words about two recent documents, namely the Five-year External Evaluation and CEPOL Strategy. Among other decisions and documents, these give a background for the future plans regarding research and science related activities within CEPOL.

#### *Five-year External Evaluation*

In order to orientate to the correct direction in the future, a rear mirror view is needed too. We have a fresh external evaluation report (CEPOL 2011) that gives us a knowledge base for the future work, including in the field of research and science. The evaluation report indicates strong support and need for research and science among the Member States. The assessment

of CEPOL's research and science activities was positive. It was a great pleasure to recognise that nowadays there are only very few people in CEPOL who think that research and science activities are unnecessary for the agency.

One conclusion from the evaluation - and this does not concern research and science activities only - is the need for a more integrated thematic approach for the CEPOL programme activities. There are good reasons to take this into account in the selection of the themes within research and science activities too. This in its part will guarantee the best possible input from research and science to the learning activities within CEPOL. Having limited resources, the efforts should be concentrated to the topics that will be assessed to be the most relevant and natural to the agency. In practice this will have influence especially to the themes of research and science events and publications.

#### *CEPOL Strategy*

The CEPOL strategy is an ambitious document bringing up such things as the high level international excellence; recognised and valued CEPOL's qualifications; qualified teachers, trainers, and tutors; and creation of an intellectual environment. Naturally, such high level education cannot be achieved without a steady scientific foundation. The document also expresses that the home for European police science shall be CEPOL.

The CEPOL strategy has direct and practical implications for the CEPOL research and science activities. Among other things, CEPOL aims to become the driving force of Police science and researchers; the European approach will be further developed; a researchers' community and network will be built; and outstanding research work will be awarded. In order to guarantee the concrete implementation of the strategy, the Research and Science Working Group has formulated a strategic action plan that will work as a living document directing the future activities of the group.

In the following, I will take up some assignments that will be realized in the future. The selection is not complete and not all of the matters are new ones. This is rather a selection of the examples of the activities that has already been carried out or planned in the Research and Science Working Group as means to realise CEPOL's goals:

- **Next Step for the "Jaschke"-Group:**

The topic of the 2012 research and science conference will be "Proceedings in European Police Science". In order to implement the aims of the strategy there will possibly also be a new project group on European police science now concentrating in particular on the future challenges and future research agenda.

- **Research and Science Conference to become a flagship event for CEPOL:** This annual conference that started in 2003 has become an important event within the European police research and science community. In the future the aim is to open it to a wider audience too. Thus the importance of the event will increase further and allow CEPOL to open its doors to the wider academic world.
- **Workshops** (earlier called symposia): This new form of events was launched in 2009. These events actively facilitate the research activities and the implementation of the results into police practice within the selected themes. The start has been promising and there are good reasons to go on in utilising and developing the concept further.
- **The network of Research and Science Correspondents:** This has already become an important resource for CEPOL in education and research matters. Through the creation of the national implementation plan there are good opportunities to make the Correspondent network an even better resource for CEPOL and the member states.
- **New Publication Series:** This is a new initiative that was thought up in the working group meeting in



Trakai Lithuania in April 2011. The main idea is to develop a European overview and comparison on police research findings.

- **E-library:** This is an existing system, but there is still much to be done in order to increase the use of this resource for the benefit of education, research, and development.
- **European Police Research Bulletin:** A publication that started 2009. This has proved to be a good way to disseminate and receive information on various police research matters. The Research and Science Working Group is in charge of the editing and developing of the bulletin.
- **European Police Research and Science Award:** This is due to become an important European honour in the field.
- **Researchers' database:** There have been very innovative ideas about how to realise this item of the CEPOL strategy. The Research and Science Working Group is going to work on this topic in the near future.

### **Finally: the Justification and Role of Research and Science in CEPOL**

As can be seen from the above, research and science is, at the moment and even more in the future, a strength and core business of CEPOL. At the 10 year anniversary, I was happy that I have had the chance to be a part of the story - the story that will go on towards even bigger achievements. Kippis!

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# E-Library News

The European Police College is running the e-Library, a web-based knowledge repository, which supports archiving, sharing and disseminating of any knowledge documents of relevance for police training and education in the wider European context. It serves to fulfil the task of disseminating research findings and best practice in support of high-level police training and education. CEPOL is committed to acknowledge outcomes of research projects and scientific studies, which could be relevant for the various aspects of policing in education and practice and the improvement of it. In the so called “Scientific Collections” of the e-Library researchers and scientist from all EU Member States and EU Institutions can share their projects, studies and findings. Apart from storing bibliographical information of diverse forms of publications, even a digital version when copyright allows, there is also information about police related research projects, either completed, on-going or in planning.

CEPOL invites academics and experts from the EU Member States in particular, to share their, research findings and scientific projects with their peers on a European level, by submitting their reports, articles, books, or PhD thesis for inclusion in the e-Library, especially if it features a comparative or European aspect. Contributions in all languages of the European Union are accepted, as long as an English translation of the title and a meaningful English abstract are provided.

While the e-Library holds non-classified material only, the access is not public at the current stage. If you would also like to contribute to this unique European police knowledge project, please contact us ([research.bulletin@cepol.europa.eu](mailto:research.bulletin@cepol.europa.eu)), and you will be put in touch with the CEPOL National Research and Science Correspondent of your EU-country about the procedures and details.

A selection of recent entries with full-text in the scientific collections of the e-Library

<i>Ditrich, Hans</i>	Does "Forensic Science" Exist?
<i>ENISA</i>	Cyber-Bullying and online Grooming: helping to protect against the risks -A scenario on data mining / profiling of data available on the Internet
<i>European Agency for Fundamental Human Rights</i>	National Human Rights Institutions in the EU Member States: Strengthening the fundamental rights architecture in the EU I
<i>Fredin, Gunilla</i>	Children as Eyewitnesses: Memory recall and face recognition
<i>Granér, Rolf; Skoglund, Peter; Mikkonen, Maria</i>	Anmälningar mot poliser, en kartläggning (Complaints against police officers - an inventory)
<i>Hermann, Dieter/ Laue, Christian</i>	Urban Structures and Crime
<i>Jakubowicz, Linda</i>	Migration and Security - an Unusual Perspective?
<i>Kirchengast, Sylvia</i>	Minimum body height requirements for police officers - an international comparison
<i>Lindström, Peter</i>	Fler poliser - färre brott? (More police officers - less crime?)
<i>Mutttilainen, Vesa</i>	Talousrikollisuuden kehityssuunnat ja toimintaympäristö 2000-2009 (Development trends of economic crimes in 2000–2009)
<i>Pfahl-Traugher, Armin</i>	Potential Risks of Politically Motivated Violence - A Comparative Analysis
<i>PriceWaterhouseCoopers Belgium</i>	How does organised crime misuse EU funds?
<i>Susi, Mika</i>	Terrorismin rahoitus (Perspectives on Terrorism Financing)
<i>van Ewijk, Anne R.</i>	Diversity in uniform : An exploration of diversity and a comprehensive analysis of the regional police forces in Catalonia and Utrecht

## Upcoming Conferences, Meetings, Symposia, and Seminars

### **Seminar International Police Cooperation**

*“Under the Looking Glass:*

*New Perspectives on Theory, Methodology and Empirical Research “*

Date: 15 December 2011

Place: VU Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands

### **2012 Annual CEPOL Police Research & Science Conference**

*“Proceedings in European Police Science”*

Date: September 2011 tbd

Place: tbd

### **European Society of Criminology (ESC) 12th Annual Conference**

Date: 12-15 September 2012

Place: Bilbao

*The European Police Science and Research Bulletin will publicise announcements of events that are relevant for the development and advance of police research and police science from a European perspective. Please send all information in time to [research.bulletin@cepol.europa.eu](mailto:research.bulletin@cepol.europa.eu).*

# EUROPEAN POLICE RESEARCH AND SCIENCE BULLETIN

## ISSUE 6 - Winter 2011/2012

### Contributions to the Bulletin

Readers of the Bulletin are kindly invited to make **submissions** and to share outcomes of recent research, information about research departments or calls for cooperations in research projects.

For a full list of invited contributions and more information about the Bulletin please visit our **website** on:

**[www.cepola.europa.eu/index.php?id=science-research-bulletin](http://www.cepola.europa.eu/index.php?id=science-research-bulletin)**

Potential contributors invited to download the *Manuscript Submission Guidelines*, which can be downloaded from the website.



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