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# EUROPEAN LAW ENFORCEMENT RESEARCH BULLETIN

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# Introduction by the Executive Director

Detlef Schröder



Dear Reader,



We have seen in the last decade a constant and very dynamic change in the threat landscape of internal security in Europe.

Before 2014, there has been not such a relevant discussion round a massive problem with illegal migration into Europe. In the last years this topic became the decisive factor for elections in many EU Member States and on the European level.

Almost at the same time we have been facing an unprecedented wave of terrible terror acts across several EU Member States. These terrorist attacks have been directly linked to or inspired by extreme forms of Islamic radical ideologies.

Recently we have to notice equally a growing threat of extremism and terrorism from right wing oriented groups.

From the perspective of technology, digitalisation and all crime phenomena linked to it, are evolving equally very dynamic and we can predict - with full rollout of 5G, Internet of Things, Artificial Intelligence and maybe driverless cars – that law enforcement needs to invest on a massive scale to prepare our officers for all these new challenges.

In a geographical perspective, there are still several countries in close neighbourhood to Europe in an unstable, almost warlike status or maybe to be considered as failed states, (e.g. Libya and Syria). The situation in all these countries has already and will have for sure in the future a knock-on effect on the security situation in Europe.

And not to forget the topic of BREXIT. Here we will experience the real impact most likely only in the years to come.

Unfortunately, all these emerging challenges from the recent years add only up to all our traditional challenges in law enforcement, e.g. various forms of serious and organised crime, various forms of mobile criminal groups, environmental crime, corruption, and so on.

However, regardless of the dynamically evolving threat landscape, the citizens of the European Union can expect for good reasons results from the law enforcement communities to deliver on security in an open and free Europe. Even when law enforcement cultures are often described as being quite conservative, I do trust that we will take this as an opportunity to showcase that our services can adjust as fast as possible to deal in a pragmatic way with the full landscape of challenges.

This requires that all organisations and services engaged in the law enforcement cooperation constantly scrutinise their preparedness, their processes and procedures and their results achieved to aim for a further improvement. I am well aware that this may sound too easy and simplistic. However, understanding the still fractured landscape of law enforcement services in Europe and their very diverse operational and legal conditions on the national level, it is obvious that we as law enforcement communities in Europe are by now to be as agile as required under the described scenarios.

Here I would like to highlight two examples of the mechanisms and tools on the EU level, which are useful for moving forward to get up to speed in this dynamic environment.

The European Union has already decided to upgrade the various EU IT systems on internal security so that they will be fit for the future purpose. Additionally the EU is ambitious to add in the coming years a new, to be developed, interoperability package, to these systems. The aim is to enable that an end user will receive results from all searchable EU databases in this context and the data systems can mutually support and complement each other. Everyone who was engaged into the development of national law enforcement databases can imagine how ambitious this will be on European level.

In this case the European Commission, the leading agency euLISA, supported by FRONTEX, EUROPOL and CEPOL, are all strongly committed to bring the revision of the existing data systems and the new interoperability package forward.

From the perspective of CEPOL as law enforcement training provider it is essential that we do not underestimate the importance of a sufficient support to our end users by training components, when we roll out such improved or new large scale IT systems. Only when the end users are fully aware of the potential and limitations of such systems, they are in a position to apply and fully utilise the expected advantages. Here the major burden in relation to the training for the new systems needs to be carried by national structures. However, a strong support from the EU level, e.g. provided by CEPOL, could be most useful to harmonise the usage and application of the systems across Europe.

Now we are still in ongoing consultations to receive the necessary means for such an important task to provide those services in due time to all Member States. However, we are fully committed to team up with our partner Justice and Home Affairs agencies and with our partners from the Member States to contribute to the success of this important development.

As a second example, I would like to elaborate in short how we are constantly adjusting our business scope and our processes to the changing environment. When CEPOL started its existence as an EU agency back in 2006, the services offered were focussed on senior police officials to facilitate a common platform for contacts and to raise awareness of the tools and instruments of police cooperation in Europe. CEPOL has seen different steps in evolution of the mandate and as well on its business volume and focus. In the current status CEPOL delivers services to the different law enforcement communities in Europe based on priorities identified with data from sound training needs assessment tools. The agency brings the different professional communities closer together and has moved with its scope very close to the direct support of operational needs in cross-border cooperation of our services. This is not only evidenced that we have dedicated over 40 % of our resources to the engagement in the different EMPACT priorities. The challenges described earlier are included in our constant environment scan and the strategic aim to offer excellent tailor-made services to our partners in the EU Member States. We strive towards excellence across our services. This is underlined by achieving ISO 9001 certification for the management of our residential and online services and by the achievement of ISO 29993 certification for selected training services.

In our organisation, like in many other law enforcement training institutions, we do need to constantly evaluate our training services. This is not always easy or simple, especially as we have to operate, like many of our partners from Member States, with rather very limited resources. Additionally, the bureaucratic requirements for an EU agency do not necessarily provide a very convenient basis for innovation and constant business adjustment. However, over the last decade we have already delivered several innovative services, e.g. webinars, online-courses, European Joint Master Programme, online library with a large volume of electronic journal and electronic books and successful models of blended learning.

All the success in the recent years was only possible based on very trustful and committed cooperation with our partners from the Members States and the EU institutions.

As our latest innovation I am proud that we could open in June here in Budapest the CEPOL Cybercrime Academy. Taking into account the upcoming challenges for the law enforcement communities in Europe on cybercrime and digital competences, it is vital that we now have the infrastructure in place to service the communities in the future on a larger scale.

We can now train on a very modern technical platform up to 100 participants in one seminar or course. The results of our operational training needs assessment on cybercrime has revealed that approx. 160.000 officials from our law enforcement communities require training on this topic. And I do personally expect that this demand will grow for sure in the next years.

I am also looking forward that we can bring our new electronic learning platform live by 2020.

So in summary, a constant re-arrangement of our approach on law enforcement training is required in this challenging dynamic environment. Already by now, as described, several developments on European level are on the way to support our communities.

However, this will require in the future an even closer link to research and science and to academic institutions, seeking their input and in support of delivering the best possible services for the European citizens.

Sincerely,

Dr. h.c. Detlef Schröder



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# Editorial

The articles of issue Nr. 18 of the European Law Enforcement Research Bulletin (formerly known as the European Police Science and Research Bulletin) have been made available to the public online already since February 2019. Similar as with other major publishers, the aim of the “online-first” release is to let readers access the finished article, as soon as it has passed the review and editorial processes: all the latest articles are released at the Bulletin’s homepage at <https://bulletin.cepol.europa.eu>, where readers can register for notification of the release of the next issue and authors can submit new papers. However, the final production of the complete issue for the printed and finished online edition always takes a bit of extra time.

In this issue, overall eight articles will address a variety of aspects driving modern law enforcement development in Europe and in European countries.

The first contribution by **Coaffee, de Vries & Hadjimatheou** summarises the outcome of the H2020 programme research project MEDI@4SEC, which has been looking at the potentials and future roadmap for the role of social media in policing and other law enforcement efforts. While they spell out the new opportunities for investigations, intelligence and in particular for community-oriented policing and communication with the public at large, they as well make aware of potential risks and point at the often thorny issues of securing sufficient resources and training, when innovation is on the agenda.

An exemplification of the obstacles good new ideas in policing have to overcome sometimes is the story **Evangelos Stergioulis** can tell about the “roller-coaster ride” of trying to get community policing introduced in Greece. Again, (lack of) training and resources are raised as critical points.

**Phelps, Kudlacek, Karatrantos & Theofilopoulos** continue the thread, by adding the aspects of hate crime and violent extremism, emerging under the migratory and economic pressures the country has been subjected to. They provide analytic insights from a counter-radicalisation workshop held with officers from various law enforcement bodies and by that, bring practitioners’ experiences and perspectives to the fore.

The theme of “exploring the views of experts in the field” continues in **Kaasik & Tong’s** article about their research into the Schengen Evaluation Mechanism, which delivers a rare empirical insight into one of the quite practical arrangements of the European Union of achieving and securing its objective of being an area of freedom, security and justice. The reader might take note that this contribution is based on one of the successful master thesis of CEPOL’s European Joint Master Programme.

The next two articles are highlighting two emerging crime phenomena of modern times, one happening literally “on the streets”, the other with a wider, geo-political background and impact, but seem to be strangely linked by the hyper-modern connectedness and the associated life-styles of the younger generations. **Brown, Thompson, Pepper & Ryan** report on the increase of a “snatch offense”, where mobile phones are taken from unsuspecting victims and the evenly mobile young offenders are taking opportunistic advantage of crammed inner-city traffic settings. **Arje Antinori**, in contrast, reviews the evolving complexities and “hybridization” of the Jihadist threat and emphasizes the urgency for EU law enforcement to keep up with cyber-realities of the global digitally native “millennium generation”.

The two concluding contributions deal each with a specific law enforcement tool and how its potential and actual use and implementation is perceived among law enforcement professionals in Portugal: **Barbosa Marques & Milne** examine how the “Cognitive Interview” as an investigative technique is assessed among the law enforcement professions of investigators, prosecutors and judges. To their disappointment, they find a considerable discrepancy between what the academic knowledge advises and what officers actually tend to do in practice and call for an institutional move for implementation of “best practise” in the Portuguese case. How they perceive (the prospective introduction of) body-worn cameras for officer duty on the street and the impact this technology might have, is explored in **Morgado & Alves’** contribution amongst a small officer sample.<sup>1</sup>

If there is one commonality between the contributions to this Bulletin, than it is that they all deal with (recent) innovation in law enforcement, may it be on the technological, organisational or procedural level. It is equally noteworthy that almost all the authors point out either the risk or the evidence of a lack of sufficient training and resources, to achieve the new measure promised gains.

Finally, we have to inform the reader that the term for Justyna Jurczak, Barbora Vegrichtová and Peter Neyroud as editors of the Bulletin has ended. Their honorary commitment to this publication project has been invaluable and his highly appreciated.

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<sup>1</sup> The articles by Antinori, Barbosa Marques & Milne and Morgado & Alves are based on initial papers to the 2017 CEPOL Research & Science Conference in Budapest. In this regard, see also the forthcoming Special Conference Edition Nr. 4 of the Bulletin.

New member of the team since last year is Gurchand Singh.



**Gurchand Singh** is the Chief Information Officer at the Department of Justice and Equality in Ireland. He has responsibility for, amongst other things, the Departments research and data analytics programme. Previous to this role, Gurchand worked in An Garda Síochána, Ireland's national police service, where he helped establish the Garda Síochána Analysis Service. This provided research and data analytics to inform strategic policing and support operational activity. The work of the Analysis Service has been recognised nationally within Ireland. Prior to arriving in Ireland, Gurchand worked in the Home Office in the United Kingdom. He had responsibility for the Home Office's research programme in various areas, including Crime and Drugs Analysis and Research. Amongst his

other roles, Gurchand is also a board member CeADAR, the National Centre for Applied Data Analytics and Machine Intelligence, which is associated with University College Dublin.

The Bulletin Editors

# ARTICLES

# Enhancing Public Security Trough Use of Social Media: the good, the bad and the ugly

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### Abstract

*This paper focuses upon the emerging findings of a recently completed Horizon 2020 project -MEDI@4SEC: The Emerging Role of New Social Media in Enhancing Public Security. Working actively with police forces across Europe, MEDI@4SEC has created a future roadmap for the role of social media in law enforcement and public security planning, not only for communication purposes and as a listening platform, but also as a tool for collaboration – a digital realm where policing and crime prevention can be done in new ways with new types of digital and real-world interventions. The ongoing results of MEDI@4SEC presented here illuminate a variety of police tasks that are increasingly utilising social media. Such activities further highlight a series of challenges and opportunities for policing associated with organisational change, legal and ethical issues, privacy, transparency and liability, technological infrastructure and training required and budgetary concerns that are likely to shape the take up of social media usage in police forces around Europe in the coming years.*

**Keywords:** social media, ethics, community policing

## Introduction

*Nothing will ever replace good old fashioned police work, but Facebook and Twitter have been like a tool on our belt, in some ways it can help them in their investigations and in some ways it can hinder - Bill Bratton (Former NYPD Commissioner)*

This paper focuses upon the emerging findings of a recently completed Horizon 2020 project -MEDI@4SEC: The Emerging Role of New Social Media in Enhancing Public Security<sup>1</sup>. Working actively with police forces across Europe, MEDI@4SEC has advanced a future roadmap for the role of social media in law enforcement and public security planning, not only for communication purposes and as a listening platform, but also as a tool for collaboration – a digital realm where policing and crime prevention can be done in new ways with new types of (digital and real world) interventions (Foster, 2016). The MEDI@4SEC project has addressed three key questions which are illuminated in this paper: How and why new forms of social media currently are being adopted and used by policing, public security planners and citizens; how social media use amongst law enforcement authorities should evolve in the future and influence operational practices and requirements; and what the social, ethical, legal and data protection implications are of this increased use of social media by the police.

Social media is omnipresent and have become powerful mechanisms driving social, and economic change. New and emerging forms of social media (e.g. Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, Instagram and others) are open, distributed, digital communication platforms that enable individuals and communities of users to create and share information and ideas worldwide. Social media allows the fast sharing of user generated content, facilitating communication on a many-to-many basis, providing the ability for personalization and anonymity and allowing use anytime and anywhere (De Vries and Smilda, 2014; Bartlett et al 2013). Specifically, in relation to policing, social media allows law enforcement authorities and others involved with public security to ask for information from, send information instantaneously to and interact with a range of civil society groups as well as providing a monitoring and intelligence gathering function (Schneider, 2016).

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1 This paper draws from studies conducted during the Medi@4sec project which was funded from the European Union's Horizon 2020 Programme for research under grant agreement no 700281. The collaborative work of all consortium partners in this paper is acknowledged, details of which can be found at [www.media4sec.eu](http://www.media4sec.eu). The work of the project, including a range of detailed research reports on themes explored in this paper can also be found on this website. Follow @media4sec on twitter for further updates.

## The growing role of social media in policing tasks

The MEDI@4SEC project focuses upon understanding the opportunities, challenges and ethical considerations of enhancing social media use for public security: the good, the bad and the ugly. The good comprises using social media for problem solving, fighting crime, decreasing fear of crime and increasing the quality of life. The bad is the increase of digitised criminality and terrorism with new phenomena emerging through the use of social media, particularly on the dark web. The ugly comprises the grey areas where trolling, cyberbullying, threats, or live video-sharing of tactical security operations and the propagation of rumours are phenomena to deal with during incidents. Making use of the possibilities that social media offer - including smart 'work-arounds' - while respecting privacy, legislation and ethics is not an easy task.

This changing situation raises a series of challenges and possibilities for overall policing and has impacted upon a range of specific policing tasks, notably around communication, engagement and community policing, response to emergencies and crisis, surveillance and, criminal investigations and intelligence gathering. In terms of *communication and engagement* social media has changed the landscape of policing communication drastically (Goldsmith, 2015) enabling everyone to send information or ask questions to anyone, instantaneously and at minimal costs. This is true for both internal police communications as well as increasing accessibility of policing services for citizens. The two-way engagement with the public is a tangible benefit of social media. In stimulating engagement between police and community, social media adds legitimacy and knowledge to many police tasks and can offer a great opportunity to reach target groups who traditionally are hard to reach. In response to a reduction in 'on the beat' policing, individual police officers are increasingly using social media to enhance their visibility and reassure the public that they are active in an area, as well as making it easier for the public to contact them. In this way, increased social media communication can lead to increased transparency and increases in perceived police legitimacy and reputation (Meijer and Thaens, 2013; Grimmelikhuijsen, & Meijer, 2015).

Conversely, social media can also damage reputation, for example in cases where the misbehaviour of police officers is recorded and shared through social media. Though fruitful for different purposes, communication using social media thus generates challenges and training needs for police forces. One challenge with communication via social media is finding the right tone for the conversation. Information needs to be relevant and useful for citizens, otherwise the public might be left with the impression that the police are not spending their time effectively. There are different ways for police forces to communicate via social media; some try to be more personal and others more formal. Many studies highlight that the public would like to see more engagement (two-way interaction), while current practice in many countries sees the police use social media mostly to

send or gather information for fear of misusing it and getting censured, and *not* for fully interacting with the public (Heverin & Zach, 2010).

Social media can furthermore stimulate *community policing*, by enabling all employees in a police organization to have fast and (almost) autonomous contact with citizens (Lieberman et al., 2013; Meijer & Thaens, 2013). In theory, better communication enables 'active citizenship' which itself enhances effective community policing in ways that allow citizens give the police information through social media and in some cases help with investigations (De Vries & Smilda, 2014). Neighbourhood police officers for example, often use Twitter and Facebook extensively to obtain information from their community. Social media can also be used to motivate the crowd to volunteer. For example, the restoration of public places that have been affected by riots or demonstrations, as seen in the 'clean up' after the London 2011 riots (Procter et al 2013). Another way for the community to stimulate community policing is by organizing 'neighbourhood watch' through a WhatsApp group or a commercial service like Nextdoor (De Vries, 2016). Such community policing practices are not unproblematic. Challenges may arise around privacy and vigilantism, posing critical ethical questions about the roles and responsibilities of citizens who get involved in crime prevention (Huey et al. 2012)<sup>2</sup>.

A further core police task that increasingly utilises social media is *responding to emergencies, incidents and crises*. In the case of an emergency, incident or crisis, community members need to be able to contact and inform the police quickly, and the police need to achieve situational awareness in a short space of time. An array of mobile apps have also been launched to warn bystanders of incidents and enable them to act as first responders. However, using social media to alert police to an emergency situation is complex and challenging. It requires the public to respond quickly and for police forces to have appropriate technical systems that can interpret and act upon the data received. In the case of larger incidents, police officers can use social media to warn and inform large number of citizens simultaneously by sending a small number of messages that then get spread. For example, during the Christchurch earthquake in New Zealand and the flooding in Queensland, Australia, (both 2011) social media was the primary medium to broadcast information. After the recent spate of urban terrorist attacks across Europe social media was used to share information with the community and to keep them informed about the ongoing incident (Coaffee, 2017). During a crisis, social media is not only a helpful communication tool but also enables police to gather and analyse a lot of information in a short time period. However, social media also causes problems for police responding

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2 Helped by scientific research of funded through the EU Horizon 2020 programme police, forces are now discussing the next generation of community policing, allowing them to engage with virtual instead of just local communities and shifting from citizen participation (where citizens volunteer to join police activities) to police participation (where police joins activities initiated by the public). See for examples the INSPEC2T, Trillion, Unity and CityCop projects.

to incidents in terms of having to expend a lot of time and resources quelling rumours whilst an event is ongoing, which can cause considerable disruption to policing activities and in some cases compromise attempts by police to track suspects as they move away from the scene of an incident (ibid).

*Surveillance* tasks can be significantly affected by social media and aid the police in preventing unrest and signalling suspicious situations. By monitoring social media alongside other sources such as CCTV, police can better get to know certain communities and their behaviours and pick up leads of potential incidents or planned criminal activity. Emerging research has highlighted that analysing large numbers of tweets can improve crime prediction, help make deployment decisions and increase effective allocation of resources (Gerber, 2014). However, police must know how to effectively monitor these types of communications in order to gauge the mood of a crowd, assess whether threats of criminal activity are developing and to stay apprised of any plans by large groups of people to move to other locations. The emerging challenge in policing of using social media for online 'surveillance', particularly of monitoring terrorist groups who use social media to radicalise and recruit, illuminates the scale of the challenge facing police forces both in terms of technical equipment requirements and also in training to better be able to analyse social media. For example, in the aftermath of a serious incident, police can "mine" social networking sites to identify victims, witnesses, and perpetrators that which requires getting hold of the provenance of messages, understanding where the information is coming from and if it can be trusted.

The police task of tracking down the offenders of crimes - criminal *investigation* - increasingly utilises social media to achieve its goals. By leaving traces on social media criminals turn it into a potentially rich source of incriminating information that can be collected and analysed in accordance with legal protocol. Overall, social media has proved to be helpful in solving crimes. This has often involved regularly visiting and monitoring of certain sites that are infamous for being used to facilitate criminal activity (e.g. the dark web) and those which allow or stimulate hate propaganda. However, increasingly, police officers are seeking to translate existing legal frameworks, developed for police operations in the physical world into digital legal frameworks because the crucial legal framework for investigations on social media is missing (Denef, et al., 2012). Therefore, the challenge for online investigation is to obtain accurate data legally from the different social media networks, which have different methods of sharing data (or not sharing) with the police.

The police further use social media for *intelligence operations*. The speed of social media provides a crucial advantage when appealing for witnesses, or, information or looking for missing persons. For example, social media can be used to assist with missing persons' inquiries by enabling the police to harness the 'wisdom of the crowd' (Denef et. al., 2012). But although social media can be helpful in intelligence gathering, it also brings forward

challenges concerning the veracity of the intelligence obtained (Kumar 2013). Identifying credible information from rumours and speculation is proving increasingly difficult. Filtering and identifying the useful information in a situation of information overload often creates provenance and trust issues.

## Challenges and opportunities of social media use in practice

During the course of the MEDI@4SEC project we have investigated the enactment of these different policing tasks through a series of thematic workshops where a range of policing and non-policing stakeholders have discussed and debated the key challenges and opportunities of using social media in these different practice contexts.

Firstly, our workshop on *Do-it-yourself (DIY) policing* questioned the general division of responsibilities and legitimate power between citizens and police. For some policing activities a key question is about how to cooperate with citizens, when to take control and how to avoid negative effects. For example, there is a growing trend of citizens taking coordinated action in places where there is a perception that public security falls short or fails, for example with the growth of so-called 'paedophile hunting' (Jamieson, 2016). This leads to the question of whether DIY policing can actually assist police operations. Whilst some European police forces have taken concerted efforts to co-create safety jointly with citizens, DIY policing does raise a range of delicate ethical questions. Empowered citizens have the means to fight injustice and produce desirable change, while at the same time they can also create great harm when acting irresponsibly or taking the law into their own hands.

Secondly, we looked at the opportunities and challenges for social media use within the context of *riots and other mass gatherings* and in particular the role social media played in monitoring, signalling and communicating with the public during such events (see for example Archie, 2016; Mair, 2016 for terrorist attacks). In such situations, the rapid adoption of social media has assisted in the organization and coordination of the event itself, as well as its policing. This raises key questions about authoritatively communicating with the public in such situations and the advancement of a communication strategy to ensure the uniform use of social media by authorities in a positive, friendly, instructive and helpful tone to promote citizen engagement, collaboration and trust. Such interactive communication can provide a substantial resource that can aid situation awareness but should be done in an ethically aware way that protects data privacy and avoids spreading unsubstantiated rumours.

Thirdly, we focused upon the *everyday policing of public security*, including cooperation with citizens via social media as part of new models of 'community policing'. The transformed communication and information habits brought forth by social media, provides policing with new opportunities for intelligence sources and platforms to communicate as well as enhance their local crime prevention strategies (Ruddell and Jones, 2013; LexisNexis, 2014). But how can community policing initiatives supported by social media best contribute to the everyday management of security? And how can policing advance a unified, consistent approach to modern technology usage, incorporating specialized staff, budget dedicated to innovation and defining a clear legal framework and procedural protocols?

The fourth and fifth themes explored focused upon newly emerging areas of policing: *dark web investigations* and *trolling*. Historically, technology has revolutionized policing practices but more recently it has also facilitated criminality with the Dark Web emerging as a key space for 'high tech' (organized) cybercrimes linked, for example, to cryptomarket-related crime or the distribution of extremist material, that raises a number of issues for police forces to consider: keeping one step ahead of the cyber-criminal; assessing the balance between freedom of speech and crime facilitation with regard to dark web content; as well as issues of jurisdiction that is forcing co-ordinated international efforts to be put in place (Bryant, 2014; Trottier, 2015). With regard to *trolling* – broadly understood to include cyberbullying, cyberhate, cyberstalking, cyberharassment, revenge porn, sextortion, naming and shaming and flaming – European police forces are coming to terms with its legal status - something which differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from act to act. The relationship between the formal policing of trolling by police and community-driven counter-trolling actions is also coming under scrutiny with questions being asked about where the responsibility – both legal and moral – for intervention lies. It also poses questions about how police can improve their human and technological resources to intervene in trolling effectively, and what legal and policy frameworks should be developed to assist and facilitate the countering of trolling. For both dark web and trolling activities there is also a broader question about the role which social media providers should play in policing illegal activity, extremist material and online abuse, in large part because it happens on their platforms and because they have the discretion to remove material. These questions have recently been tested in Germany through the introduction of the controversial *Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz* (NetzDG) law which came into force in January 2018 and requires more effective policing of social media after several high-profile cases in which inappropriate material was being spread via the German arms of prominent social media firms.<sup>3</sup> However, adjudicating on what falls foul of hate-speech laws and what is legitimate freedom of expression is proving difficult to decipher.

<sup>3</sup> The new law gives the networks 24 hours to act after they have been told about law-breaking material (BBC, 2018).

The sixth theme we focus on cross cuts the others and highlights *innovative market solutions* and new commercial products for including social media in police work. To digest, analyse, expand and share the valuable information on social media for policing, constant innovations are required in order to meet expanding and complex needs. Such applications should not only aim to increase the effectiveness of policing operations with fast and accessible formats but do so in ways that respect data protection regulations. Ethical and societal considerations and privacy by design technologies thus need to be at the forefront of new solutions to ensure police use of social media cannot be above the law.

## Emerging trade-offs in police use of social media

The 2017 UK Home Affairs Committee inquiry into *Policing for the future: changing demands and new challenges* noted that advances in technology and notably social media have 'led to the emergence of new forms of crime, and have enabled other crimes to move online, changing their nature and impact on victims and communities. Technological change has also generated new opportunities for the police at a time of increasing focus on efficiency and innovation' (HAC, 2017). Given the predicted future state of policing across Europe, many police organizations adopting social media consider the usage very fruitful for different purposes in their operational tasks and organizational goals (de Smet 2012). Whilst the use of social media has brought forward tremendous benefits, there are significant challenges and trade-offs. Most immediately, and from a resourcing perspective, being present on and using data from social media takes a lot of time effort and in many cases specialist equipment/tools, a conflict with Europe-wide cutting of police-budgets (The Police Foundation, 2014).

A further emerging challenge concerns significant issues of ethics and law particularly with regard to data sharing and privacy that have not traditionally been a major concern for police forces. This is leading to ongoing discussion about the need for guidelines or codes of conduct to adhere to or consider before individual police officers tweet or share Facebook messages (Mulder, 2018). Whilst the social media platforms utilised by policing can facilitate communication, interaction and participation on an unprecedented scale and deliver security more effectively and efficiently, all that glitters is not gold. Social media is also the catalyst and conduit for abusive communication, for the grooming of children for sexual exploitation, for terrorist recruitment and for a range of other unethical and illegal activities. Moreover, anonymity and encryption can help some criminals act with impunity. And, although everyone agrees that police should take measures to detect, prevent and prosecute such behaviour, such measures are often controversial, risking disproportionate interference with freedom of expression or privacy, or the unwarranted visitation of suspicion on innocent individuals or groups. Inaccurate or incom-

plete information and the problematic inferences about people's criminality that follow can further result in disproportionate monitoring or even unfair criminalization.

It is therefore important that police adopting social media as a core activity address how such tools can address risks of bias, such as in the patterns of language that it flags as suspicious and what safeguards can be built in to prevent their misuse. In a recent example from the USA, responses to freedom of information requests from the American Civil Liberties Union have revealed that data mining companies that marketed products specifically to target activists of colour or religion have had contracts with a number of police forces. In these instances data from Twitter, Instagram and Facebook was used to surveil, monitor and track protest groups, including the Black Lives Matter campaign and Muslim protestors using specific hashtags such as #MuslimLivesMatter (Cagle, 2016; Perez, 2018).

Balancing the detection and prosecution of crime with ethical concerns is emerging as a core tension within social media use in policing. Through the MEDI@4SEC project we have identified a range of issues with police use of social media that could possibly subvert European ethical and legal norms of democracy. These issues include accountability, transparency, fairness and duties of special care for the vulnerable in the application of criminal justice. They further include a proper respect for civil liberties, and the ethically risky, anti-social and illegal uses of social media by citizens. These issues implicate not only the duties and functions of public security providers such as police and local authorities but also the potential role of technology developers and social media providers as evidenced by calls from senior politicians throughout Europe to pressurise prominent social media companies to remove extremist material. As the British Prime Minister noted in June 2017 after a year of terror attacks across Europe, 'we cannot allow this ideology the safe space it needs to breed, yet that is precisely what the Internet and the big companies that provide Internet services provide' (cited in Stone, 2017). Subsequently the UK government have worked with technology companies to develop a new tool that can automatically detect terrorist content on any online platforms with a high degree of accuracy (UK Home Office, 2018).

Further ethical issues include, in particular, risks of disproportionate interference with the privacy of innocent individuals, risks of outright discrimination or unwarranted stigmatisation of individuals or groups as criminally suspicious as well as risks of discrimination and unfair (because less easy or reliable) access of some vulnerable or disadvantaged groups to criminal justice or public security resulting from their relative lack of technology and/or technological skills. In addition, the rights of police officers to a private life and to freedom of expression on social media are also emerging as key issues to consider as allegations emerge in the media of inappropriate use of social media by officers through abusive postings or the leaking of confidential information (Irish Times, 2018).

Furthermore, the involvement of citizens in the provision of public security and criminal justice raises significant concerns from a legal perspective. These relate primarily to the difficulty of ensuring transparency, accountability and non-discrimination in the delivery of public security when functions are carried out by citizens driven by their own interpretations of the law and morality and without democratically legitimised authority. For example, in the UK a complex debate has raged over the extent to which the police should work with self-styled paedophile hunters - who for some are vigilantes or 'digilantes' acting outside of the law but for others could be a source of useful information that is increasingly used in prosecutions. These concerns are likely to persist and indeed grow as it becomes apparent that the police are unable - for a range of reasons - to deal with the proliferation of illegal and unethical behaviour online. Key challenges and risks for public security providers in responding to such behaviour, including on the Dark Web, include distinguishing between illegal and merely offensive or otherwise unethical behaviour, and determining the line between justified covert interactions with criminals and unjustified entrapment.

### **Mainstreaming social media in policing**

Social media has added another dimension to the police tool-belt and has been a powerful force in driving organisational change within police departments (Lierbeman et al 2013; Meijer & Thaens 2013). However, the introduction of social media in policing has shown differences in the conditions required for success in adopting social media as a mainstream activity and the respective opportunities and threats this has presented. A European wide survey conducted with senior policing respondents elicited a series of needs, priorities and concerns about using social media now, and in the future. Specifically, it illuminated a series of important and *inter-linked considerations* that will either facilitate or stymie social media use by police forces in the near future. These are shown in Figure 1 below.

**Figure 1:** Key factors for the uptake of social media in policing

Factor	Description	Effect
<b>Greater engagement with the public</b>	Engagement between LEAs and the public through social media will increase two-way communication and enable valuable security information to be exchanged	LEAs will have greater situational awareness 'on the street' and citizens will contribute to, and be better informed about, security issues
<b>Changes in public opinion</b>	The changes in the way public perceives the trade-off between privacy and safety will impact the way social media is used for public security planning.	In the future, the public may have a different perspective on how important privacy actually is with respect to the trade-off between privacy and safety.
<b>Perception of usefulness and ease of use</b>	Social media will become increasingly easy to use in a range of situations	Individuals / community will be encouraged to use social media as long as they feel confident that they contribute to, and in return receive, "public security"
<b>Social media popularity in LEAs</b>	The perceived importance of social media for public security will influence the viability of the presence of LEAs in social media platforms as well as the prevalence of private social media accounts	Active interaction and enrolment in LEAs social media accounts will be an important metric of the successful implementation of the venture
<b>Law enforcement agency re-organization</b>	Re-engineering of procedures, processes, human and technology resources is needed in order to embed social media within their existing organizational structures.	Develop social media strategies and plans to respond and react effectively in everyday policing operations and emergency situations.
<b>Privacy, transparency and liability concerns</b>	Privacy, transparency & legal liability regarding the use, misuse and errors in the management of information and practices followed by LEAs in social media	Transparency between public authorities and LEAs will play an important role in the way citizens embrace social media. Legal liability & clear definitions of what information is collected and by whom is a significant component to transparency.
<b>Changes in legislation</b>	Future changes in legislation will impact the way social media is used for public security planning.	In the future, LEAs may have different restrictions on what information may be used and how for public security planning.
<b>New technological advancements</b>	New technologies will have a great influence on the activities and behaviour of citizens and organizations. Citizens rapidly adapt to new social media and leave previous ones behind.	Citizens will have more opportunities for networking and LEAs will have to be flexible in adapting social media in order to continue effective collaboration
<b>Financial burdens</b>	Financial impact of the adoption, training, information upkeep and monitoring of social media platforms	Budgetary restrictions can affect the number of staff and investment in technologies used for social media engagement by LEAs and its effective operation
<b>Infrastructure concerns</b>	Social media technology tools and the related IT infrastructures needed, are under continuous development and evolution.	The appropriate IT infrastructure and tools to handle the continuously increasing needs of storage and processing of social media data produced

From this analysis a number of factors can be identified as key needs, notably advancing more user-friendly and user-attractive social media applications that are easier to use in policing. Also important in these new technological advancements are the ease with which community engagement and public relations can be facilitated through social media in a bi-directional way. Other key priorities that emerged centred upon how social media is bringing about significant changes in operations and practices and that assist police forces to become fully embedded into the digital world. Whilst there is optimism about the impact and likelihood of change involving social media, a number of concerns remain prominent regarding how such change would be operationalized; notably around issues of data privacy, ethical and legal considerations, financial budgeting and the need for up to date infrastructure. In other words, whilst there is a 'promise' that social media will allow the police to do 'more for less' through efficiency gains and the facilitation of more joined-up and ethically-informed policing practices, the start up and running costs of such operations might affect the uptake of such techniques in future years.

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# Perspectives of Community Policing in Greece

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## **ABSTRACT**

*This research article studies the implementation of community policing in Greece and the critical impact of severe constraints related to the historical, political and socioeconomic background of the country. Based on an analysis of the main components of the philosophy of community policing, it is explained how this contemporary form of policing can be impeded or even fail if it lacks of a comprehensive strategy with community's active involvement, interdependency from politics as well as sufficient resources and scientific research in the field. It concludes with main findings in understanding the limited development and progress of community policing in Greece and offers concrete proposals for the improvement of the current situation. The research was based on a quantitative analysis of data on community policing published by the competent state authorities as well as on the study of the relevant but extremely limited academic literature on the issue.*

**Keywords:** *community policing, Greek police*

## Introduction

Community policing has been always considered as the main tool of the overall police function (Demsey & Forst, 2014: 26-30). In the distant past, policing, in the collective consciousness of every society, was mostly perceived as a repressive apparatus used to safeguard the interests of the ruling class by exercising coercion and using legitimate violence to suppress crime and restore order. In the course of time, policing has become more complex, heavily influenced by rapid changes stemming from the consequences of globalization in all areas of social, political and economic life. The evolution of crime coupled with the tremendous progress of new technologies have created a completely new social reality which led the Police to review traditional principles and perceptions on policing. In principle, the Police have progressively abandoned traditional policing that used to focus on suppressing crime and restoring public order and moved to the adoption of a new philosophy of police action based on the active engagement of the community. Policing, both as a function and a process, followed the evolution of society and accordingly adapted to the changes of the sociopolitical conditions (Miller, Hess & Orthmann, 2014: 3-25).

## The Philosophy of Community Policing

In police science, policing is widely acknowledged as a process (Cepol, 2007:23). It is composed of two basic parameters. First, it is an officially organized form of social control being part of the overall criminal justice system. Second, it is a process through which a wide range of services are provided to the community not only in the field of crime prevention but also in the broader sector of public safety and order (Stergioulis, 2008:35-41). In this respect, policing is not only affected by police determinants such as police culture, training, organizational and administrative issues, but also by social, political and historical factors embodied in the society's structures and functions (Kelling & Moore, 1988, Seagrave, 1996).

Community policing is indeed a new philosophy of police action. Unlike traditional policing practices, the Police call upon the representatives and the various institutions of the community to be engaged in a continuous dialogue concerning all aspects of public order in the area of the community (U.S. Department of Justice, 2012 :1). The fact that the Police open up its doors to citizens seeking their advice and involvement in policing related matters, policing is instantly transformed into a social process. In essence, community policing promotes a human face of the police institution and changes the Police's image from a state mechanism of repression to an organization providing manifold services in the field of public safety to all citizens without discrimination (Somerville, 2009).

Serving the community on the basis of a constant dialogue in an open and transparent manner and by giving priority to vulnerable individuals and social groups, community policing leads, in the long term, to the establishment of a climate of mutual trust between police and society, which is a prerequisite in combating crime and maintaining public order. The results of relevant surveys on community policing have shown that close co-operation between the Community and the Police increases the level of citizen's satisfaction in the police work, reduces the fear of crime and improves the quality of community's life. (Kappeler & Gaines, 2015:10). Bearing in mind that diversity is the substantial element of the modern society nowadays (Stergioulis, 2017) and that police practices have often prevented ethnic minorities from accessing police services on an equal basis causing tensions and conflicts (Srinivasan & Hearn, 2001), the planning and development of community policing can definitely benefit from the widest possible society's active engagement.

The philosophy of community policing is therefore directly related to major concerns of citizens regarding the protection of their personal safety and property and the maintenance of public order while fully respecting fundamental human rights and freedoms. The engagement of citizens and community's local authorities in planning and implementing community policing, progressively contributes to the social acceptance of policing, which, in turn, it promotes a wider social consensus in police work in preventing crime and safeguarding public order. (Friedman, 1992:15). Community policing can produce positive results when it is developed in a police system governed by autonomy, decentralization, decision-making flexibility, innovative leadership, participatory management, transparency and open procedures (Riechers & Roberg, 1990). In sum, it is a combination of ideological, practical and theoretical elements that all together form the backbone of the philosophy of community policing.

## Community Policing in Greece

### The Greek Police today

The Greek Police was founded in 1984 as an amalgamation of the two former police organizations, the Greek Gendarmerie and the City Police (Stergioulis, 2001:44). Both police forces had a long history. The Gendarmerie Corps was created in 1833 on the model of the then French Gendarmerie whereas the City Police was established in 1920 on the model of the London Metropolitan Police. The main reasons that led to the unification of the Gendarmerie Corps and the City Police are detailed in the introductory report of the founding law of today's Greek Police (Law 1481/1984) summarized as follows (Stergioulis, 2001:214):

- to adjust police competences to the fulfilment of the mission of the Ministry of Public Order and limit police work strictly to the duties of policing by abolishing any other non-police related activity which used to overwhelm daily police work.

- to improve police and civilian relations as the unpopular use of both police forces in the past had created a climate of mistrust and even hostility between the police and the public.
- to increase the productivity and the efficiency of police officers in combating crime especially the new forms of criminality.
- to improve the educational level of police officers as well as their working conditions.

The foundation of one national police organization took place in a period during which Greece was striving to consolidate democracy after seven years of dictatorship (1967-1974) (Papanicolaou & Rigakos, 2014). At that time, the social and political country's environment was overwhelmed by continuous conflicts between a vast working class seeking to establish its own democratic rights and the ruling class trying to maintain a balance between working demands and fundamental constitutional requirements (Rigakos & Papanicolaou, 2003). The Police was heavily involved in confronting these conflicts by maintaining public order. Most police resources were allocated to safeguarding public order and less in the policing of criminality, which in the 1980s used to fluctuate at low levels (Lambropoulou, 2005). Policing used to be carried out in a traditional manner and seemed to be considered efficient as long as crime rates were kept low. Thus, the concept of community policing at that time was totally unknown in the Greek Police.

At the beginning of the 1990s, policing in Greece entered into a new phase which was deeply affected by the severe consequences that stemmed from the enormous social and political changes in the continent following the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989). Bordering, in the north, with countries from the former eastern bloc, Greece was faced with an unprecedented migratory influx which drastically affected all aspects of policing. The traditional police structures were challenged by the sudden increase of criminality throughout the country especially in the urban centers and the increasing threat posed by domestic terrorism (Courakis, 1993). The resulting increase in the workload of central police services along with the increased demands of additional human resources to serve in the front line, gradually led to the disappearance of patrolling officers from neighborhoods.

Over the last decade, the Greek Police have been severely affected by the adverse consequences of the global economic crisis while at the same time crime has been rising with unprecedented and continuing migratory and refugee pressures at country's south eastern borders. It is worth underlining that the aforementioned reasons that led to the foundation of the Greek Police in 1984, are still relevant nowadays and continue to constitute major issues of concern for the Greek Police. In particular:

- the staff of the Greek Police continue to carry out even more work non-related to policing duties. (Pan-Hellenic Federation of Police Officers, 2017).

- criminality has constantly been on rise especially in the period of economic crisis (Tsouvelas, et al. 2015).
- Relations between the Police and the public suffer by continuous conflicts affected by austerity's consequences, the increase of crime and the acute immigration and refugee problem in the everyday life (Zarafonitou, 2011).
- the adverse consequences of the economic crisis have caused an unprecedented deterioration of police working conditions and a critical reduction of police personnel vacancies (Pan-Hellenic Federation of Police Officers, 2015).
- the police training system has not been adjusted to the principles of the Bologna Process (Bologna Declaration, 1999) and the main police educational structures have not been revised since 1994 (Law 2226/1994).

### Neighborhood Policing

As common criminality was constantly on rise provoking extensive and critical public discussions on the sensitive issue of urban security (Xenakis, & Cheliotis, 2013) and racist phenomena occurred more frequently in the increasingly diverse society (Antonopoulos, 2006), the Greek Police has realized that the traditional policing styles should be replaced by contemporary forms of policing. To this end, the very first attempt to introduce community policing took place in 2003 by establishing a legal framework of neighborhood policing which sets out the mission and tasks of the neighborhood police officers as follows (Presidential Decree 254/2003):

- The mission of the neighborhood police officer is to approach and communicate with citizens, to consolidate the sense of security, to create mutual trust and cooperation between the police and the local community, to prevent crime and to deal with community's problems related to the police mission.
- Neighborhood police officers patrol daily in the neighborhood being in touch with the inhabitants, the local and social actors, undertake initiatives to resolve police issues and incidents in the area, provide assistance to crime victims and collect crime related information for further police action, participate in events organized by local authorities and in meetings when problems of police nature are discussed, visit the schools in the neighborhood and discuss with the directors, teachers and parents about the existing problems of police nature, recommend and organize lectures in cooperation with neighborhood representatives on crime related issues.

It should be noted that this general and rather descriptive legal provision regulating community policing which is still in place to date, does not foresee anything for the training of police officers who will be assigned to perform the neighborhood policing duties, there is no provision for institutional partnerships with community's representatives and

even more there is no provision for a common strategy with the active participation of the community.

Based on the above legal framework, a pilot phase of implementation of community policing set off on 17 March 2003 in 35 police departments throughout the capital and in 2 police departments in Thessaloniki with a total of 354 police officers involved. Although there has been no evaluation published of this very first phase of neighborhood policing, the fact that it was warmly welcomed by the public and was positively presented through the media (Kathimerini, 2003, Ministry of Public Order, 2003), has led the political leadership to officially announce on 4 June 2003 that community policing would be progressively expanded throughout Greece (Ministry of Public Order, 2003). In spite of political announcements and commitments, the expansion has never taken place and the neighborhood policing was abandoned by the new government elected in the next year's parliamentary elections, in March 2004. One of the main reasons for quitting this very first attempt was the fact that the strategic focus of the Greek Police was concentrated on the security preparations of Olympic Games (2004) (Rodopoulos, 2011), a global event that absorbed the total amount of resources of the Greek Police along with the then assigned neighborhood police officers. However, it should be underlined that there was no strategy by the Greek Police Headquarters on how to proceed with implementing community policing and the political decisions at that time due to the importance and the complexity of organizing the Olympic Games' security have totally overshadowed any other policing priority.

A second attempt for implementing community policing in Greece took place almost six years later, in January 2010. The Ministry of Public Order officially announced that the neighborhood police officers would commence their activities aiming to strengthen security in the neighborhoods of urban centers with an upgraded role. The restart of neighborhood policing occupied 218 police officers at 45 police departments in Athens, Thessaloniki, Patra and other major cities focusing on areas which were selected on criteria such as density population, diversity, rates of criminality as well as the extent of willingness of the local communities to collaborate with the Police (Ministry of Citizens' Protection, 2010 a). After a period of six months, in June 2010, an activity report (Ministry of Citizens' Protection, 2010b) was published, the main points of which are summed up as follows:

Neighborhood Police Officers:

- Received 2.166 complaints and requests from citizens for a variety of cases of which 1.576 were directly arranged.
- Recorded 154 cases as focal points for possibly causing criminal actions.

- Spotted 562 places that degraded the neighborhood living environment such as abandoned facilities and vehicles, road safety issues, poor lighting, etc.
- Dealt with 115 school issues.
- Visited 722 domiciles and various places where criminal activities occurred and collected information or supported morally crime victims.
- In 6.745 cases served individuals with health problems or persons needed some kind of administrative assistance from police authority (e.g. ID verification).
- Conducted 47.644 informative visits to various local authorities.
- Delivered 563 lectures on anti-social behavior, school bullying, exploitation of minors, drugs and crime prevention.

This first activity report of community policing in Greece is worthwhile although the outcome is generally presented instead of examining and evaluating the activities of neighborhood policing on the basis of each police precinct in a specific city followed by an analysis based on a number of determinants such as population, density, criminality rates and diversity. The major finding, however, of this activity report is the huge responsiveness of the public with remarks, suggestions and complaints addressed to neighborhood police officers, a fact that highlights an increased interest of citizens to get in touch with the Police. Nevertheless, this second attempt in establishing community policing in Greece came to an end within the same year without any official explanation by the Greek Police Headquarters or by the competent ministry. Again, there has been no strategy and the fact that this second attempt was soon abandoned, clearly indicated impact of political decisions' on local policing.

In the beginning of 2015, national parliamentary elections led to a new government in power and the issue of community policing came back to the foreground. In March 2015, a third effort took place for the establishment of community policing which is in place to date. It was again decided to implement neighborhood policing in a pilot phase of three months' duration in two central police departments in Athens and two others in Thessaloniki. In addition, it was announced that a special scientific committee would be set up in order to submit proposals for improving the efficiency and the effectiveness of neighborhood policing (Ministry of Citizen's Protection, 2015), but the outcome of this special scientific committee has never seen the light of publicity. By the end of the year, neighborhood policing was expanded in total 37 police departments throughout the country (Greek Police Headquarters, 2016).

According to the last published report (Greek Police Headquarters, 2017), neighborhood policing is currently implemented in 37 police departments covering 96 neighborhoods across the country. In particular, in 9 police departments in Athens, in 4 police depart-

ments in Thessaloniki and in 24 other police departments in the rest of country covering 22 cities in total. In the same report, it is mentioned that in 2016 the neighborhood police officers across the country have accomplished in total 151.884 actions and interventions which included informative visits with citizens, meeting requests and solving problems of daily life. They also developed and strengthened partnerships with local authorities (municipalities, schools, associations, churches) and participated in events organized by local authorities. As far as crime prevention is concerned, it is noted that the frequent presence of neighborhood police officers outside bank facilities, have contributed decisively to preventing criminal activities and protected citizens' safe transactions through automatic teller machines (Greek Police Headquarters, 2017). However, since 2015 that neighborhood policing has been implemented in Greece, there has not been any evaluation in respect of the impact of community policing in preventing crime and no joint police-community projects and actions have ever been published.

### **Local Crime Prevention Councils (LCPCs)**

In 1999, an innovative legal framework was introduced in the context of community policing providing for that in every municipality with a population of more than three thousand (3,000) inhabitants, a Crime Prevention Council is established composed of scientists and officials, who reside themselves in the communities and possess special knowledge and expertise in relevant fields of criminal justice such as judicial officers, criminologists, psychologists, sociologists, police officers, social workers etc. The idea behind this initiative was to strengthen communities' efforts in preventing crime and enhancing protection of vulnerable individuals and social groups, thus improving communities' quality life (Zarafonitou, 2003).

The competences of the LCPCs cover a wide range of areas such as drawing up a crime prevention program for their community areas, rendering opinions and advice on relevant questions posed by the mayor, cooperating with the respective LCPCs of neighboring communities, organizing workshops, seminars and other related events aiming at raising public awareness on crime prevention (Law 2713/1999, art.16). This very first attempt of establishing LCPCs has not been successful mainly due to lack of resources and appropriate organization and coordination of the LCPCs' activities. Therefore, a second attempt took place six years later, in 2005, which led to the creation of a central council within the ministry of public order aiming to coordinate the work of the LCPCs across the country. It should be noted that the composition of the central council for the LCPCs is politically influenced as it is composed of eleven (11) members appointed by the minister himself and remunerated under an annual renewable contract, while the members of the LCPCs are appointed by the mayor without any compensation (Law 3387/2005, art.13).

It is worth mentioning that unlike other European countries, the community's participation in voluntary forms of policing has been extremely limited in Greece (Zarafonitou,

2013). The LCPCs constitute the first and the only form of communities' participation in the broader context of preventive policing in the country. In accordance with the Greek Police Headquarters, the LCPCs' aim is the development of an alternative and decentralized crime policy tailored to the particular needs and demands of local communities in close cooperation with local authorities, the police and judicial authorities, the social actors and the citizens themselves who aspire to contribute in the consolidation of public safety in everyday life (Greek Police Headquarters, 2018). However, neither the Greek Police Headquarters nor any of the competent ministries have ever presented a strategy in which the work of the LCPCs is integrated in connection with neighborhood policing nor any annual report of the LCPCs activities and best practices has ever been issued at central level.

In a conference organized at University of Athens in 2006 on the operation of LCPCs with the participation of representatives from local authorities, the Central Union of Municipalities of Greece and the academic community, it was stressed the fact that all LCPCs are underrepresented and malfunction due to lack of resources and the absence of an integrated strategy (Courakis, 2006). In fact, the effectiveness of the LCPCs after seventeen (17) years of operation has not been consolidated and their efficiency within the Greek society is seriously questioned. Research has revealed that the function and the mission of the LCPCs remain little known within the broader society, while there is a high level of citizens' unwillingness to participate in collective actions planned by the LCPCs (Chalkia, 2014). Last but not least, the most significant setback regarding the function of the LCPCs is the fact that the existing legal framework does not provide any kind of nexus between the LCPS and neighborhood policing.

## Conclusions

Since its establishment in 1984, the Greek Police has remained heavily politicized and centralized with a semi military-political structure (Papakonstantis, 2003), which allows limited flexibility and discretion in developing and promoting contemporary policing forms. The development of community policing has been deeply affected by politics and by lack of independency of the Greek Police Headquarters to plan and implement a long-term community policing strategy. In addition, there has been a considerable lack of scientific knowledge due to absence of relevant researches in the domain of community policing across the country.

Comparing to other European countries, the introduction and implementation of community policing in Greece has been considerably delayed. In fact, the legal framework regulating community policing was adopted in 2003 but it had not been implemented on a constant basis until 2015. The first two attempts to implement community policing

in Greece, in 2003 and in 2010, have shown encouraging results but none of them lasted more than one year due to lack of political will and of a strategy defining concrete targets with an active role of community's stakeholders.

It is therefore so important nowadays than ever for the Greek Police to strengthen its efforts not only to ensure continuity of community policing but also to expand it throughout the country, thus promoting the human face of the Greek Police and progressively ensuring a broader public consensus in preventive policing.

From a quantitative point of view, the activity reports of community policing in Greece are extremely positive demonstrating not only a high level of citizens' willingness to cooperate with the Police but also an efficient preventive dimension in confronting serious crime such as robberies of citizens during their financial transactions via ATM. However, these activity reports should be subjected to a qualitative evaluation and analysis based on a number of determinants such as the geographical area, density of population, diversity, criminality rate (Cyprus Police, 2017), public awareness and satisfaction, extent of community's engagement, neighborhood police officers' perceptions and recommendations as well as other factors related to police administrative and organizational issues which affect community policing.

Community policing has been implemented in Greece on a consistent basis only over the last three years but it is exceptionally limited both in terms of police departments and police officers involved. As an example, community policing is applied in nine police departments out of 86 police departments in the whole area of Attica. The Greek Police lacks of a strategy on community policing although it has repeatedly announced its commitment to the value of community policing in the field of crime prevention with the support of the local authorities. The role and the participation of the local authorities and other community's stakeholders are not foreseen in a common strategy, while the public itself remains reluctant to be actively engaged and closely cooperate with local police authorities.

The Greek Police has been deeply affected by the consequences of the economic crisis that has plagued the country since 2008 (Vasilaki, R. 2016). As a result, the Greek Police nowadays face a reduction of nearly 6.700 personnel who have either resigned or retired but they have not been replaced. (Pan-Hellenic Federation of Police Officers, 2015). In fact, this huge gap of vacancies combined with extensive police budget financial cuts due to austerity reasons, have led to a reorganization of the Greek Police that took place in 2016 and resulted in reduction of 21% of the total number of police services across the country and in the closure of about 30% of the total number of Attica's police departments (Greek Ministry of Citizen's Protection, 2016b). The consequences of these organizational changes also had an adverse impact on the development of community policing.

Last but not least, it is imperative that the overall function of LCPCs should be reviewed aiming to become effective and efficient by increasing awareness among citizens and enhancing partnerships with local authorities in the crime prevention field. To this end, the LCPCs should be encouraged to establish their own common strategy and implement their own projects in close cooperation with the Police and other competent authorities. Therefore, a nexus should be established between LCPCs and neighborhood policing through an integrated strategy with sufficient scientific support and resources subject to an evaluation system at central level. In this respect, the structure of the existing central coordinating council based in the competent ministry should be reviewed and become independent in its function and accountable directly to a parliamentary committee for ensuring an effective and efficient operation for the benefit of both the Police and the Community.

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# Law Enforcement Responses to Violent Extremism in Greece

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## **Abstract**

*In order to generate a European perspective of counter-radicalisation, it is important to understand the individual strategies of Member States. Illuminating the best practices of countries can provide the best stimulus to initiate policy reform and changes to multi-agency prevention. In this article, the experiences and needs of practitioners from law enforcement agencies in Greece are captured to provide a deeper understanding of prevention work. Results are presented from focus groups with law enforcement practitioners that were held at a counter-radicalisation workshop in Athens where over 120 practitioners assembled to discuss violent extremism and vulnerable groups in Greece. Approximately two-thirds of the participants reported having contact to extremists in*

*a professional capacity. These practitioners most commonly worked in smaller teams (1-10) and collaborated with a diverse range of national stakeholders. Although left-wing extremism was the most commonly reported form of extremism, participants were most concerned about Islamist extremism. Only a small number voiced concerns about right-wing extremism. Participants emphasised the need for further training in recognising the signs of violent extremist behaviour and international information sharing. Results indicate a growing need for more technological formats that can host counter-radicalisation tools, such as app-based risk assessments and training modules.*

**Keywords:** *Extremism, radicalisation, prevention, Greece*

## The refugee crisis and its challenges for Greece

In a time of budgetary pressures and demographic shifts, Greece, as with other European member states, is faced with the challenge of allocating limited resources to achieve effective democratic governance. As Greece has been one of the most affected countries by the migration crisis, strong demands have been generated for the improvement of social welfare and political stability. Mass migration presents a further challenge to law enforcement agencies in providing security by reason of the perceived correlations between migration and increased rates of violent crime, and perceived threats of terrorism. The millions of refugees that arrive in Europe often have to use routes that pass through Greece in which numerous departure points exist, both legal and illegal. Greece itself has seen a steady rise in the number of asylum seekers between 2013 and 2017, though comparatively few to countries like Germany, Italy and France (Eurostat, 2018). With the transiting of refugees in huge and unrelenting waves, Greece has seemingly reached its resource and logistical capacity in providing humanitarian assistance, resettlement and housing supplies. Europe's aim to improve overall border management and ensure shelter and assistance for refugees has led to its support of Greece in the establishment of hotspots and a relocation scheme to transfer persons in need of international protection to other EU Member States.

The EU-Turkey statement was an important game changer in EU efforts to decrease migration flows via Greece. The core principle of the EU-Turkey Agreement was the provision that all new irregular migrants or asylum seekers crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands will be returned to Turkey, after an individual assessment of their asylum claims in line with EU and international law. For every Syrian being returned to Turkey, another Syrian would be resettled in the EU from Turkey (1:1 mechanism) (European Commission, 2017). Since the EU-Turkey agreement took effect in 2016, statistics from the national au-

thorities in Greece<sup>1</sup> have revealed a significant drop in known illegal migration levels (see table 1).

**Table 1** Number of arrests of known illegal immigrants between 2016 and 2017

Year	Illegal immigrant arrests
2016	204,820
2017	68,112

For migrants who are not denied entry, both short-term and long-term shelters are available in concentrated areas of Greece, such as those on Lesbos Island. The critical situation of these centres has received due attention in media reports on account of the poor living conditions refugees are subjected to, such as overcrowding, restricted access to health care services, and lack of sanitation. In a study investigating the physical health of refugees across 29 locations in Greece, Mellou et al. (2017) had noted a significant risk of communicable diseases in refugee camps. Further studies have shown high levels of psychiatric disorders in refugee populations given their highly heterogeneous experiences of traumatic events and other stressors (Farhat et al., 2018; Hermans et al., 2017). An elevated risk has been shown in refugee groups for anxiety disorders (Javanbakht et al., 2018), post-traumatic stress disorders (Li et al., 2016), and depressive symptoms (Alduraidi & Waters, 2018).

Research has considered how traumatic events compounded with other stress factors could expose an individual to a stronger risk of sympathising with extremist behaviours and organised violence (Campelo et al., 2018). Greece stands currently under pressure of dealing with incoming migrant populations who suffer from traumatic stress. As mentioned before, the economic situation is limiting the availability of support and care that can be given to vulnerable groups. However, local governments have shown a tremendous willingness to support through social assistance, public health polices, and programmes that foster multiculturalism. Nevertheless, one might see that the combination of economic tension and huge demographic change may set a matrix for the development of decreased solidarity and devaluation of individuals with migrant backgrounds, and violent interactions between far-right and far-left groups. This also brings a fundamental change to the role of law enforcement agencies and the way vulnerable groups, such as migrants and asylum seekers, are policed in terms of preventing crime. More specifically, increasing migration levels raise the challenge of how law enforcement can transform security and prevention strategies to police an increasingly plural Greece.

<sup>1</sup> Data taken from the Hellenic Police. Retrieved from [http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo\\_content&lang=%27.%27&perform=view&id=70776&Itemid=1240&lang=](http://www.astynomia.gr/index.php?option=ozo_content&lang=%27.%27&perform=view&id=70776&Itemid=1240&lang=), data of access: 18.11.2018.

## Hate crime and political violence in Greece

Evidence of the tensions between certain societal groups in Greece and arriving immigrants can be discernible by the prevalence of hate crime offences. In this article, we maintain the definition of hate crime as being the victimisation of an individual on the basis of their perceived race, colour, religion, disability, sexual orientation or national origin (Sun, 2006). A review of the data from the Hellenic Police showed an increase in the number of recorded hate crime offences, like in most European countries (FRA, 2018). Although the numbers have seen a steep increase between 2016 and 2017, the total amount remains comparatively low. In 2017, the number of acts grew to 184 incidents representing a 119% increase to the previous year (84 offences). The figures also revealed that the large majority of hate crimes in 2017 were of a xenophobic and racist nature (133 offences), for example incidents based on race and ethnicity. Not only is Greece used as a transit country for thousands of asylum seekers to continue onto other countries like Germany, France and Sweden, but it also remains the main destination for thousands more. This high border activity of migrants entering and exiting the country has fuelled populism and far-right extremism, which has led to increasing acts of discrimination and signs of a growing intolerance towards refugees.

Violent mobilisations of political extremist groups present a form of criminal deviance that is motivated, among other reasons, by hate, racism, xenophobia and a devaluation of otherness. This has resulted in numerous violent clashes between various societal groups including migrants. In this regard, fears have spawned over the potential escalation of political violence to terrorism, which has now become a significant threat in Greece. According to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), Greece is ranked in 46<sup>th</sup> place (out of 130 countries) for the number of terrorist attacks it has incurred. This is listed higher than countries like Ireland, Canada and Switzerland but lower than, for example, United States, United Kingdom and Germany (Global Terrorism Index, 2017). As regards to official acts of terrorism in Greece, none has been officially tied to the activities of right-wing extremists who have instead been arrested for violent attacks against far-left groups and migrants.

Terrorism linked to left-wing extremism and anarchism, however, presents arguably the greater threat in Greece to date. Of the European member states, Greece, alongside Italy and Spain, were the only countries to have experienced terrorist attacks related to left-wing militancy within the last years (Europol, 2018). A series of eight attacks and twelve arrests were attributed to left-wing terrorism in 2017 alone, in comparison to no completed terrorist offences being officially reported for jihadist extremism and right-wing extremism (Europol, 2018). Specifically, the Greek anarchist group 'Conspiracy of Fire Cells'

have claimed responsibility for multiple fire bombings, explosions and most recently the mailing of parcel bombs to EU officials including the German Finance Minister<sup>2</sup>.

## Counter-radicalisation in Greece

### Counter-radicalisation legislation

Counter-terrorism laws have evolved in the Greek legal system and is addressed by different articles of the Greek Criminal Code (articles 185, 185 and 187A). The national legal framework exists mainly as a punitive measure that seeks to punish various terrorist actions and to facilitate the investigation and disruption of terrorist offending. Greece has incorporated further laws from the European Union, such as the framework decision 2002/475/JHA, which also comes under the heading of combatting terrorism. Yet, there appears to be no specific laws in Greek legislation that reflect a need to prevent those extremist behaviours leading to terrorism. The dangers of radicalisation, however, are clearly recognised by regional partners and governmental departments, which is evidenced through policies to improve training for law enforcement agencies in responding to violent extremism. Furthermore, these actions are perhaps covered, in a broad sense, by overreaching counterterrorism laws.

The provision of legislation could prove useful, if anything, in providing a clear distinction between counterterrorism and counter-radicalisation, the boundaries of which are currently blurred in the Greek legal framework. Laws are required that encourage prevention efforts that deal with the complex social and behavioural behaviour conducive to terrorism and not just the preparatory acts of terrorism itself. In this light, duties could be placed on certain societal stakeholders to raise awareness of radicalisation and to challenge extremist behaviours. Combining such measures with laws would create a legal stability to support the development of long-term prevention efforts. A European example promoting this concept is the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 of the United Kingdom. This act of parliament places a duty on selected authorities to prevent vulnerable people from pathways to violent extremism. A certain caution, however, is needed because although empowering civil society partners to participate in counter-radicalisation seems ideal, it might also bring with it certain consequences that could undermine its very aim. Practically speaking, placing additional security functions on societal actors, who might not possess the necessary training or knowledge in identifying signs of radicalisation, generates a risk of discriminatory and alienating practices if not correctly applied. Another more passive option of legislating prevention activities could be in the area of

2 Dearden, Lizzie. "Greek police find eight more parcel bombs intended for EU officials as anarchist terror campaign continues". The Independent, March 21, 2017. Retrieved from <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/greek-police-eight-parcel-bombs-letter-eu-officials-imf-paris-office-germany-finance-ministry-a7641241.html>, data of access: 18.11.2018.

education where educators are given a duty to promote values, inclusion and diversity. Irrespective of what these measures entail, revisions to the Greek legal framework are needed to legally recognise the importance of tackling the root causes of terrorism and violent extremism.

### **Research and innovation**

In response to the threat of violent extremism and terrorism, Greece has seen an increased cohesion and interoperability of organisations in order to promote preventive activities. The Center for Security Studies (Κέντρο Μελετών Ασφαλείας, KEMEA), established as part of the Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection, has been a significant contributor to the research of violent radicalisation. Key activities of KEMEA include the development of national collaborations between local authorities, such as the State Security Division of the Hellenic Police and Athens Municipal Police, and the implementation of awareness programmes for first line practitioners in recognising and responding to extremist behaviours. Related exercises include the provision of intercultural trainings and lectures, which bring together the experiences of academics from international universities, representatives of Europol and Interpol, and EU counter-radicalisation projects.

The involvement of Greece as a participating country in EU research funding has also evolved within the last decade as scientific and technological organisations join and coordinate projects. KEMEA exchanges best practices on an international level with the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) Centre of Excellence (CoE) and is actively involved in the implementation of research and training actions financed by different EU mechanisms (ISF Police, ISEC, Horizon 2020, and Erasmus+). In particular, KEMEA is participating in the implementation of six programmes (PRACTICIES, PERICLES, PROPHETS, TENSOR, INTEGRA and J-SAFE), which all focus on different forms and aspects of radicalisation that lead to violent extremism and terrorism. These programmes both aim at the creation of special tools and training programmes for first line practitioners that emphasise on the identification of real operational needs when responding to acts of violent extremism and terrorism.

### **Counter-radicalisation workshop in Athens, Greece**

On the 21<sup>st</sup> and 22<sup>nd</sup> of February 2018, a counter-radicalisation workshop titled 'Actions for preventing radicalisation that leads to violent extremism in Greece' took place onsite the premises of the Hellenic Ministry of Interior in Athens, Greece. The purpose of this workshop was to identify the common challenges facing Greek practitioners in the prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism. The workshop relayed the specific needs and challenges of over 120 Greek practitioners including the Hellenic Police, the Hellenic Coast Guard, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior and the Independent Author-

ity for Public Revenue, Ministry for Migration Policy (Asylum Service, Reception and Identification Service), the Ministry of Education, Research and Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Health (National Centre for Health Operations, Hellenic Centre for Disease Control & Prevention), and the Municipality of Athens.

The workshop was also used as a platform to conduct focus group discussions as part of the EU project PERICLES (Policy recommendation and improved communication tools for law enforcement and security agencies preventing violent radicalisation)<sup>3</sup>. The aim was to capture the personal experiences of frontline practitioners in Greece who typically had a role in the prevention of radicalisation. Discussions with practitioners were divided into four topics: organisational structure of law enforcement agencies, forms of violent extremism typically encountered, risk factors present among extremists with whom the participant encountered, and counter-radicalisation activities performed by law enforcement agencies. Open-ended questions were used to acquire the views on different aspects of prevention work. Additionally, questions were asked about the frequency of certain risk factors related to radicalisation.

Overall, 30 practitioners participated in the group discussions. A core sample of five professional groups could be distinguished: counterterrorism police officers (11), prevention officers within intelligence agencies (7), community police officers (6), professionals working with the general prison population (4), and other professionals involved in the field of counter-radicalisation (2). No personal information was collected from the participants such as age, gender, nationality or educational background.

## Results

Common themes that were identified from the group discussions presented information on the characteristics of law enforcement practitioners, working practices, and challenges with current prevention strategies of radicalisation and violent extremism.

### Organisational structure of law enforcement agencies in Greece

Limited research has explored the structure of counter-radicalisation organisations and how this can impact on the implementation of prevention activities. We included under the meaning of organisational structure the level of professional training employees received, time employed in the organisation, and the type of employment contract (working on a full-time, part-time, or voluntary basis). The level of training and job position of staff within prevention programmes and projects can directly affect the quality and effectiveness of prevention activities. Therefore, examining the internal structure of prevention programmes and projects can provide a potentially important area for introducing improvements. The participants at our workshop worked within different sized

<sup>3</sup> For more information on PERICLES, see Kudlacek et al. (2018).

teams the most common being small-sized groups (1-10 persons), followed by medium-sized groups (21-50), and large-sized groups (51-100). This pattern can be related to the prevention triangle where the top part represents those prevention interventions targeting a narrow group of individuals, i.e. those who are at the highest risk of radicalising or have already radicalised, and the bottom part of the triangle representing prevention interventions that target the largest group of individuals. As law enforcement agencies are usually involved when a case radicalisation has been brought to their attention, the level of prevention they provide is specific to the selected individual. This would require smaller teams to enable a more personal level of assistance and direct and manageable lines of communication.

### **Contact with radicalised individuals**

When asked whether the participants had any contact to individuals who were radicalised or in the process of radicalising, approximately two-thirds said yes. One-third of the participants claimed not to have any contact with radicals. The high rate of law enforcement agencies in our group discussions who have had contact with radicals confirms them as an important stakeholder in the prevention of violent radicalisation. Law enforcement agencies are often seen as one of the main authorities involved in cases of radicalisation and with whom other stakeholders communicate for purposes of information sharing. Therefore, ongoing efforts to develop training and strategic materials for law enforcement agencies in order to enhance police effectiveness can be justified by their significance as a potential source of information and their direct exposure to radical individuals.

### **Multi-agency cooperation**

Participants indicated a wide range of coordination efforts in the area of multi-agency working. On a regional level, the main actors included the Hellenic Police Intelligence Directorate (HPID), regional police, coast guard, prosecution service, fire service, customs and excise, counterterrorism division, Europol and Interpol. Collaborations with civil society and non-governmental organisations were also mentioned such as social workers, mental health organisations, tax authorities, and asylum agencies. The range of stakeholders reported by the participants indicate a broadened perspective on multi-agency cooperation, which includes stakeholders that are not typically involved or at least seldom mentioned. This shows an appreciation of a comprehensive response to counter-radicalisation and is only achieved through the inclusion of perspectives from different stakeholders. The value of exploring collaborations with stakeholders in different employment sectors comes from the complexity of radicalisation processes that lead to violent extremism and terrorism. As no single organisation possesses the required knowledge and experience to respond effectively to cases of radicalisation, a huge benefit can be seen from a more diversified collaboration as the solutions thereby developed would transcend beyond those of individual stakeholders.

### Radical ideologies and experiences with radicalised individuals

Participants were asked about the different forms of radicalisation of which they were most concerned. The large majority were mostly concerned about left-wing extremism (18), followed by Islamist extremism (16). Of the three included ideologies, only a small number were concerned with right-wing extremism (8). These concerns appear to match the current terrorist threat levels in Greece as left-wing terrorism has contributed to the most significant attacks so far. Participants were then asked which forms of extremism they most commonly confronted. Over half of the participants (19) identified left-wing extremism. Over one-third dealt with Islamist extremism (11) and only a small majority addressed right-wing extremism (4). It is quickly observable that a linear relationship exists between the ideologies that are of most concern and the ideologies that are actually confronted. Yet, we would caution that this correlation could be interpreted in several ways. Whether a certain ideology is viewed as a concern might come from a person's professional experiences, for example, how often a person has encountered a particular type of extremism. However, this might also occur because of objective reasons such as a strategic decision by a police force to police selected forms of violent extremism.

### Recommendations for future counter-radicalisation measures

We identified three key themes from responses to the question: What tools could we develop that would be most useful to your work in recognising and preventing radicalisations?

The first recurring theme among participants was the apparent need for further training specifically in relation to the identification of radicalisation signs and indicators. Further professional training is desired as law enforcement agencies, particularly community police officers, encounter individuals where the immediate detection of potential violent extremists is potentially required. Opportunities to improve knowledge in these areas are therefore essential to provide a better assessment of a situation and to reduce the occurrence of misidentifications and other pre-emptive actions that may lead to the persecution of individuals. Although this is often one of the first outputs offered by programmes and initiatives supporting counter-radicalisation, it is essential that training curricula is kept updated with the latest research and results in the field.

*"Frequent training, including workshops, manuals and practical psychological tips. It would be extremely useful to establish permanent working groups to include social workers and create support network and also international meetings in order to disseminate experience and best practices especially in the EU".*

(Community police officer during the focus group)

When looking at the types of training offered, it is as equally important to place consideration in the way material is brought across to end users. For example, e-learning is

a particularly useful tool given that it is relatively inexpensive, permits accessibility from any place at any time, and lends itself to being updated more easily. In order to promote effective learning practices among end users, it is necessary that classical teaching methods understand how technological advancements can be used to better supply knowledge. Moreover, how this knowledge is conveyed should complement the abilities of the practitioner and their time and work-related constraints.

The second theme raised here is the need for improved national and international information sharing in counter-radicalisation and counterterrorism. Although current research and policy directives have inspired the development of a growing number of information platforms across European countries, for example the European Counter Terrorism Centre (ECCT) and Secure Information Exchange Network Application (SIENA), a continuing need for international information hubs were voiced during our discussions. This would indicate that discrepancies in information sharing are still prevalent.

*“An information exchange tool that will provide fast secure and effective data and information exchange on a national and EU level between law enforcement agencies, public authorities, agencies and organisations. Educational and information programmes for students, parents and teachers.”*

(Prevention officer within intelligence agency during the focus group)

Information exchange platforms are a recent addition in the area of counterterrorism and counter-radicalisation, however, the issue of cross-boundary information sharing is not. These boundaries may come in the form of conflicting data protection regulations of different stakeholder groups, or because of concerns about sharing potentially sensitive information that could be misused or be made publicly available. Alternatively, structural issues with the information exchange platform itself might be present that limits how collaborations are facilitated. Limited resources, financing, or legislative support can all significantly affect a network's operational capacity. As this field remains largely unexplored, further research on counterterrorism and counter-radicalisation information platforms is required to pinpoint the variables that impact on how information and knowledge is shared among practitioners.

The third theme identified from the group discussions was the need for new methods and technologies to be developed that aid law enforcement agencies in counter-radicalisation, such as information exchange platforms, risk assessment tools and cyber-space detection tools. Yet, the format in which these methods are made available (paper, electronic, or other) and whether stakeholders have direct access can influence whether or not they are utilised. How technological solutions and information are delivered to practitioners is generally achieved by training sessions, briefings and, increasingly of late, e-learning platforms.

*“A creation of an app for mobile smartphone, tablets etc. both for Android and iOS would be great.”*

(Community police officer during the focus group)

As ICT and technologies advance, law enforcement agencies have shown an increasing acceptance of technological equipment for its power in helping to respond to crimes. The strategic use of multimedia apps demonstrates a useful exploitation strategy for counter-radicalisation programmes and initiatives. The conversion of counter-radicalisation tools into an app format, whether an app-based risk assessment or guidance on identifying signs of radicalisation, could lead to a more effective response by practitioners, such as those police officers on patrol who may not have direct access to paper-based tools.

## Conclusion

This article provides an insight into the needs of law enforcement agencies in Greece and suggests several important areas that require further research. One of the most relevant aspects for practitioners in the field of counter-radicalisation is the need for more multi-agency collaborations to take place that goes beyond the stakeholders who are typically involved i.e. law enforcement agencies, educators and NGOs. In order to push for a whole society approach in the prevention of radicalising factors, new ways should be considered in how different stakeholders can be integrated and what insights they may bring for a more comprehensive model of prevention.

In Greece, law enforcement agencies have shown evidence of multi-agency working by starting collaborations with organisations that are not usually on the forefront. Positive relationships with local fire services were reported, which is one stakeholder group whose role has absorbed prevention responsibilities in recent years due to the number of violent incidents they encounter. Another stakeholder group mentioned was the involvement of asylum agencies given their exclusive position to implement preventive actions among potentially vulnerable populations. Prevention measures offered in refugee camps does not necessarily imply an increase in internal security and policing of refugee areas, although this could lessen the risk of external influences from political or militant groups, but could involve efforts to raise the awareness of radicalisation and extremism among staff members and educators working within refugee encampments. Working relations were also reported with tax agencies, which has received very little focus in research. Among other forms of criminality, fraudulent documents and tax violations provide further areas where radicalisation can occur (as seen in the case of Timothy McVeigh<sup>4</sup>).

<sup>4</sup> Timothy McVeigh was an American domestic terrorist convicted of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and was also involved in tax evasion and tax fraud due to his extreme anti-government beliefs.

The research also draws attention to the absence of legislation in Greece that specifically encourages public and private institutions to adopt working environments that are mindful of the signs and threats of radicalisation and extremism. The provision of a legal framework that prohibits actions related to terrorism and violent extremism have a different aim than those legal provisions that promote stakeholder responsibility. Although developing legislation to promote resilience and cohesiveness in specific areas may eliminate certain radicalisation risk factors, a trade-off might occur between enforcing legislation and professionalism. For example, involving different stakeholders to help identify and regulate behaviour, who might not possess the necessary knowledge or training, might cause the reverse effects if selection bias and misidentification occur.

In line with current research, more training and prevention tools were stated as ways in which counter-radicalisation measures could be advanced. We recognised that this came hand in hand with a need for technologies that provide this information in a practical and timely manner. In contrast to trainings and tools that are only available in paper form, online and application-based platforms present perhaps a more effective way of presenting material. An interrelated challenge is the apparent gap in information sharing between international and national stakeholders. What has become visible in Member States is that those practitioners on a local level are not implementing the scientific outputs of counter-radicalisation projects and related initiatives, whether because of political or financial reasons, or distrust of its use due to a lack of scientific evaluations. This development calls for a greater focus to be applied on utilising and enhancing those technologies already available as opposed to developing entirely new counter-radicalisation tools.

The evolution of radicalisation has given rise to several issues with preventive strategies in Europe. A distinct feature of Greece's strategy has been the prevention efforts developed both on a national and international level. However, in order to maintain a relevant strategy more effective international cooperation and information sharing practices should be expanded upon. Only as international multi-cooperation's advance can the individual operational capacities of stakeholders truly exploit the possibilities at their disposal.

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# The Schengen Evaluation Mechanism: Exploring the views of experts in the field of police cooperation

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### Abstract

*Freedom of movement was founded in Europe over 30 years ago, signing the Schengen Agreement 1985. The convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA) took effect in 1995. It was incorporated into EU law and considered a major achievement of European integration. The Schengen evaluation mechanism has been developed as a guarding system for establishing and maintaining effective cooperation and mutual trust among member states. There have been major changes within the mechanism, the initial intergovernmental peer review process is now a community method led by the European Commission. This study analyses the development of the Schengen area and the evaluation process, exploring the views of the evaluation experts assessing police cooperation. The research found that although the new evaluation system was considered appropriate for the monitoring of the arrangements, there are key areas that could be improved within the process of conducting evaluations, maintaining expertise and sharing best practice.*

**Keywords:** Schengen area, Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism, police cooperation, evaluation experts

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## Introduction

The “Schengen area” is a “border-free” area in Europe, where the free movement of citizens and goods is facilitated. Most EU States, except for Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Ireland, Romania and the United Kingdom are part of Schengen, and four non-EU countries (Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein). Bulgaria and Romania are in the process of joining the Schengen area, Croatia are fulfilling criteria to join (European Commission, 2018a).

Schengen members have agreed rules based on the mutual trust, but some tasks have been delegated away to other Member States (MS). For example, several measures are in place to compensate missing border controls, such as tightened border control on external borders, common rules on visas and relevant information system, enhanced cross-border police cooperation, judicial cooperation and Schengen Information System (SIS).<sup>3</sup> These measures are assessed through the Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism (SEM)<sup>4</sup> for reliability and effectiveness.

The aim of this research was to examine the development of the Schengen acquis<sup>5</sup>, police cooperation and its evaluation mechanism. The SEM has experienced recent changes<sup>6</sup>. The research explores the contribution of the evaluation system to ensure compliance and the potential for future development. Within this analysis, the research considers the views of expert evaluators in relation to the changes to SEM. Therefore, the research targeted mainly the Schengen police cooperation evaluation process.

3 **Schengen Information System (SIS)** – large scale information system supporting border controls and law enforcement cooperation in Schengen countries, allowing alerts to be seen and raised on wanted or missing persons or objects (European Commission 2018a).

4 **Schengen evaluation and monitoring mechanism (SEM)** – assesses the application of the Schengen acquis (Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013, recital 3).

5 **Schengen acquis** – legal framework for Schengen area, according to the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union (Annex B to the Treaty of Amsterdam). It includes Schengen Agreement (signed 1985), Convention of Implementation of Schengen Agreement (signed 1990), Accession protocols and agreements to the aforementioned legal acts, decisions and declarations adopted by the Executive Committee established by the 1990 Implementation Convention, as well as acts adopted for the implementation of the Convention by the organs upon which the Executive Committee has conferred decision making powers (The Treaty of Amsterdam, Annex B protocols, Official Journal C 340,10/11/1997 P. 0093).

6 The changes were introduced by Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013 implemented in spring 2015. The system was strengthened through new tools (e.g. unannounced visits, adding return field as a new area for evaluation, more regulated follow up procedures, evaluation activities are led by the European Commission), which will be explained in this writing later.

## Schengen and police cooperation

Schengen, it has been claimed, is *'the major achievement of European integration (...) [being] one of the key means through which European citizens can exercise their freedoms, and internal markets can prosper and develop'* (European Commission, 2016a: p.2). At this point, it would be useful to provide a brief overview of the Schengen system and cooperation.

Schengen started relatively slowly from the initiative of a group of founding countries. The limited regional initiative (Laursen, 2016) involving a limited group of countries has become one of the most important freedoms for EU citizens and significant influence on EU law (Eckes, 2014). Five countries (France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) signed the Schengen Agreement 1985. The convention implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA)<sup>7</sup> was drafted and signed on 19 June 1990 and took effect in 1995. The idea grew incorporated into the EU by the Amsterdam Treaty 1997. The signatory states of the Schengen Agreement abolished internal borders. Common rules regarding visas, asylum requests and border controls were agreed and cooperation between police and justice authorities set up. Currently, the Treaty of European Union (TEU) describes free movement in conjunction as one of the key principles of the Union (Art. 3, Consolidated version of TEU 2012). The Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) lays out the main objectives of Schengen cooperation, acknowledging the absence of internal borders and efficient control and integrated management for the external borders (Art.77, Consolidated version of TFEU 2012).

Although CISA is now part of the EU law, the Schengen area is not the same as the EU area (Figure 1). Some non-EU states enjoy the privilege of free movement, but some EU countries are still not fully part of the agreement. Popa argues that *'free movement can be even more important for the people of Eastern Europe because movement has been restricted through communism'* (Popa, 2015: p.97). Although considered a positive outcome, the full accession of Bulgaria and Romania remains a political issue to be solved at Council level (Zhelev, 2015). Two countries have chosen not to implement the Schengen Agreement, preferring to maintain control over their own borders (Popa, 2015: p.97). The United Kingdom operates the SIS in the field of law enforcement cooperation and another state, Ireland, is in the process of integrating into SIS (European Commission, 2018a). The Schengen area becomes a complex and differentiated system. Since the Lisbon Treaty, it has been an *"active policy domain"*, where EU combines freedom of movement with challenges of security and human dignity (De Capitani, 2014: pp.117-118).

<sup>7</sup> Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the gradual abolition of checks at their common borders.

**Figure 1.** Map of the Schengen area and the Schengen States (source: European Commission 2018b)

The EU agencies (e.g. Frontex), common standards (e.g. Schengen Visa Code, Schengen Border Code) and the new Schengen evaluation mechanism have been developed to ensure consistency. The migration flow of 1.3 million people into the EU in 2015 (Connor, 2016) was a wake-up call for EU institutions. Schengen was at risk and in autumn 2015, some member states (Slovenia, Hungary, Austria, Germany, Sweden, and Norway) made a temporary reintroduction of border controls (Member States' notifications..., 2017). Early 2016 the European Council gave a mandate 'to restore the normal functioning of the Schengen area' (European Commission, 2016a). The temporary introduction of border control in five countries was then decided at EU level, not by individual countries. It was done 'in exceptional circumstances putting the overall functioning of the Schengen area at risk' and supposed to last until November 2016 'as a last resort', but was prolonged on two occasions until November 2017 (European Commission proposals COM (2016)711, COM (2017)226).

The Commission tried to explain the need for strengthening Schengen governance for better evaluations in its communication some years ago. Free movement of citizens in the Schengen area is based on a system, where the mutual trust between the countries is guaranteed. However, tools put in place by EU cannot themselves ensure that agreed rules are applied. The Schengen evaluation mechanism is “used to monitor the application of the Schengen acquis and issue recommendations on any shortcomings” (European Commission 2011). Indeed, the Schengen evaluation is an important guarding mechanism necessary for keeping consistency among member states’ best practices. It is also important to keep the balance between national interests and the general aims of Schengen area.

A proposal to modify the Schengen evaluation was presented in 2009, aiming to entrust the Commission to take over the tasks from the intergovernmental group of experts. This proposal was rejected by the European Parliament, because they were excluded from the decision-making process (Pascouau, 2012). It was a source of tensions during discussions (Pascouau, 2013). The Commission explained later proposals for changes in SEM (European Commission 2011) arguing the intergovernmental system was not effective and that unannounced visits by Commission-led teams would be a solution. A follow-up procedure was mentioned as a goal for the new system there. After difficult discussions, the “new” SEM was finally adopted in 2013. Following the adoption, the Council issued conclusions on the past of Schengen evaluation (Legacy of Schengen evaluation..., 2014) dividing them into two periods:

1. **The pre-EU integration era** (from Schengen Agreement 1985 to the Treaty of Amsterdam 1999). It was an intergovernmental mechanism relying on the decision of the Executive Committee (SCH/Com-ex (98) 26 rev def.), better known as “the Mandate”. A “Standing Committee on the evaluation and implementation of Schengen” was set up in 1998. The role of the Executive Committee was taken over by the Council’s Schengen Evaluation Working Party, later becoming the Council Working Party for Schengen Matters - Schengen Evaluation (the Scheval Working Party).
2. **Post-integration: the EU era** (from the Treaty of Amsterdam 1999 to new Schengen evaluation regulation 2014). Countries were visited at regular intervals by teams of experts from the Schengen MS accompanied by a representative from the General Secretariat of the Council and a Commission observer, to verify jointly whether the collective trust was justified. Compliance was assessed in border control at air, land and sea borders, police cooperation, data protection, visa issuance and the functioning of the Schengen Information System (SIS), and SIRENE bureaus and guidelines were given to the MS where necessary.

A **third era** could be added now: (operational). Implementation of new Schengen evaluation mechanism (starting from the 27th of November 2014, when all second mandate evaluations are carried out).

The Schengen evaluation and monitoring process has been an important tool for keeping the system working and to ensure the mutual trust between countries continues. Being initially an inter-governmental peer review system, it has become a more community-based method (European Parliament's Policy Department ..., 2016). The aim for improved effectiveness and new security challenges in Europe has been a driving force behind these changes.

There are clearer rules for outcomes for evaluations, based on certain standardised criteria. The assessments are divided into three categories: 'compliant', 'compliant, but improvement necessary' and 'non-compliant' (Council Regulation 1053/2013; European Commission, 2015). The assessments in previous system were not so well defined and could be presented differently. This new tool is to ensure that the evaluation will result with an objective assessment and that the reports of different countries are more comparable.

It can be summarised that the main new tools available for evaluation are:

- evaluation missions and follow-up procedures are led by the Commission;
- experts from EU agencies are observers in the team;
- unannounced evaluation visits to get more realistic insight.

The concerns or problems still present in new SEM are:

- questionable objectivity of the assessment due to the close networking of experts;
- the ability of the evaluated countries to implement the recommendations;
- too lengthy procedures decreasing the effectiveness of the system.

Although the literature (e.g. European Parliament's Policy Department ..., 2016; De Capitani, 2014; Pascouau, 2013) suggests the new evaluation mechanism should be more effective, strict and objective analysis of the available sources exposed questions concerning the objectivity of Schengen evaluation mechanism, the possible influence of the networking and areas for improvement. These potential problems and gaps of knowledge are related to the *research questions in this study*:

1. What are the differences, if any, between the "old" and "new" system and main benefits of the current Schengen evaluation mechanism?
2. Does the SEM ensure the full compliance of the states involved?
3. What do evaluation experts think about SEM implementation? What is their personal view of their role and on the objectivity of the SEM?

4. What is the possible influence of networking on the evaluation? Do the good relations between experts involved have any impact on the evaluation results? If so, what kind of impact?
5. What are the possibilities for the further development of Schengen Evaluations?

In short, the research is aimed to examine effectiveness and objectiveness of the Schengen evaluation process in the field of police cooperation and perceived differences between new and old systems. It explores the experience and views of the MS and EU evaluation experts.

## Methodology

The most valuable source of empirical information regarding the SEM is the experts being involved in evaluation missions. The target group were the experts with experience in police cooperation evaluations (see Table 1 for a brief characterisation). The selection of the experts was challenging, as there is no list of Schengen police cooperation evaluation experts available. There are approximately 1-2 experts per Schengen member state on average (about 60 in total of which a third is more active<sup>8</sup>). Therefore, different contacts with known and less known colleagues had to be used to put the possible list of candidates together. Comparing those lists, the first preference was to choose experts with sufficient experience in (preferably both) Schengen evaluations. The second and equally important criteria was to find at least two potential interviewees from all identified regions (but not more than one expert from the same state) and involve EU institutions and agencies. The list of 33 possible candidates from 21 countries and two EU institutions/agencies was put together, 23 of them were contacted.

**Table 1.** General information about the background of the interviewed experts

Characteristics, markers of the experts	Yrs, times, amount
Average age (yrs)	45
Average work experience in related field (yrs)	20
Experts currently at Deputy's/Head's of Unit position	7
Total number of eval missions done by the group	117
	<i>in old system</i>
	63
	<i>in new system</i>
	54
Average missions per expert (without EU)	5

<sup>8</sup> The representative of DG Migration and Home Affairs was on the opinion in verbal informal conversation that the estimated number of evaluation experts in the field of police cooperation can be approximately 60, from which maybe only a third (15-20) are more active.

Characteristics, markers of the experts	Yrs, times, amount
<i>Maximum missions per expert</i>	over 20
<i>Experts who had been in LE role</i>	8
Postgraduate degree (master or PhD)	13
Number of persons with some police education	12
Police officers	11
Number of experts having special Scheval training	14
<i>Incl. before the first mission</i>	8
<i>Number of people trained in CEPOL course</i>	13
Experts having done at least 1 Schengen evaluation in other field	6

Although different methods are available for collecting data (such as written questionnaire, a structured, open interview), the semi-structured interview was selected as a research method for the following reasons: First, the higher response rate is possible among a low number of available experts. Second, the interview can be considered as the best approach, since the objective of the research is exploratory, examining the attitudes and feelings of the evaluation experts. Third, the use of semi-structured interview was selected because the interviewer has also some personal experience in the field of police cooperation evaluations and the method allows flexibility and participants to add details about their specific experiences, to clarify views or to expand on the responses in discussions. Since there was still a need to maintain some structure in the information received and be able to compare to some extent with other interviews, open interviews or informal conversations would be too spontaneous or unstructured for comparison (Gray, 2004: pp.214-217). Semi-structured interview enables the researcher to encourage the interviewees to present their personal opinions through the dialogue with interviewers (Noaks and Wincup, 2004: p.79).

In total 18 interviews (respondents labelled A-R in the analysis) were conducted with the experts from 14 countries and two EU institutions between April and June 2017 (Table 2). 10 interviews were face-to-face and eight interviews through video conference or phone call. The total length of recordings was almost 14 hrs and the average interview was about 46 minutes. The interview data was analysed using thematic analysis. Due to the relatively low number of the available experts in this field and the need for objective answers, confidentiality considerations are limiting the use of data collected during the interviews. A coding system was used and participants were identified by region rather than country and were aware of their right to withdraw their consent at anytime.

**Table 2.** Division of interviewed experts between the groups

Group	Countries, institutions	No experts interviewed	No of states, Institutions
1 <i>Alpine countries</i>	Austria, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Slovenia, Germany	2	2
2 <i>Baltic countries</i>	Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania	2	2
3 <i>Benelux countries</i>	Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg	2	2
4 <i>British Isles</i>	England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland	2	2
5 <i>Central European countries</i>	Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary	2	2
6 <i>EU institutions</i>	Commission DG, General Secretariat of the Council, EUROPOL, CEPOL	4	2
7 <i>Mediterranean countries</i>	Portugal, Spain, France, Monaco, Italy, Croatia, Greece, Cyprus, Malta	2	2
8 <i>Nordic countries</i>	Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Iceland	2	2
<b>Total number of experts</b>		<b>18</b>	<b>16</b>

## Analysis: The views of experts on Schengen evaluations

### General assessments

Networking between experts was seen as a positive effect. There was not much evidence of negative attitudes detected on behalf of the evaluated countries. The group dynamics and the relationships with the evaluated country appear to be influenced by the personalities involved in the process. It is also important to note that the main effect does not come only from the Schengen evaluation visits and that SEM actually has a wider positive influence on the countries involved. The internal preparation for the scheduled external evaluation is an important outcome benefiting the development of the evaluated countries. It usually enables a deeper self-evaluation than any outsider can do. If the country wants to be seen in a good light, there will be improvements made before the official evaluations are underway. Recommendations given during the Schengen evaluation can also support the internal efforts of the agencies involved and put pressure on decision-makers at state level.

The experts were asked to give their general assessment on the Schengen evaluation mechanism. All experts were of the opinion that it works at least to a satisfactory level and helps countries to improve in the field of international police cooperation. The changes in SEM have been mostly seen as good but there are opportunities for improvement. Few experts saw Schengen police cooperation as a secondary evaluation among all the fields of evaluations. They believed that SEM is actually designed for other fields.

The experts were of the opinion that Schengen evaluation is an important tool to check if the country is on the right course and to advise on doing things in the right way.

EXPERT O: *"It does [work], if there wouldn't be any missions like this evaluation, check mechanism, so, in our country we would have different approach to everything. So, it wouldn't work at all."*

EXPERT K: *"I think really improve the things, not only sometimes in the Schengen matters but also in the police structure. If I may take an example with my country, for example, before Schengen, there was no uniform statistics on police activity. /.../ It was really a mess. /.../"*

SEM also helps to keep track, how countries are dealing with problems identified. Although, some experts believe that there are no strict sanctions, if the country doesn't follow the recommendations, it still supports the development process. Some experts see the evaluation and networking as a good tool for internal negotiations regarding the rules and budget for changing activities.

### **The future of Schengen evaluations**

The new Schengen evaluation mechanism started to be implemented in spring 2015. It is a bit too early to come up with any drastic changes in the current system. However, there are some concerns and areas for improvement that could be identified. It is mentioned in article 22 in the SEM regulation, that the Commission should undertake the review of the operation of the new evaluation system six months after the evaluation reports from the first multi-annual (five-years) evaluations are adopted (Council Regulation 1053/2013). This will occur most probably in the year 2020. It might be good timing to start analysing the current system and to think about the possible improvements now, especially keeping in mind previous lengthy discussions between the Commission, EP and Council regarding the current regulations.

The experts did not propose many improvements in terms of the Schengen evaluation mechanism. They were mainly focused on implementing the existing system and sharing best practices between evaluation fields. The bureaucracy and length of the procedure are concerns mentioned by the experts from the MS and EU institutions. Most probably, the shorter internal procedures of adoption, planning respective meetings well in advance with the representatives of states (Schengen Committee and Scheval WP) and keeping to deadlines for the decision-makers, could optimise the process. There are already good practices in place in the follow-ups. Discussions regarding the implementation of monitoring provisions from current regulation (Council Regulation 1053/2013) have caused some confusion but in general the follow-up system takes some shape through experience. Training of the 40 evaluation experts (SIS/Sirene and police cooperation) has been delivered by CEPOL in 2018 (CEPOL Single Programming Document 2018-

2020). The Commission in cooperation with other institutions should take some steps in the fields of improvement mentioned by the evaluation experts.

There were no consistent views about possible improvements to the current SEM, since the experts were quite diverse in their suggestions. The following division of the responses are therefore conditional and interpreted by the authors. Most often mentioned possible improvements are listed below:

- procedure/legislation (7 occasions);
- training or available expertise (8 occasions);
- programming and time management (6 occasions).

A couple of experts did not see anything important to be improved now and considered the existing new evaluation system still to be tested.

First, the procedural/legislative issues involved among other things shortening the process of bureaucracy regarding the evaluation report and recommendations, and how these are handled and prepared for the evaluation. Improvements, according to the experts, should start with border related issues. The field of police cooperation alone does not seem to be that influential at EU level.

*EXPERT Q: ".../If something structural comes, I would expect, that it would come for border people, people who really... you know, because they are 'de chef of the theatre'. Main service for the Schengen evaluation /.../"*

Some experts mentioned that the evaluation could cover a wider area of police cooperation, not limiting itself to Schengen. For example, in reality it is quite difficult to distinguish if the joint patrol was done under the Schengen or Prüm regulation ("Prüm" Convention ..., 2005, Council Decision 2008/615/JHA).

Second, the availability of the experts with appropriate training/experience, improve planning of their involvement, and improve information exchange between experts. Few experts argued that the Commission should also try to employ more people with specific experience from the field to be involved in on-site visits. An agreed pool of trained experts with the platform of information exchange is one of the solutions for having enough MS officials available for Schengen police cooperation missions. A rotation of experts would be beneficial to share best practices in different evaluation fields.

Third, improvement could be made in organisation, programming and time management of the preparatory phase and in on-site visit. Good preparation through the questionnaire and possible pre-evaluation visit meeting would help to save time during the on-site visit. Some experts proposed that more precise guidelines should be given to the

evaluated country for their presentations, to avoid duplication of the information available for the evaluators. More practical inspections could be commissioned.

EXPERT N: *"... You read all this information, then you go and sit in a room for maybe even five, six hours being presented more or less the same thing you read a week before you got to that country. Then you're given about an hour to go and actually check. ... / I don't need to listen to it again. For me, maybe, this is one of the major aspects on which it can be improved."*

Other areas for improvement included: the possibility of sanctions and more frequently organised unannounced visits (4 occasions); update the catalogues of best practices (3); wider view on the evaluations and cross reference between different evaluation fields (3). There is a need for a better system to stimulate countries who do not follow recommendations, to make improvements in long term. So far pressure has not been that visible for the evaluation experts. Unannounced visits were seen as a good tool for getting a realistic perspective and motivate countries to make efforts between the 5-year evaluation periods.

The catalogues/ manuals should be updated on a regular basis and the best practices should be used across the evaluation fields, where possible. An expert recommended that the Commission should make more use of their position to examine evaluations in a more general way and find crosscutting issues, making sure that they are correctly addressed. Improved training was also mentioned.

EXPERT F: *"You can also improve the trainings. There are trainings organized by FRONTEX and there are trainings organized by CEPOL. Maybe once this evaluation process is more or less the same in each area, they could be preparing the same way in this approach ..."*

Finally, there were some proposals regarding the tasking team members (the position of two leading experts and their roles) and how evaluators examine different practices in different countries. One expert was in opinion that there should be certain limitations in using best practices as an argument for any kind of recommendations – differences between the policing systems should still kept in mind.

EXPERT B: *"... / The cops on the ground will understand, what works much more, than a lot of European kind of evaluators. I think that sometimes only evaluators have freedom to say a lot's of - "we must do this, because the manual says you must do this." I don't think, that is necessarily the way, I would like to see that change."*

## Recommendations

To summarise, the potential future of Schengen evaluations should be on the implementation of the current system without major changes. These proposals are about improving exchange of information, planning of the programs and resources, training and maintaining a pool of experts available for the evaluations, shortening the length of the procedures and better follow-up monitoring.

The following proposals can be made:

- Support the exchange of the best practices and information among the different evaluation fields and experts;
- Create a permanent pool of experts and with regular training (organised by CEPOL, Frontex or any other relevant organisation);
- Work with evaluation experts to develop a review mechanism to ensure evaluations meet needs of the changing context in Europe;
- Encourage the rotation of the COM and MS experts;
- Introduce the Code of Ethics to Schengen evaluators. Existing guidelines should be reviewed and amended;
- Review/update catalogues/manuals of the best practices. Best practices should be critically assessed;
- Improve internal guidelines for the Commission to monitor crosscutting issues among different evaluation fields;
- Improve the follow-up system of countries with serious deficiencies;
- Improve planning for the on-site visit programme with evaluated country to avoid duplications;
- Involve different EU agencies more actively as an observer to the different evaluation actions with clear task.

## Conclusion

The views of the experts were explored and analysed in the research to fill in the gaps of knowledge about practical issues relating to the implementation of Schengen police cooperation evaluations and to formulate proposals for future improvements. As far as we know, there is no similar empirical study available in this field.

Initially the objectivity of the evaluations seemed to be the key issue generated from the literature; however, the reflections from the interviewees suggested the significance of that criticism was overestimated. The current study serves as an exploratory study and provides an insight into the views of evaluators. It may be necessary to plan further

research with wider focus including all the evaluation fields and a greater number of experts.

The evaluation system developed from the intergovernmental to the supranational mechanism is fully integrated within the EU system. It is led by the European Commission but MS still influence the implementation of the evaluation mechanism as a whole.

It is possible to critique both, the “old” and “new” evaluation mechanisms. Still, the new system was viewed as being generally more effective than the old one. The main arguments were: clearer structure of the actions and reporting and common financial system supporting MS experts participating the on-site visits. The new mechanism is seeking also a more neutral approach, where the Commission has taken a leading role, although it is still shared with the MS. The EU agencies are also involved. It should give higher credibility to the results, if the observers are well chosen and want to contribute. There were some concerns discussed as well – for example, the objectivity of the experts might be put under question in some circumstances, the possible influence of the networking, too strong role of the Commission, not clear division of the tasks between two leading experts, excessively long and bureaucratic process of the adoption of the recommendations and other procedural issues.

Schengen evaluation is not fully objective as long as people are involved in the process, because of its human and peer-to-peer nature. The research shows that it does not play an important role, because the most significant improvements in an evaluated country will usually take place in the preparation phase before the official visit. Many experts assessed it as a crucial part of the development. The evaluation will help to improve the MS performance. It can sometimes be used as an external pressure to the internal policy to be improved. Experts do consider professional networking as rather positive effect and being useful for the evaluation process enabling to receive more and better quality of information.

The research findings presented in this paper set out the strengths and weakness of the current Schengen evaluation system. The recommendations point to enhancing procedures and processes within a system that is fit for purpose from the perspective of the experts that lead evaluations. Therefore, the potential impact of this research is to identify areas for improved operation, efficiency and effectiveness of system that is in the early stages of its implementation. Further developments in Schengen evaluations will depend on general developments in EU and on the readiness of the states to make concessions in their sovereignty.

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# Mobile-enabled Mobile Phone Snatches: A tale from two London boroughs

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## **Abstract**

*This research utilised both quantitative and qualitative methods to examine the rapid growth of moped enabled mobile phone snatches across two boroughs in London, UK. It demonstrates how the availability of suitable victims and the roads system influences moped enabled mobile phone snatches. The research suggests a number of crime reduction initiatives which could be adopted by law enforcement agencies and should be studied further as to their impact and long term effectiveness. The research concludes that there is not a single solution to this rapid growth in moped enabled mobile phone theft.*

**Keywords:** *Moped, mobile phone, snatch, London*

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## Introduction

The Office for National Statistics (2017) suggested that the recent increases in recorded robberies and snatch thefts are disproportionately linked to the larger urban areas, such as London. Over the 12 months from April 2014 to March 2015, The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) reported the theft of almost 10,000 motorcycles, mopeds and scooters, with an estimated value of more than £28 million. Many of these vehicles were stolen in order to commit other crimes (Metropolitan Police Service, 2015). Topping (2017) reported that moped enabled crimes have almost trebled in the 12 months to November 2017, reaching over 23,500 offences. Rudgard (2017) identified a continued increase in the use of mopeds, motorcycles and scooters in 'snatch' related offences. This research utilised both quantitative and qualitative methods to identify the similarities and differences in the choice of locations for moped enabled mobile phone snatches across two London policing boroughs and makes recommendations relating to initiatives which could be utilised to assist in the reduction of the rapid growth of such offences.

## Review of the literature

Gale and Coupe (2005) identified how street robberies are predominantly an urban-based crime. In London, the Metropolitan Police Service (2018a) have described the growth in moped enabled theft as a concern, stating that these vehicles are often subsequently used in the snatching of mobile phones from members of the public. Tompson (2012) detailed how the modus operandi for the theft of a mobile phone in a snatch offence usually involves an offender using a moped with a pillion passenger travelling around an area in search of victims who will be low risk to the offenders, such as those individuals distracted whilst talking on their mobile phones. The offenders on their moped will then usually approach the victim from behind, this allows them to make the best use of the phone user's distraction, then the victim will have their mobile phone snatched from their hands before the offenders escape at speed on their moped whilst the victim is both surprised and disorientated by the sudden sequence of events. The phones are often then sold on illegally and swiftly a number of times before being exported, after which it becomes harder to trace them. For the police to pursue a moped at speed is a high-risk strategy for the public, the police officer and the riders. Often riders will cover their face to hide from CCTV but not wear a helmet in an attempt to further dissuade officers from pursuit in case of injury resulting from an accident. As the College of Policing (2018) highlighted, due to their lack of protection afforded by the vehicle, riders of motorcycles in any pursuit situation are very vulnerable.

London is not the only city in the United Kingdom or across Europe experiencing moped and motorcycle enabled crimes. This means of committing offences is particularly prevalent where highly desirable goods, such as mobile phones, are stolen. For example, Butler and Rucki (2017) reported the use of mopeds in Manchester city centre involving the snatching of mobile phones, Farrell (2015) highlighted robberies in the Netherlands involving the theft of mobile phones using motorcycles. More generally, Europol (2014) co-ordinated a day of action across eight European countries against individuals and organised crime groups dealing with stolen mobile phones. This operation resulted in over 200 arrests and the seizure of just over 2,400 mobile phones.

In order to tackle the problem, Farrell (2015) stated that, because the problem of mobile phone theft is international and widespread, government intervention and international coordination is imperative to ensure effective crime prevention methods to reduce such thefts. For example, Farrell suggested targeting those who deal in stolen mobile phones with police resources and the international blacklisting of stolen mobiles using each phone's unique serial number to in effect block its use across networks, such a collaboration would render any stolen mobile phone useless both domestically and internationally. As a result the mobile phone would become less desirable to potential thieves, by rendering it useless once it is out of the hands of the registered keeper.

This approach is obviously situated as part of the local analysis and problem solving. Routine activity theory, first evolved by Cohen and Felson (1979), focused attention on the circumstances of the crime rather than the offender. It is often used to research and propose solutions to trends in crime, such as street robberies. The routine activity theory requires a motivated offender with the intention and willingness to commit a crime, a suitable victim or target, along with the lack of presence of an effective guardian, all of which come together at a single point in time. Deakin et al., (2007) suggests how the physical presence of police officers along with an increased use of surveillance technology can deter some offenders from committing crimes

The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) has moved to address the rising trend in both moped and mobile phone theft by establishing crime prevention campaigns focused towards securing possible target vehicles and raising awareness amongst potential victims of the risk of mobile phone theft in crime 'hotspot' areas. Gale and Coupe (2005) identified how street robberies can often occur near transport links or near the victim's home. Research studies have shown how targeting crime hot spots with police resource can have a direct, if often short-term, impact on reducing rates of crime whilst also diffusing crime in adjacent areas (Ariel et al., 2016; Braga et al., 2012). Operation Attrition, launched in June 2016, is an MPS crime reduction initiative to raise awareness in relation to mopeds being used in snatch crimes, with targeted social media posts, adverts at London Underground stations, advice from officers and leafleting (Metropolitan Police, 2016).

Victims in such offences are not necessarily selected at random; as those committing the offences follow a specific decision-making process regarding who will be their victim (Deakin, et al., 2007). This supports the analysis of victim profiles carried out by the Metropolitan Police, which details how those using mopeds to commit crime, target those people who are holding mobile phones, oblivious to their surroundings, and near a road which allows them to mount the pavement on a moped and drive at the victim (Metropolitan Police Service, 2018(a)). As well as the obvious financial and policing implications of such a snatch of a mobile phone, the physical and psychological effects of a robbery in the street on a victim should not be underestimated (Gale and Coupe, 2005).

## Methodology

This research sought to examine moped enabled crimes in two of the London's boroughs as well as how the MPS is responding to the problem. A blend of quantitative and qualitative data was collected, collated, compared and contrasted in an evidence based approach to identify and compliment findings in relation to the similarities and differences of moped enabled mobile phone snatch locations across two of London's 32 boroughs.

The boroughs, selected through convenience sampling, are both north of the River Thames. The two boroughs are similar in that they have high-density residential populations, great diversity, social deprivation and poverty. In one borough data mining provided quantitative information on recorded offences taken from a police Crime Reporting Information System (CRIS). This information was collected and mapped in order to establish the number and locations of moped enabled mobile phone snatches over a period of 12 months ending in February 2018. Volumes were also compared to the previous 12 months.

Conducting research on the CRIS system is the most reliable way to extract quantitative data. Data on the CRIS adheres to the standardised National Crime Recording Standards (NCRS) and Home Office Counting Rules (HOCR) (Metropolitan Police Service, 2018b). These rules promote consistency between forces when recording crimes. Therefore, each reported incident of a moped enabled mobile phone snatch in the borough is accurately recorded by the police on CRIS, with resultant emerging crime trends being revealed quite quickly. Using CRIS as a data collection method does not however take into account any unreported offences and their associated locations, the non-reporting of which may impact upon the outcomes of any data analysis.

In the second borough, semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted with eight police response officers from across the four shifts within the borough. These of-

Officers had a range of policing experience, but were all qualified for independent police patrol. As the first officers attending such incidents, the qualitative data collected from these response officers assisted in identifying incident 'hotspots' for moped-enabled mobile phone snatches and the reasons why those interviewed felt these locations were selected by the offenders. Then, as an intervention, thirteen police officers, with a range of policing experience from newly appointed officers to those with many years of experience, were deployed in uniform around one of the identified hotspots, an underground station. The officers were deployed for a period of sixty minutes to interact and advise the general public by providing crime prevention advice based around the Metropolitan Police's corporate campaign in relation to mobile phone theft. This included the officers handing out leaflets, talking to the public and reassuring them. The number of interactions with the public and the number of mobile phones put away out of sight either in pockets or bags were individually recorded by the officers.

## Findings and discussion

Snatch offences recorded on CRIS in the first borough occurred in clustered 'hotspots'. The data analysed from the London borough in question revealed that in the 12 months ending in February 2018 there were 1,334 reported incidents of thefts/robberies where a moped was used, of these 62% (830 offences) involved the theft, or snatch, of a mobile phone, this is slightly over an 85% increase from those (447 offences) recorded of mobile phone snatches over the same period in the previous year. The theft of mobile phones was by far the most common item stolen in the moped-enabled snatches across both years. Within the borough, such an increase of over 85% on the previous year's moped-enabled snatches of mobile phones, equated to an average of 2.27 reported incidents and the police responding to each 24 hour period.

However, the data showed that these snatches did not occur solely around transport hubs, instead being far more widespread. Tomson (2012) identified how the specific uses of land may also attract and bring together offenders with their potential victims, such as the development of fast food outlets, shops and bars. The clusters of snatches from the research in this borough were mostly on main roads and easily accessible residential roads. It could be inferred from this, that these crimes are occurring where there is more likely to be heavier footfall and, therefore, more potential victims, and where there can be easy escape on the mopeds via the faster main roads.

The semi-structured qualitative interviews with police officers in the second borough, identified how they tended to respond to clusters of reported snatch offences around a specific transport hub, a London underground station. The underground does not always have signal for mobile phone coverage and so calls and texts cannot always be

taken or made underground. This means that when someone leaves a tube station, they will often take their mobile phone out of their pocket or bag at street level so that they can check for messages or access maps for directions. This may therefore be one of the reasons why the offenders committing crimes in this particular borough tend to target streets next to the underground station, as there are many potential victims holding mobile phones who may already be both distracted and disorientated. Tomson (2012) also suggested such transport hubs provide the opportunity for offenders to hang around unnoticed within the crowds. The police officers interviewed within the research also identified how the underground station is bordered by numerous streets which provide easy escape routes for potential offenders and the station itself is located on a fast road with lots of traffic, allowing offenders on mopeds to quickly escape into the flow of traffic or down a side street without being pursued.

Fennelly and Crowe (2013) identified the importance of thoughtful street design in the prevention of crime, so called crime prevention through environmental design (CPT-ED). This application of crime reduction methods is designed to assist the prevention of crimes, including robbery, and suggests taking measures to reduce crime through the manipulation of the physical environment. Such approaches could include options such as metal barriers, or even bollards, along pavements in areas of high footfall which may prevent mopeds from being able to ride onto pavements to commit 'snatch' offences, thus assisting in their prevention.

One of the key elements relating to the snatching of a mobile phone in both boroughs appears to be that the victim is holding their mobile phone in their hand and therefore on display to potential offenders who may be watching nearby. This type of snatch crime, where mobile phones are stolen, are therefore far less likely to occur if the potential victim has put their mobile phone away removing the temptation of the desirable goods to be stolen. Enabling the ideas from previous research (Braga et al., 2012; Deakin et al., 2007), thirteen police officers were deployed for an hour in the second borough during daylight hours around one of the identified crime 'hotspot' the underground station. During this limited period of deployment the officers recorded 314 interactions with commuters providing crime prevention advice with 189 of those members of the public (over 60%) putting away their mobile phones out of sight following the police interactions. The immediate impact of this intervention was high, however, the resource implications of such interventions as an ongoing means of crime reduction are also high. Ariel et al., (2016) identified how the police presence at crime hotspots does not have to be uniformed police officers but could be frequent visits by uniformed police community support officers (PCSO's) who have limited powers of arrest but would have the same effect. Whichever physical policing resource is used, their presence as guardians, impacts on the reduction of snatch crimes at the least over the period of deployment or visit.

Going beyond crime reduction approaches supported by routine activity theory, further research into offenders and their motives themselves may also lead to a greater understanding of the reasons which lead to moped enabled mobile phone snatches. The term 'snatches' tends to suggest there is little or no violence involved, but this is not always the case, with incidents involving violence, including a police officer being threatened with a knife by an offender on a moped enabled crime attempting to effect an escape (Dearden, 2017).

As an additional crime prevention initiative, Europol (2014) also continues to encourage mobile phone users to activate GPS enabled tracking applications within their mobile devices in case of their theft, as this may assist in the eventual phone's recovery.

## Conclusion and recommendations

This research provides quantitative evidence in relation to the rapid growth of moped enabled snatches of mobile phones within a London borough. Using both quantitative and qualitative research, it has evidenced how the footfall, general public awareness and the transport system, specifically the road network, influence moped enabled mobile phone snatches. It has also demonstrated how using police officers (or potentially other uniformed police staff) as guardians, who interact with the public informing them of the possibility of mobile phone 'snatch' thefts, appears to affect a significant number of people, who as a result put away their mobile phones and therefore reduce the opportunity for the theft of their phone through a snatch. This of course is an expensive use of resources and only had an impact at that one moment in time around the specific hotspot.

It is possible that adopting some of the ideas presented by CPTED, particularly in relation to the physical roads environment, may in effect assist in the designing out of the apparent ease by which these moped enabled crimes can be committed.

The research has also identified the importance of further in depth studies required into the motivations of offenders, identifying why they commit such offences along with the sustained effect of a physical uniformed police intervention. Further research into the suggestion of making the mobile phone itself less desirable as a commodity to steal (Farrell, 2015) may also lead to a more effective solutions.

In reality, there is no one solution to this rapid growth in crime and the associated requirement to increase the prevention of moped enabled mobile phone snatches.

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# CONFERENCE CONTRIBUTIONS

# "Jhaspora" and Millenials: Complexity, evolution, change and hybridization of terrorim in the EU

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## **Abstract**

*The military campaign in Syria against the Islamic State, along with the consequent fall of Raqqa and Mosul, fostered the "Jhaspora": it is the diaspora of many foreign terrorist fighters who have moved from the Caliphate territories to new "jihadi magnets" far from their home countries. If we focus on their countries of provenance, we notice how the "Jhaspora" has generated a sort of magnetic effect which can potentially attract many fighters and direct them to several geopolitical magnets. In the last two years, Europe has been facing the Millennials wave, a new surge of young terrorists inspired by the Lone Jihad narratives (cyber-)cultivated within the ever-increasing "Jhadisphere" and dominated by an "Islamic State of Mind". While the Member States are committed to set a legal framework and promote effective solutions to face the returnees-phenomenon, the security scenario is characterized by the "Jhaspora" multi-faceted threat. This study also aims at explaining why we should abandon the monolithic interpretation of the EU foreign terrorist fighters-phenomenon, in order to develop and adopt different perspectives, as well as methodologies and techniques to face the criminal hybridization of the terror threat.*

**Keywords:** *jihadi magnets, "Jhaspora", Millennials, "Jhadisphere", foreign terrorist fighters, criminal hybridization, security, Sahel*

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## “JIHASPORA”

The Caliphate territorial coverage, as a sort of pseudo-State, represented an opportunity for the Islamic State militants - not only the real fighters - who had the opportunity to develop specific skills and find a job (Dearden, 2015). The military campaign in Syria against the Islamic State, along with the consequent fall of Raqqa and Mosul, fostered the “Jihaspورا” which is the phenomenon concerns the Foreign Terrorists Fighters that leave the Islamic States’s territories and migrate toward Countries different than the ones they came from. Nowadays, despite the loss of hegemony in its territories, along with its physical presence within them, the Islamic State is still characterized by a wide and globalized trans-generational consensus.

## CRIMINAL HYBRIDIZATION

Al\_Qaeda and the Islamic State express the same strategic continuity to “colonize” the so called “no man’s land” with the aim, from a geopolitical perspective, to fill in the “empty spaces”. Therefore, it is necessary to pay very close attention to the criminal hybridization phenomenon, as a direct consequence of the changed scenario, fostered by several trigger factors:

- a) “Jihaspورا” - the exodus of Foreign Terrorist Fighters - some of them searching for new lands where establish with their families - from the Syriaq front. It represents a serious threat for EU security because it is born of new organized crime and terrorism actors. The Tunisian Southern border able to link Maghreb to Sahel seems to be particularly vulnerable to the jihadi penetration: jihadists now act not only as terrorists, but importantly as affiliated and/or workforce in organized crime groups in Sahel. The jihadi groups are increasing their military benefits in terms of weapons, mobility, logistics, illicit proceeds and intelligence assets (Raineri & Strazzari, 2017). From a security perspective, considering al\_Qaeda and the Islamic State attacks in Europe, the transcontinental character of the huge criminal networks across Europe and Africa imposes to look at that Region as the “far frontier” for EU;
- b) refugee camps in Mena Region - Turkey, Pakistan, Lebanon, Iran and Jordan are in the top 10 countries hosting refugees, followed by Libya (European Commission, 2017). In these camps, the huge number of refugees, the conditions of life are already or can generate a hidden and informal system for recruiting young men to join local extremist groups, taking advantage of their need of money to support their families. As a consequence of that, violent extremist/terrorist groups select some of these young men to lead local attacks reinforcing the terrorist threat in these countries;
- c) narco-jihadism – the increasing of drug trafficking in the Sahel Region (United Kingdom Government, 2013) where AQIM (alQaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) controls

the no man's land located between the borders of Mali, Mauritania, Algeria, Tunisia, Nigeria, Libya. The Qaeda's branch was responsible for a series of terrorist attacks: Mali (November 2015), Burkina Faso (January 2016) and Ivory Coast (March 2016). AQIM's interest in Sahel Region stresses the importance of taking part to several illicit trafficking in that area, especially the Cocaine business, as a strategic asset aimed at supporting the military campaign and spreading the influence of the Maghrebian affiliate. Furthermore, in Morocco AQIM controls the drug trafficking (U.S. Department of State, 2015) from Rif where half of the world's Hashish is produced (Blickman, 2017) - final destination Northern Africa and Europe drug markets;

- d) "Black Jihad" – AQIM, al Mourabitoun and Boko Haram represent a threat for security in Africa and Europe, as well as three different jihadi entities, with their own interpretations of pseudo-religious ideology, geopolitical and strategic visions. One of the most relevant effects on the African social-fabric is given by their capability to use money to develop and strengthen their recruitment networks in the small villages of Guinea Region, with the aim to involve young soldiers of fortune and searching for cash for their military campaign (Ewi, 2012);
- e) migrant-smuggling networks – the criminal networks manage more than 90% of the migrants coming to the EU. This transcontinental phenomenon is overflowing due to the increasing demand and has serious consequences on borders security, because of the creation of illegal corridors for migrant smuggling. Considering the multi-national engagement of migrants smuggling business - suspects originating from more than 100 countries both inside and outside of the EU - developing an estimate yearly turnover of an average US\$ 5 to 6 billion turnover in 2015 (Europol & Interpol, 2016). The resilience of organized crime networks improves the smugglers capability to quickly adapt and sell different "products", from drugs to humans. Besides, we do not have to forget that many migrants are indebted to their smugglers and this condition makes them vulnerable again and subjected to be "placed" in the labour or sexual exploitation market in EU. Moreover, in this well-networked criminal system, the terrorist groups can use migrant smugglers' assets, means and routes to achieve their goals as the need to infiltrate EU.

## THE MAGNETIC EFFECT OF JIHASPORA

Considering the heterogeneous origins of foreign terrorist fighters, if we focus on their countries of provenance, we notice how the "Jihaspora" has generated a sort of magnetic effect which can potentially attract the foreign terrorist fighters from Syria to several geopolitical magnets that represent the main jihadi hotbeds. For the most, these areas are characterized by peculiar geomorphologic conditions able to guarantee protection, high level of trafficking interconnections and, at the same time, they impede security controls.

1. Khorasan - in this Region al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban are competing to promote their own personal version of jihad: the "Islamic State Khorasan Province," the "Islamic State of Khorasan", the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan of Waziristan". The battle or, on the contrary, the convergence between branches and groups, as well as between Talibanism - strongly characterized by the tribal roots -, Qaedism and Takfirism as professed in the Islamic State, will produce a significant change both in the jihadi identity and control system of territory in this area;
2. "Balkisistan" - The movement of foreign terrorist fighters to the Balkans and the living memory of the Srebrenica genocide (1995) can reinforce the transnational jihadi identity which gathers individuals and groups from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia under the black flag of the Islamic State. For the first time in history, we might observe the result of the dangerous mixture between traditional mujahideen - who established after the Balkans war leading many criminal business as THB, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, traffic in stolen cars, smuggling, etc. - characterized by "veterans" strong criminal skills, on one hand, and the massive presence of young audacious European jihadists;
3. Caucasus - This region is populated by Caucasus mujahideen from the Caucasus Emirate - one of the main Islamist insurgent group operating in the North Caucasus (2007 - 2015) - and militants from the Islamic State Caucasus. The resources wealth, the geostrategic profile of the region and the anti-Russia sentiment can foster the merger of many small groups into a completely new jihadi macro-actor, more likely an informal militia movement, just like the Chechnya's Islamic insurgency;
4. Southeast Asia - The radical extremist groups have opened a new Southeast Asian front through which disseminate their campaign of violence aimed at spreading the global jihad. In the region, the Islamic State seems to be more transnational and pervasive than al-Qaeda. The revenge of the foreign terrorist fighters might start from here, if we consider how easier - than in Western countries - it would be attacking residents or Western visitors as soft targets and, in some cases, global company representatives;
5. Sahel - this region has been becoming the first magnet for the foreign terrorist fighters, as previously explained.

## EU FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL THREAT

We can estimate that the number of the Foreign Terrorist Fighters that will decide to go back home will be scarce: they do not want to come back home particularly because of the frustration to be constantly controlled by EU police forces and security agencies.

Considering the finite resources of EU and Member States, in any case, the returnees phenomenon needs to be addressed focusing on the multi-dimensional nature of both the threat and categories of actors, as follows:

- a) foreign fighters not involved in crimes;
- b) foreign terrorist fighters ready to attack because of preexisting "sleeping cell" capability;
- c) returnees who decide to join a non-violent extremist movement/party;
- d) foreign terrorist fighters who decided to come back home just to carry out a preordained attack;
- e) foreign fighters who can be considered living icons and/or magnets for face-to face radicalization (family, friends, prison, etc.);
- f) returnees who can be considered as low-profile hubs connected to relevant global *jihadi* movements of actors;
- g) highly frustrated potential foreign terrorist fighters who were not able to travel to join the Caliphate;
- h) proto-foreign fighters who are waiting for the next call to *jihad*;
- i) foreign terrorist fighters who turn into lone wolves.

Moreover, especially in the West, the spread of the "Islamic State of Mind" virus has been becoming always more relevant, as in the last terrorist attacks in EU.

Taking into account those elements, it is clear that we need to abandon the monolithic interpretation of the EU foreign terrorist fighters-phenomenon in order to develop and adopt different perspectives, as well as methodologies and techniques to face the threat.

## 2016-2017 TARGET EUROPE - THE MILLENNIALS WAVE

Three years after Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack in Paris we can explain why it represented the 9/11 for EU: it had the same strength to redefine the security balance, perceptions and priorities in the continent. For the first time, a European capital was attacked by two terrorists symbolically dressed as foreign terrorist fighters, using the same weapons and asymmetrical tactics. It was so relevant because this terror attack breaks the boundary between the quiet and peaceful European continent and the bloody war zones, making

EU enter a new world of danger and fear. From that time, the “world of peace” and the “world of war” as to separated dimensions ceased to exist. The globalized world is just one and it is infected by the jihadi virus which goes beyond any border. Everyone can be the testimonial of the jihadi violent campaign against the West - the infidel crusaders - in his own city and daily-life with no need to be in Raqqa or Mosul.

Now, considering the arrangement of the low-cost jihadi attacks carried out in Europe during the last two years (2016-2017), we can deduce how old the perpetrators and accomplices are. Excluding Khalid Masood, the lone actor who attacked the pedestrians in Westminster Bridge and Parliament Square, the other terrorists are mainly Millennials - individuals born between 1980 e 2004 -, thus they belong to the known “Generation Y” or “Millennial” generation (Goldman Sachs, 2017). Such generation is completely different from the previous ones (Pew Research Center, 2010): they are followers/influencers/prosumers who spend most of their daily-routine interacting in the (cyber-)social ecosystem.

Therefore, it is necessary to highlight some key-elements that can facilitate the comprehension of their behavior, vulnerabilities, modi operandi and goals. For example, despite terrorists are frequently connected by blood ties and/or close links - some of them are brothers, cousins, friends, etc. -. We think that “families of terrorists” - and/or group of terrorists well-integrated into family networks - concept is not applicable to the last wave of terrorists. Indeed, exploring their past, family structure, relationships and quick radicalization process is relevant to focus on their need to “reboot” life in terms of creating a new jihadi life based on “peer family”, which replaces their own family. That is why they decide to break the ties with their parents before attacking.

The ICT evolution assumes a key role in the terrorist threat transformation and, contextually, the development of new social dynamics and codes affects the ICT development trends. This happens since the cyberspace is not a mere space of information sharing, but a real (cyber-)social ecosystem: we have to definitively consider it as the environment in which human existence “materializes” day by day.

In this context, the incessant action/representation of digital circularity and the media coverage of terror, fear and insecurity is the main asset employed to implement the asymmetric power of terrorist entities, especially of jihadi groups because of their specific violent and sadistic rhetoric based on horrific images.

Twenty years ago, the websites which developed and spread the online terrorist propaganda were only ten, while, nowadays we estimate they are about ten thousand and the most of them refer to the jihadi threat. The Internet Jihadism has to be considered a complex and evolving phenomenon (Antinori, 2017) which needs to be studied and tackled through specific cross-disciplinary skills. The rapid rise of the Islamic State, espe-

cially among the Western Millennials, demonstrates that the traditional nature of propaganda - actions used to target local audiences as masses and then aimed at compacting them against a specific target – has been changing in a more pervasive and seductive mobile "individualized globalization" (Antinori, 2018).

That is the reason why we need to move from an approach merely based on conflict of 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> generation of migrants and their integration/inclusion in society, to a new and more effective multi-dimensional approach focused on the 1<sup>st</sup> generation of Millennials as terrorists, also considering the spontaneous-violent and low-cost modalities which characterized the last wave of terrorist attacks occurred in EU. The Millennials roots are not linked to traditions nor cultural origins. Their roots are more superficial but very extensive and interconnected in the "infosphere" due to the "superficial complexity". Such concept is quite relevant if we want to deeply understand current and future (cyber-)social violent radicalization in the cyberspace. This generation is particularly characterized by specific vulnerabilities, as below specified:

- the need to be always interconnected but, in fact, deeply alone;
- the lack of a strategic vision of the future;
- the consciousness of being world citizens;
- the extensive use of a "visual" language and a storytelling;
- the main role of peer groups;
- the lack of local ties;
- the rampant narcissism and "selfism";
- the need to be protagonist of the history perceived as the present;
- the belief that "smart" is "clever";
- the post-truth era and the overexposure to fake news, cyber-trolling and misinformation. The concept of (real) truth seems to depend on a sort of (cyber-)relational adhesion often allowed without any previous verification of authenticity from the supporters.

Now, taking into consideration the "generational vulnerability" in addition to the individual vulnerabilities, it is possible to understand how the evolution of the exploitation strategies related to (cyber-) social mobile-media for terrorism purposes has to be considered one of the main assets to develop the *jihadi* hybrid warfare. In this scenario, the User Generated Contents (UGC) are the tools used to create the cross-groups influence across the (cyber-)social ecosystem, which allow the new young terrorist generation to change target: moving from the terrorist groups to the individual target, that is the core business of the Millennials next wave of terror.

That is why, after the fall of Mosul and Raqqa, we are not living in a time characterized by a "Virtual Caliphate", as many authors affirm. Instead, we have to consider the generation-

al and individual vulnerabilities which strongly reinforce the “Islamic State of Mind”, that is, the concrete manifestation of the - (cyber-)social - Caliphate.

## CONCLUSION

The first wave of jihadi Millennials terror in Europe and the unceasing evolution of the Internet Jihadism points out the hybrid warfare capability and strategy to create new and more sophisticated asymmetric tactics and modi operandi - strongly supported by User Generated Contents (UGCs) disseminated across the Web. The “Islamic State of Mind” spread continues to inspire violent creativity and incite to attack soft targets.

Law Enforcement Agencies in Europe have to face the hard challenges given by complexity, evolution, change and hybridization of terrorism in EU between the cyber and “physical” world. There is an urgency, with the aim to innovate in EU Law Enforcement, to promote awareness of the new security challenges. The Law Enforcement has to deeply understand that the current threats are characterized by a converging dynamic both in cyberspace and territory. It implies to develop scenarios based on cross-disciplinary skills to deal with terrorism new issues such as, for example, jihadi hybrid warfare, fake news, lone wolf culture of terrorism, (cyber-)tailored narratives, UGCs, Islamic State of Mind, cyber-trolling, low cost/dual use modi operandi, caliphacking, visual-storytelling, violent cultivation, chatbots and mobile addiction.

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# The Investigative Interview Contribution to Law Enforcement: Perceptions of Portuguese Police Officers and Magistrates

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## Abstract

*The Cognitive Interview (CI) offers a systematic method for increasing the amount of relevant information obtained from a witness without compromising accuracy. Purpose: This research aimed to investigate police officers' perceptions of their interviewing practices with specific reference to their use of the cognitive interview components. Second, it was intended to assess how useful prosecutors and judges consider the cognitive interview techniques. Method: A sample of 362 police officers' from 4 Portuguese law enforcement agencies and a sample of 148 Magistrates (64 Judges and 84 Prosecutors) completed a self-report questionnaire con-*

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*The content of this study does not reflect the official opinion of the Public Security Police. Responsibility for the information and views expressed in this paper lies entirely with the author.*

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cerning their perceptions of witness interviewing practices. Results: The results indicated that officers' report they use some techniques more often than others. Police officers' also tended to opt for more intuitive techniques (e.g. rapport, uninterrupted account) and move away from the more advanced techniques and mnemonics that help an extensive retrieval (e.g. recall in variety of orders, change perspective). This may be indicative of insufficient training in techniques that promote more efficient recall. Conclusion: In fact, regardless of the criminal police body in Portugal, there is still a long way to go with regard training police officers' in adequate procedures to obtain better testimonial evidence. It is perceived that the current training of criminal investigators is simplistic, relying mainly on intuitive techniques and disregarding the contributions of the scientific community.

**Keywords:** *investigative interview, law enforcement, judges, prosecutors, Portugal*

*The investigative task is the core aspect of policing today and what emerges from that core task is the key element of the ability to interview.*

*(Evans & Webb, 1993, p. 37)*

## Introduction

Criminal investigations aim to answer two primary questions: (i) "What happened?" (if anything did happen) and (ii) "Who committed the offence?" (Milne & Bull, 2016). The goal of any successful investigation is for the police to detain the perpetrators and gather sufficient reliable evidence for legal proceedings. At the outset, witness evidence often directs the entire investigatory process, while in the latter stages of an investigation it plays a central role in legal decision making and the delivery of justice (Ridley, Gabbert, & La Rooy, 2013; Shepherd & Griffiths, 2013). Indeed, the use of testimonial evidence goes back to ancient times; however it was under the *Corpus Iuris Civilis*, issued from 528 to 534 A.D., by order of Eastern Roman Emperor Justinian, that some regulation was found in the admissibility of testimonial evidence (Buckland, 1968).

In 1975, the RAND Corporation reported that 85% of what the police do on a daily basis is talk to citizens, but only 2% of police respondents had received any formal training on how to interview people. It was only in the early 1990s that any formal consideration was given to the procedures that could be used to gather testimonial evidence. A Home Office task force in the UK including psychologists and police officers' was developed in order to examine suspect interviewing practices following persistent concern over the manner in which these interviews were conducted (Poyser, Nurse, & Milne, 2018). In the light of the task force conclusions, and following a national review of interviewing practice, the PEACE model was formulated and introduced across England and Wales (Clarke & Milne, 2001; Milne & Bull, 1999). Frequently considered as a solution to the controversial

use of coercive practices, the PEACE model trains officers' to employ a non-accusatory, investigative-interviewing approach (Milne & Bull, 1999, Clarke & Milne, 2016).

PEACE (an acronym for the stages of an interview, *Planning and preparation, Engage and explain, Account, Closure and Evaluation*) standardized the way in which police officers' were trained to interview, and eventually brought about a sea change in attitude towards the purpose of an interview – that is, PEACE educated police officers' in the benefits of a structured, information gathering approach to interviewing (Williamson, 1993), steering them away from the interrogatory practices that dominated interviewing practice until that time. PEACE is also evidence-based as it incorporates two primary models of interviewing from the research base: (i) the Cognitive Interview (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992) and (ii) the Conversation Management (Shepherd & Griffiths, 2013). Each is offered as being suitable for witnesses, but the former is advocated for cooperative witnesses, because it relies on witnesses agreeing to 'use' several mnemonic techniques, while the latter is used for more reluctant/uncooperative witnesses. The enduring value of PEACE stems from the fact that, among other things, it is evidence-based, it clearly defines the structure of a witness interview and distinguishes the aims and differences of each of the phases within the structure in relation to questioning and retrieval techniques (Clarke & Milne, 2001).

Numerous law enforcement agencies, and other professionals, all over the world use the cognitive approach (from here on referred to as the Cognitive Interview) as a way of obtaining an interviewee's account with minimal interference. However, only a few countries (e.g., UK, Australia, New Zealand, Norway) have established specific guidelines for the use of this methodology. In fact, UK is perhaps the best example of a country where this interview has been adapted and included in police protocols as the primary method for interviewing witnesses (Milne, Griffiths, Clarke, & Dando, in press).

The primary objectives of the study reported here were twofold. First, to investigate Portuguese police officers' perceptions of their interviewing practices with specific reference to their use of the cognitive interview components. Second, it was intended to assess how useful do prosecutors and judges consider the cognitive interview techniques to be.

Data was also collected to assess police officers', prosecutors and judges perceptions about the importance and usefulness of visual recording the investigative interviews conducted by law enforcement.

### **Witness Interviewing Training in Portuguese Law Enforcement Agencies**

In Portugal interviewing techniques are taught to police officers through brief training modules that include legal and psychological issues related to witness testimony. Although these modules, part of police officers/inspectors training course, address the

PEACE model and advocate the use of the CI procedure, they blend different (sometimes contrasting) interviewing models with traditional police-dominated interview techniques. The absence of a structured training framework hinders the acquisition of advanced interview skills, resulting in the use of improper interviewing techniques often learned on the job (Marques, 2018).

Peixoto, Seabra, and Castanho (2015) found that the different law enforcement agencies in Portugal include interviewing techniques in their initial training, and these skills are further developed in the training of police officers' carrying out criminal investigation functions. However, different law enforcement agencies in Portugal have different training. According to Peixoto et al. (2015) the inspectors at the Portuguese Criminal Police (i.e. Polícia Judiciária, or PJ) have more extensive training than their counterparts from other police organizations (e.g. Public Security Police – PSP; Republican National Guard – GNR). Nevertheless, the only research to examine real life interviews conducted by Portuguese police officers present a different picture – no matter what the criminal police body it is, the training is insufficient (Freitas-Magalhães & Castro, 2009; Santos, 2006).

Freitas-Magalhães and Castro (2009) analyzed a sample of interviews conducted by 46 inspectors and chief-inspectors (mean length of service: 13.7 years) from PJ to assess the techniques being used in the interrogation of suspects and in the interviews of victims using content analysis. It was found that there was a non-standardization in the techniques used by the different inspectors, suggesting that they rely upon intuition, lacking techniques being used with scientific support, sustained only by the expertise gained in their years of service. Furthermore, the reference to a training manual entitled Criminal Interrogations and Confessions (Inbau, Reid, Buckley, & Jayne, 2004) is contained in the PJ police inspectors training course and is highlighted as being the “Bible” of interrogation techniques. This shows a lack of knowledge of other research based approaches in the interrogation of suspects (e.g., conversation management, Shepherd & Griffiths, 2013). Over the past decade, psychological and socio-legal research has demonstrated that the types of trickery and deception regularly used with the Reid Technique of interrogation can result in a significant cost to social justice – they increase the likelihood of eliciting false confessions by the innocent (Kassin, 1997; Kassin et al., 2010; Meissner et al., 2014).

Moreover, research on witness interviewing in Portugal is very limited. The first research on this issue addressing the Portuguese context (to be published in peer-reviewed journals) point out that cooperation among professionals (e.g., police and research teams) is very rare in Portugal and disclosure or evaluation of police interview protocols is seldom conducted (Paulo, Albuquerque, & Bull, 2014). In light of the above mentioned difficulties, in Portugal, CI has only been examined through laboratory research with student samples. As a result it would seem valuable to investigate how often officers' use the CI components (as they are trained in the CI) in real investigations. Moreover, as the frequency

of use of the components is likely to be predicted by their perceived usefulness it would also seem reasonable to inquire as to how effective each component is perceived to be. Furthermore, while it is important to examine perceived witness interviewing practices, it is important also to understand how these techniques are being taught in the police academy and if the model complies with any specific guidance. The present study aimed to investigate these factors.

### Police Officers' Perceptions of Interviewing

Officer's beliefs and perceptions as to the efficacy of interviewing techniques will likely influence its forensic application. Moreover, if officers' perceptions are not positive then any training will unlikely have any impact on behavior due to motivational problems (Dando, Wilcock, & Milne, 2008).

Two studies have examined police perceptions of CI techniques.

Kebbell, Milne, and Wagstaff, in 1999, collected data from 161 serving UK police officers' about their perceived witness interviewing practices and concluded that among these officers' there was a consensus that some of the CI components were used more often than others and that some were more useful. Rated as most useful and most frequently used were *establish rapport*, *report everything*, *encourage concentration*, *witness compatible questioning* and *mental reinstatement of context*. Rated as less useful and less frequently used were *recall in different orders*, *imagery*, *change perspectives* and *transfer control*. In addition, the study pointed out that trained officers' were significantly more likely to use instructions to *mentally reinstate the context*, use *different orders*, *change perspectives* and *imagery*, when compared with untrained officers'. However, of the sample, only 38% of respondents were constables (first rank officers'). The remainder were either higher ranked or specialist officers' all of whom would not typically interview witnesses of volume crime (i.e. theft, robbery, & assault). Moreover, the respondents were all experienced officers' with a mean length of service of 12 years and were enrolled on a degree level correspondence course and consequently were unlikely to have been representative of the police service. Thus in a more recent investigation Dando et al. (2008) collected data from 221 young in service, non-specialist police officers' from five UK police areas, who completed a self-report questionnaire concerning their perceived witness interviewing practices. There was a consensus among these officers' that they perceived using some of the PEACE CI components more frequently and perceived some of them to be more effective than others (e.g. *free recall*, *rapport*, and *explain* were used/attempted most frequently. *Witness compatible questioning*, *report everything*, *mental reinstatement of context*, *never guess*, and *concentrate* were less frequently used/attempted). The authors concluded that frontline police officers' report feeling inadequately trained, under pressure and generally ill equipped to conduct interviews

While the aforementioned literature provides some insight as to how the CI is perceived by police officers' in the UK, to the best of our knowledge, until now, no similar study has been conducted in Portugal. Thus, very little information was available to inform the predictions of the study. In fact, the present research addresses this gap in the literature by examining, for the first time Portuguese police officers' witness interviewing practices.

Considering the findings of the abovementioned studies pertaining to officers' perceptions (Dando et al., 2008; Kebbell et al., 1999) and the only research examining real life interviews to be conducted in Portugal (Freitas-Magalhães & Castro, 2009), it was hypothesized that Portuguese police officers' fail to fully apply the CI procedure. Further it was hypothesized that the more demanding CI components, namely recall in variety of orders and change perspective, would be among the least applied components.

Additionally, this was also the first study to assess the Portuguese judges and prosecutors perceptions of investigative interviewing. It was sought to examine the knowledge of judges and prosecutors on evidence-based investigative interviewing models and how they perceive Portuguese police interviewing training and practices to be.

## Method

### Participants and Procedure

A sample of 362 police officers' from 4 Portuguese police law enforcement agencies<sup>3</sup> (PSP, GNR, SEF, ASAE) and a sample of 148 Magistrates<sup>4</sup> (64 Judges and 84 Prosecutors) completed a self-report questionnaire concerning their perceptions of witness interviewing practices.

### Sample Details: Police Officers'

Out of the 362 respondents, 92% were male and 8% were female, which broadly represents the male to female ratio in criminal investigation duties. The mean age of respondents was 40.2 years (SD = 6.7 years) and mean length of service was 17.7 years (SD = 7.1 years) ranging from 1 to 39 years. The large majority of respondents were from GNR (60.2%) and PSP (31.8%), the two most representative criminal police bodies, where 64.1%

3 In Portugal, security is mainly assured by two national police bodies, the Public Security Police (PSP), a civil police that patrols urban areas, and the Republican National Guard (GNR), a gendarmerie force with jurisdiction over rural areas. In addition, there are other national security services with more specialized functions: the Portuguese Criminal Police (Policia Judiciária, or PJ), particularly focused on violent and organized crime under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice; the Portuguese Immigration and Borders Service (SEF); and The Economic and Food Safety Authority (ASAE), the national specialized administrative authority in the context of food safety and economic surveillance.

4 The term *magistrate* is used both for Prosecutors (Public Prosecution Magistrate) and Judges (Judicial Magistrate).

were police officers' from lower ranks (e.g. Constables, Senior Constables). The sample was broad enough to include police officers' with different duties and responsibilities but a large part of the sample (74.9%) was assigned to criminal investigation functions.

### **Sample Details: Magistrates'**

Out of the 148 respondents, 62.2% were female and 37.8% were male. The mean age of respondents was 44.1 years (SD = 8.7 years) and mean length of service was 16.9 years (SD = 9.7 years) ranging from 2 to 40 years. Eighty-four respondents (56.8%) were prosecutors while 64 (43.2%) judges.

After obtaining the necessary authorizations to carry out the study, the questionnaire was made available on an encrypted online platform in order to guarantee the participants' privacy. Informed consent was requested and the participants were elucidated about the contextualization and objectives of the study, as well as ensuring anonymity of their answers.

## **Materials**

### **Police officers' questionnaire**

The questionnaire was based on that described by Kebbell et al. (1999) and Dando et al. (2008). Using an adaptation of an existing instrument is beneficial due to the possibility of a cross-cultural comparison of the results. The content was guided by both the research approach and the current police investigative interviewing training manuals, with the necessary adjustment to fit national context, and combined both quantitative and qualitative forms of data. The questionnaire was structured into four sections: (a) personal and socioprofessional data; (b) interviewing experience; (c) interview techniques; (d) impressions of interviewing; comprising in total 58 questions related to witness interviewing.

### **Personal and socio-professional data**

In the first section of the questionnaire, police officers' were asked for details about themselves including age, gender, law enforcement agency, rank, police duties and length of service.

### **Interviewing experience**

The second section asked if respondents have criminal investigation duties and if they had attended any advanced criminal investigation training course where they learnt investigative interviewing techniques. In addition, their experience of witness interviewing was asked - how frequently do they interview witnesses.

### **Interview techniques**

The third section asked respondents questions concerning their use of the PEACE CI components and how effective they perceived these components to be.

### **Impressions of interviewing**

In the last section, participants were asked how important do they perceive testimonial evidence to be in judicial decision-making. Questions were also raised about how police record witness statements and about the utility of audiovisual recording systems for interviews. Finally, respondents were asked about topics such as: (i) the quality of the training in witness interviewing; (ii) the usefulness of CI; (iii) the need of a national framework of investigative interviewing.

### **Magistrates' questionnaire**

The content of the questionnaire designed for judges and prosecutors was guided by both the research and current practical issues regarding criminal investigation and prosecution. The questionnaire was organized into four sections: (a) personal and socio-professional data; (b) introductory considerations; (c) perceptions about criminal police bodies; (d) considerations about law enforcement training, comprising in total 22 questions.

### **Personal and socio-professional data**

In the first section, judges and prosecutors were asked for details about themselves including age, gender, and length of service, career.

### **Introductory considerations**

The second section asked if respondents ever attended any cognitive/investigative interview training course and how they gained their knowledge about witness interviewing techniques. In addition, respondents were asked how useful do they consider the cognitive interview techniques in the gathering of testimonial evidence and the importance they believe testimonial evidence can have in judicial decision making.

### **Perceptions about criminal police bodies**

The third section asked respondents to answer questions concerning their perceptions about police officers' performance when interviewing witnesses. Additionally, respondents were asked about their concordance with the opinion that the interviewing of witnesses and suspects in criminal investigations should only be conducted by Prosecutors<sup>5</sup>. Moreover, respondents were asked about their agreement with the need of adopting a methodology where all witness interviews are visually recorded.

### **Considerations about law enforcement training**

In this section the magistrates were asked about their perceptions about the suitability of the initial and continuing training in law enforcement agencies.

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<sup>5</sup> An opinion raised by Rui da Silva Leal, a former President of the Porto Regional Council of the Portuguese Bar Association, in the IV Congress of Portuguese Lawyers (Leal, 2005).

## Results

The findings will be discussed by initially presenting results concerning the sections *interviewing experience* and *impressions of interviewing*, included in the police officers questionnaire, and where the participants were able to describe their witness interviewing training and practices. Then we proceed to discuss the findings concerning the perceived use of CI techniques for trained and untrained police officers. After that the results of the magistrates' questionnaire will be presented, starting with their perceived training and knowledge of CI techniques and finally reporting their perceptions of criminal police bodies' performance when interviewing witnesses.

### Police officers' training

Since the greater part of the sample had criminal investigation duties (74.9%), it was expected that most of them had had specific training to equip them with the necessary skills. Despite 69.9% of the sample having specific training in criminal investigation, their knowledge of investigative interviewing techniques derived from their initial training (54.3%) as only 7.2% had any continuing education. Moreover, when asked whether they felt their training had equipped them with the necessary skills to interview witnesses effectively, 206 officers' (56.9%) stated that the training was *quite effective* (2) on a Likert style scale ranging from 0 (*not effective*) to 4 (*always effective*). In addition, the vast majority advocated the adoption of a system of continued training to ensure the maintenance of acquired skills in investigative interviewing (78.8%).

### Frequency of interviewing

Two hundred fifty-seven respondents (71.2%) stated that they interview witnesses as part of their day-to-day duties. The mean number of witness interviews per week carried out by the respondents was 6.9 (SD = 7.6).

Officers' were asked what types of crime<sup>6</sup> they interview witnesses more often. The results showed that most of the witness interviews were related with the investigation of property crimes (58.5%), assault (52.5%) and drug trafficking (35.1%).

### Reported use of the PEACE CI components

In order to better understand the perceived frequency of use of the CI components, we used a T-test to assess whether the means of police officers' who attended a criminal investigation course where the CI protocol is taught are statistically different from officers' without this specific training.

<sup>6</sup> Multiple answers per participant possible. Percentages added may exceed 100 since a participant may select more than one answer for this question.

Of the sample, 109 were untrained in the CI. Two-hundred-fifty-three were trained in the CI mostly through the criminal investigation course. There were no significant differences between trained and untrained officers on demographic details (i.e. age, length of service, sex, rank).

Trained and untrained officers' reports of how often they use CI components were compared using t-test. Officers in the trained group were significantly more likely to report that they used rapport ( $t(360)=3,46, p < 0,01$ ), report everything ( $t(360)=2,28, p < 0,05$ ) and focused retrieval ( $t(360)=2,76, p < 0,01$ ). These means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 1. There were no significant differences between the trained and untrained groups in their reported frequency of use of uninterrupted account ( $t=1,59, p=n/s$ ), explain ( $t=-0,39, p=n/s$ ), concentrate ( $t=0,35, p=n/s$ ), never guess ( $t=1,48, p=n/s$ ), witness compatible questioning ( $t=-1,16, p=n/s$ ), mental reinstatement of context ( $t=0,81, p=n/s$ ), recall in variety of orders ( $t=0,81, p=n/s$ ), change perspective ( $t=-1,49, p=n/s$ ).

**Table 1.** Reported frequency of use of cognitive interview techniques for trained and untrained officers

COMPONENT	Total	Trained	Untrained
Rapport**	3.36 (0.72)	<b>3.45 (0.66)</b>	<b>3.17 (0.82)</b>
Uninterrupted account	3.14 (0.87)	3.20 (0.78)	3.02 (1.06)
Report everything*	3.14 (0.90)	<b>3.21 (0.87)</b>	<b>2.97 (0.95)</b>
Focused retrieval**	3.08 (0.81)	<b>3.15 (0.74)</b>	<b>2.90 (0.95)</b>
Explain	2.99 (1.07)	2.98 (1.11)	3.03 (0.97)
Concentrate	2.79 (0.92)	2.80 (0.92)	2.76 (0.90)
Never guess	2.71 (1.11)	2.77 (1.11)	2.58 (1.12)
Witness compatible questioning	2.61 (0.84)	2.58 (0.86)	2.69 (0.78)
Mental reinstatement of context	2.57 (1.03)	2.60 (1.01)	2.50 (1.07)
Recall in variety of orders	1.90 (0.91)	1.93 (0.91)	1.84 (0.89)
Change perspective	1.36 (0.96)	1.31 (0.98)	1.48 (0.91)

**Note:** Standard deviations in brackets. Significant difference between factors, \*  $p < 0,05$ , \*\*  $p < 0,01$ .

Table 1 displays reported frequency of use of cognitive interview components for officers' with and without the criminal investigation course. The components perceived to be used most frequently were rapport (ranked 1), uninterrupted account (ranked 2), report everything (ranked 3), and focused retrieval (ranked 4). Less frequently used were explain (ranked 5), concentrate (ranked 6), never guess (ranked 7), witness compatible

questioning (ranked 8), mental reinstatement of context (ranked 9), recall in variety of orders (ranked 10), change perspective (ranked 11).

### **Magistrates training and knowledge of cognitive interview techniques**

Magistrates were asked if they had ever attended a training course where the cognitive interview techniques were explored. One hundred and twenty-nine respondents (87.2%) reported that they never had training in this topic. Not surprisingly, in line with these results 57.4% of the magistrates reported that they don't know anything (19.6%) or had insufficient knowledge (37.8%) on cognitive interview and other techniques to gather testimonial evidence. However 71.6% consider cognitive interviewing techniques very useful (66.9%) or indispensable (4.7%). On the other hand, testimonial evidence is considered very important (66.9%) or indispensable (16.9%) for judicial decision making.

### **Perceptions about criminal police bodies**

When asked to rate how effective the techniques used in law enforcement for witness interviewing are, 124 respondents (83.8%) perceived they are quite effective whereas 13 (8.8%) stated that they are not very effective. In addition, 74.3% of the magistrates assume that the criminal investigators that interview witnesses as part of their job are quite experienced (2 in the 0 – 4 Likert scale). Despite this, 97 respondents (65.6%) don't agree with the idea that interviewing witnesses should be done only by prosecutors.

On the other hand, 87.8% of the magistrates agree that investigative interviews should be video recorded.

## **Discussion**

The present study aimed to investigate the witness interviewing practices of Portuguese police officers', with reference to their application of the CI procedure.

As predicted, and consistent with previous research (e.g. Dando et al., 2008; Kebbell et al., 1999), police officers' report they applied some of the CI components more frequently than others. Thus, the hypothesis, that police officers' fail the full application of the CI procedure was found to be supported.

Consideration of components that were highly rated revealed a pattern. Establish rapport, report everything and uninterrupted account were rated highly. Less frequently used were the cognitive components of the CI – mental reinstatement of the context, recall in variety of orders and change perspective. This pattern of results is the same as the pattern found by Kebbell et al. (1999). Consequently, the hypothesis that the more

demanding CI components, namely recall in variety of orders and change perspective, would be among the least applied components found to be supported too.

Officers' with criminal investigation course (i.e. trained group) were significantly more likely to report that they use rapport, report everything and focused retrieval than those without criminal investigation course (i.e. untrained group). This indicates a positive effect of training for these factors. However, no significant differences were found between trained and untrained groups in their perceived use of other CI components. These results were unexpected, because previous research comparing the reported use of the CI components between trained and untrained police officers' (e.g. Kebbell et al., 1999) showed that the cognitive components of the CI (e.g. mental reinstatement of context, change perspectives, recall in variety of orders) increased after training.

Possibly the reason that there were no significant differences between trained and untrained officers on these measures was because apparently police officers' tended to opt for more intuitive techniques and move away from the more advanced techniques and mnemonics that help in an extensive retrieval. This may be indicative of insufficient training in techniques that promote more efficient recall. The cognitive components perceived in this study to be least used are arguably the most demanding PEACE CI interview components.

Among police officers' there was a consensus that techniques that primarily aim to influence the social situation of the interview were used more frequently than others.

Furthermore, it is important to bear in mind that this research is based on police officers' perceptions of their use of the CI components and not the actual quality of the use of these techniques and thus future research should examine the actual quality of the Portuguese investigative interviews in the field.

This study also highlighted the importance of scholars understanding the views of prosecutors and judges when examining the usefulness of police interviewing methods.

A major finding of this study is that although magistrates consider cognitive interviewing techniques very useful, a large proportion of the sample, 87%, reported that they never had training in this procedure. Moreover, almost 20% of the magistrates reported that they don't know anything about the CI model.

A limitation of this study is that it relies on the views of a small number of magistrates who may not represent the views of magistrates more generally. After careful reflection on the nature of most judges and prosecutors perceptions of effectiveness of the interview protocol used by Portuguese police (i.e. *quite effective*), we believe that the above-

mentioned lack of perceived knowledge and training in witness interviewing skills could have undermined the results of the study. More research is required to explore the validity of magistrates' perceptions, particularly by examining the views of the judges and prosecutors with confirmed familiarity with CI procedure.

## Conclusion

It has been consistently highlighted that experienced officers' do not regularly use the memory enhancing CI components (Clarke & Milne, 2001; Clifford & George, 1996). Correspondingly it is likely to be the case that, at best, inexperienced officers' witness interviewing behavior would display a similar pattern. Equally, it is entirely possible that Portuguese police officers' witness interviewing practices are completely disparate from that taught in their training.

Apparently, in Portugal, the adequate training in CI techniques and the adoption of a best practice for investigative interviewing, such as the PEACE framework, is conditioned by the following set of factors: (a) there are no guidelines that discipline the adoption of standardized evidence-based practices for conducting investigative interviews; (b) initial training is insufficient and disregards the teaching of the specific skills required for the gathering of more complete and reliable testimony; (c) the CI model is understood as too difficult to understand and there is distrust regarding its effectiveness; (d) criminal investigators are completely overwhelmed with criminal cases workload and favor methodologies that ensure a faster response; (e) the workplace supervision of the investigative interviewing practices used by criminal investigators is minimal; (f) opportunities for continuing training are scarce and often directed to higher hierarchical ranks, which do not necessarily correspond to those who implement the procedures in real-life police interviews.

In fact, regardless of the criminal police body in Portugal, there is still a long way to go with regard training police officers' in the adequate procedures to obtain better testimonial evidence. It is perceived that the training of criminal investigators is simplistic, relying mainly on intuitive techniques and disregarding the contributions of the scientific community.

Despite the concerns expressed by the scientific community with regard to poor investigative interviewing, as a result of inadequate training, and the many problems associated with techniques that lead to incomplete witness testimony and which can ultimately result in miscarriages of justice, nothing similar to the changes seen in the UK, Norway, and New Zealand (Clarke & Milne, 2001; Fahsing and Rachlew, 2009; Schollum, 2005) has emerged in Portugal.

On the other hand, there is also a lack of guidelines based on evidence-based research and despite the efforts of Paulo, Albuquerque and Bull (2014), the apparent resistance of police institutions to the contributions of the academic community didn't allow the researchers from the University of Minho to develop a protocol that could be replicated in the training of criminal investigators of the Portuguese law enforcement agencies.

As stated by Griffiths and Milne (2018), there's a need to be more proactive in driving the change required. Griffiths and Milne (2018) developed the *Framework for Investigative Transformation* (FIT), each factor of which needs to be present if organizations are to achieve a goal of conducting professional and evidence based criminal investigations, contributing to a fair and effective criminal justice system, by professional open-minded investigators, seeking justice for victims and avoiding miscarriages of justice. FIT can be applied to investigations as a whole or any individual area of investigation, for example FIT for *investigative interviewing*, allowing organizations to create the correct environment for professional criminal investigations. FIT consists of eight factors (i.e. leadership; legislative framework; investigative mindset or cognitive style; investigators' knowledge base; training and knowledge regime; quality assurance mechanisms; the ability/skill set of investigator; technology) that are either enablers of, where they are all present, or barriers to, where they are absent, skilled criminal investigations (Griffiths & Milne, 2018).

Our research has revealed the weaknesses of the methodologies currently perceived to be used by Portuguese law enforcement agencies in collecting more complete and reliable testimonies. For change we recommend a reform on three broad vectors. First, it is imperative to prioritize the development of a detailed protocol including the best practices in witness and suspect interviewing, in particular the adoption of the PEACE model for investigative interviewing. Secondly, we believe that only through a standardized tier-based training program for interviewing victims, witnesses and suspects will it be possible to recover more than two decades of indifference to the progress that has been made in this area. This program should be based on the principles of PEACE framework. Finally, collaboration between academic researchers and police organizations should increase beyond what currently appears to be the case. Such partnerships may make police officers more aware of the benefits of empirically derived practices and thus increase their willingness to participate in research. As suggested by Snook et al. (2010), researchers working in conjunction with police organizations should attempt to evaluate current interviewing practices, facilitate the implementation of any training needs that emerge from the evaluations, and conduct and publish program evaluations in order to ensure that the training is leading to desired outcomes.

The implementation of these measures appears to depend only on the will of the police organizations. If, on the one hand, it falls into the decision sphere of political leaders to draft necessary legislation to regulate such practices, on the other, nothing prevents the

criminal police bodies from reforming their initial and continuing training to standardize procedures and to implement the necessary changes. Indeed, if such substantial reform in police interview techniques did not prevent the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Norway law enforcement agencies from continuing to be effective in their criminal investigations, it is highly likely that members of Portuguese police organizations would be equally successful.

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# Core Capabilities: Body-worn cameras in Portugal

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### Abstract

*In the current world situation, which is daily provided with new inputs that increase its complexity, we try to find the correct balance between multiple variables – among those, the duality of liberty and security. Technology shapes the way society is formed and interacts, introducing new challenges for the citizen and also to law enforcement. As so, technology is an external force that has deterministic impacts on organizations, modelling strategies, social actions, and criminal conducts. The discussion in the field of operational and strategic management broadly favours the idea of dynamic capabilities in order to overcome, not only the rigidities of organisational status, but also legal and public understanding. The major question addressed in this paper explores the nature of introducing police body-worn cameras in Polícia de Segurança Pública (PSP) as a tool to improve the interaction between police and citizens. This means assuring its core capabilities. To evaluate how capabilities can overcome the rigidities, the method used in this paper for collecting, analysing, refining and validating the information was the Delphi technique to gathering data for consensus-building concerning the police body-worn cameras. Alongside, with literature, the analysis shows that the respondents of different domains of expertise have a consensual overview on how core capabilities of police body-worn cameras overcome the rigidities and sustains the utilisation as the ultimate core in feeling safe.*

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**Keywords:** *Body-worn cameras, command and control, Polícia de Segurança Pública, technology, video surveillance.*

## INTRODUCTION

In a metamorphic society, an asymptomatic phenomenon occurs of changes and advances. Following this path security has also evolved in time. The technological advances have become an integral component of work, interaction, and communication. It implies a great effort of administration to be able in keeping in touch with the progress. The understanding of how and when law enforcement forces use technology in order to develop implementation strategies to maintain public order and security is essential.

Since human behaviour tends to improve when there are the notion and probability of getting caught (Ariel, Farrar, & Sutherland, 2015), mechanisms for control are implemented. The police have the task to prosecute the mission of bringing behaviour into line with the norms, rules, and laws. Thus, the mission requires legitimacy, which is a 'property of an authority or institution that leads people to feel that authority or institution is entitled to be deferred to and obeyed' (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003: p. 544).

The police in Portugal is a quasi-military organization with a strong emphasis on command and control (C2). From the structures and processes generated by commanding derives the control to regulate and minimize risks. In a military context, it's a tool for command (Pigeau & McCann, 2000), because the definition and development of who, what and when the decisions and actions are suitable (Verghis, 2008) is clear. It also enables the police to present tailored responses to unique circumstances (Kingshott, 2006) resulting in a more effective intervention to solve problems (Pigeau & McCann, 2000).

The concept of Command has a three-dimensional structure that includes competence, authority, and responsibility (Crabbe, 2000; NATO, 2015; Pigeau & McCann, 2000). On the other hand, control is a system put in practice to assist supervision, synchronisation and monitoring the progress (Balmaks, Kelly & Smith, 2013), maintaining the values of specific elements of the operational environment within the limits established by the command (Alberts & Hayes, 2006).

The two concepts become one, and C2 rather than an option is a necessity (Alberts & Hayes, 2006). It creates the structure and mechanism necessary for legitimising the commander's authority and specific directions for missions and tasks. The effectiveness of C2 is influenced by the different tools applied for monitoring, managing the mission and minimizing the risk of unsatisfying solution (McCann & Pigeau, 1999). Some of the tools are technological, deriving from innovation and evolution of crime patterns.

Actually, innovation is the buzzword in society with associated outcomes of disruption, learning, challenges, and influence in the decision-making process. Raising awareness, and food for thoughts, police body-worn cameras (BWC) is an innovation for Portuguese police. In fact, BWC's may have some benefit in closing the gap between citizen and police.

The operationalisation of this tool is the mainstream and widely used tool in police forces all over the world (e.g.: United Kingdom, Netherlands, Spain, France and Canada). Portugal has a long path to go to achieve the goal mentioned by Flight (2017: p.20) in '10 years all police officers will have body-worn cameras'.

Lum, Koper, Merola, Scherer and Reioux (2015: p. 3) notice that 'BWCs transformed from a technology that received little attention [...] to one that has become rapidly prioritized, funded, and diffused into local policing.' Conciliating this approach with the one proposed by Ariel (2016: p. 8) 'Much like live observers, mirrors, or pictures of eyes, cameras can not only make us continuously conscious of the fact that we are being watched, but also drive us into compliance', the background of BWC is established.

The core capabilities of BWC on law enforcement embodies the agencies with technical, skills, and management instruments to more effective intervention. Coudert, Butin and Métayer (2015), Farrar (2014), Goodall (2007), Grossmith et al. (2015), Miller, Toliver and Police Executive Research Forum (2014), Rankin (2013), and Ready and Young (2015) consider them as a means to: improve the quality of evidence; procedural promptness; effectiveness; deterrence of violent crime; justifying police intervention; reduction of deviant behaviour; increasing arrest activity; improving the police intervention; and enduring the sentence of crime perpetrators. The reduction of complaints is also mentioned by some authors as a result of BWC implementation (Ariel et al., 2017). Ariel et al. (2015), Farrar and Ariel (2013), Grossmith et al. (2015), Hayes and Ericson (2012), Katz et al. (2014, 2015) add to this list the improvement in the relation between police and citizen's. Ellis, Jenkins and Smith (2015), state that public opinion changes from a negative perspective to a more positive one to police forces, and there's a reduction of complaints against the police and, of behaviour of-course towards the police.

Moreover,

'If cameras are expected to influence behaviour and serve as cues that social norms or legal rules must be followed, then the cue "dosage" of awareness must be high. Mobile cameras, and specifically body-worn-cameras, are likely to have this effect.' (Ariel et al., 2015: pp.20-21).

The downside of the BWC, the core rigidities, that has to be overcome, concerns aspects such as the liberty and citizen's rights personified by the duty to inform and consent,

the time and content of recording, the storage and the access to the recording and, the threats posed for forthcoming technologies (Coudert, Butin & Métayer, 2015, Goodall, 2007).


Given the evidence from the research, the notion of what is a desirable, preferred or ideal in operationalisation, the pattern of choice, the allocation of resources and technological tools, the rate of implementation, the legal and strategic distribution of competences and, the outcomes are the critical elements of BWC.

## METHOD

### General Remarks and Hypothesis

The present study was based in the conceptual model (Figure 2), that demystifies the connections among the constructs. The research question centred on the evaluation of the consensus concerning the BWC: i) the level of support for the implementation; ii) measure the level of sense of security in the scenario of implementation; iii) perceptions of the pros and cons of the programme; and, iv) evaluate the capacity of BWC in C2 dimension.

Figure 1 – Conceptual Model



Valente (2009) suggested that ‘Talk about the police – defence of democratic legality, fundamental rights and liberties of citizens, in order to ensure the collective and security well-being – raises the question of the violation of those rights, when it intervenes to remedy an affected good, and mainly when police acts feeling «society scum»’ (p.47). Valente reveals the complexity of the police role.

Linking the conceptual model and the previous statement, BWC are the tool to bring more suitability and precision in police interventions, helping to mitigate the potential factors of harmful interfaces with the public.

Drawing on the conclusions of Coudert et al. (2015) and Ellis et al. (2015), about the positive perception of the impact of BWC on citizens and police, we identified the first hypothesis:

H<sub>1</sub>: The public and the police actors believe in the benefits of the implementation of the BWC;

Ellis et al. (2015), Farrar (2014), Goodall (2007), Miller et al. (2014), and White (2014) suggested benefits for police accountability, leading to the following hypothesis:

H<sub>2</sub>: BWC gives more transparency to police intervention.

BWC allows the gathering of total information of the incident (Ellis et al., 2015; Goodall, 2007; Katz, et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2014; Rankin, 2013; White, 2014), hence the third hypothesis is:

H<sub>3</sub>: BWC result in a more effective of gathering evidence.

Goodall (2007) mentions the necessity of criteria concerning when to record, to avoid of constant recording police shifts. The permanent recording would make the implementation of BWC unfeasible, because the volume of storage needs for the information. For this reason, we list the fourth hypothesis:

H<sub>4</sub>: The recording should be for pre-determined interactions between police and public.

Even though, literature points out differences in the predictors of the conduct of citizens and police officers before and after the implementation of BWC, we centred the focus on how this tool can affect deviant behaviour (Coudert et al., 2015; Goodall, 2007; Rankin, 2013; White, 2014) with the following hypothesis:

H<sub>5</sub>: Body worn cameras are a deterrence of deviant behaviour.

At last, we raise the pertinent perspective studied by Ariel et al. (2015), that made the balance between cost implementation and benefits, ensuring which variable is more meaningful:

H<sub>6</sub>: Potential benefits of BWC for society overcome the financial cost of the investment.

## Method

The level and interlinked consensus between questions for introduction, utilization, implementation rules and advantages are the main focus of the analysis. For this purpose, the method for gathering data from respondents within their domain of expertise was applied to determine the scientific and epistemological characteristics of the investigation, within an exploratory, descriptive and correlational approach.

The Delphi technique was applied to a panel of experts in various fields to achieve convergence of opinion concerning BWC in Portugal. This is a topic of strategic management, making the planning, assessment, police determination, resource utilisation and decision-making a fundamental subject, that must be grounded in fundamental basis and virtues of the context (Loo, 2002; Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004).

Considering, the dimension of the group, the lack of information about the substance of the matter, and the heterogeneity of backgrounds (academic, professional, ideological, etc.), the technique chosen is adjusted (Thomson & Ponder, 1979) for consensus-building. The baseline of the method is: anonymity; interaction with feedback; statistical analysis; effective utilization of the expert's time; and, convergence of responses (Dalkey et al., 1969; Renzi & Freitas, 2015).

We used a wide range of different experts from across the economic, legal, police, social dimensions, in order to enhance the validity and reliability of the conclusions (Hsu & Sanford, 2007). The above-mentioned heterogeneity consolidates the multidisciplinary of the panel, allowing predictive consensus of major validity.

The questions were framed from previous experiences, based in literature review, police reports and data from empirical international observation.

## Corpus

The data was recollected by a questionnaire sent to the panel comprised of experts of several areas: police, economic, law, social and sociological, psychological, and those engaged in public affairs, namely journalists and deputies in the Assembly of the Republic.

There were a total of 60 informants, composed by 60% of males and 40% of females, with a mean of 43 years and standard deviation of 2,080, ranging from 24 to 71 years old. The majority is married and had a University Degree (67%).

### Procedures

According to the objectives, the problem and hypothesis must combine a correct choice of instruments to finalize de operationalisation of the study (Fortin, Côte & Filion, 2009).

The data was gathered by an online form via a hyperlink on google docs. The questionnaire was in a structured format which allowed the data to be extracted for subsequent analysis. The response rate to the questionnaire was superior at 90%. Respondents were asked to grade the statements by reference to a Likert inverted scale from 1 (completely agree) to 5 (Completely disagree). The threshold for judging that there was agreement amongst the whole sample was assessed to be where the mean of the total respondent scoring was equal or lower than 3, and if 50% of the topics received the majority of the votes (Fink, et al., 1984).

The questionnaire included socio-demographic data, the objectives and consent form, and the questions concerning the BWC, with multiple choice answers, yes or no options, and others in inverted Likert scale.

We analysed data using Statistical Program for Social Sciences for Windows (SPSS, Inc. EUA), version 24, and Excel 2017 (Microsoft Corporation). The level of confidence was  $p \leq 0,05$ . Differences between groups were compared using Mann Whitney U and Kruskal Wallis H test.

## RESULTS

From the panel, 52% of them had the knowledge of body-worn cameras, therefore, the results will be also evaluated according this characteristic.

The presentation of the results begins with all the questions that were consensual, according to the criteria established.

The questions with higher level of agreement were: i) "Do you agree with the utilisation of police body-worn cameras?"; ii) "Do you feel safer if the PSP with the implementation of this tool?"; iii) "Do you agree that this tool can contribute to prevent crimes or deviant behaviour of citizens?"; iv) "Do you agree that this tool can contribute to prevent crimes or deviant behaviour of police?". In fact, every question has a mean and median appropriate

(mean = 1,45; 1,83; 1,72; 1,69; median = 1; 2; 2; 2, correspondingly) and, a positive approach above 70% in each question.

On the questions relating to the use of BWCs, the respondents felt that BWC is of added value and increases the level of confidence towards police, which is consistent with international studies (e.g.: Ariel et al., 2014). This general support needs to be qualified by the well-recognised concerns about the potential for BWCs to compromise privacy rights.

On the issues of the perception of safety (Jones, 2016), the prevention of deviant behaviour of citizens or police officers (Coudert et al., 2015), the respondents believed that the cameras might have a positive influence in behaviour when their actions are being scrutinised by a camera.

Applying cumulative criteria (mean = 3,24 and median = 3) there was also a consensus in the questions aiming to know if the police officer should decide which occurrences should be taped and if the tape should always be running (central tendency: "Neither agree nor disagree"). This might be due to the characteristics of the participants: the majority were not police officers. A second consideration appeared to be the data storage capacity that it would be required for recording 24-7 (twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week).

From the analysis of these questions it is clear that the police alone should not be left to decide when to record. In other words, there is a need of a guideline or norm defining how and when to record. In developing such guidance, it is important to take account of the questions about privacy of the actors, balanced against the issue of public protection (Jones, 2016, Stanley, 2013).

In respect of the Portuguese legal framework, the question "Do you consider that the legal framework is adjusted for the recording images by the Security and Police Forces?", there was no consensus (mean = 3,69). The appropriateness of the legal framework was considered to be a handicap in the process. It was perceived to be problematic for the security and police force, evidenced by the difficulty in obtaining images even with the use of drones. The current framework suggests a profound distrust in the law enforcement organisations. Yet, citizens are able to record any police action and share it in media, television, or in other way, without suffering any forfeit, unless there is a claim of the public.

The Portuguese legal framework appears to be at odds with the international trends. The evidence suggests that there may be significant benefits from the visualization of images, not only for increasing the perception of safety, but also by justifying or not justifying some of police use-of-force (Cullhane, Boman, & Schweitzer, 2016; Cullhane, Schweitzer, 2017).

Only 35% of the respondents remembered and pointed out situations with potential suitability for BWC. The value is in compliance with the expert's level of awareness. The lack of knowledge associated with the resistance to change is more likely to take the reality as ominous.

The respondents felt that BWCs are an important means for the collection of evidence (71,4%), in the defence of unjust accusations (52,4%) and identifying persons of interest (50%). Hence, the areas of intervention for the cameras are: i) identification of suspects (75%); ii) fact finding and conclusive proof (63,30%); iii) reducing complaints against the police (35%) and, iv) reducing assaults against law enforcement. These findings are consistent with the literature (Coudert et al., 2015; Ellis et al, 2015; Smykla, Crow, Crichlow, & Snyder, 2016). This might be the result of police background and the involvement and knowledge of situations where the cameras would have been a leverage for law enforcement and as social enlighten.

There is also a consistent thread on prevention, the perception of security, the accountability (police and citizens) which is supported by authors such as Ariel et al. (2014), Coudert et al. (2015), Ellis et al. (2015), Goodall (2007), Jones (2016), Katz et al. (2014), Miller et al. (2014) and Smykla, Crow, Crichlow, and Snyder (2016). In fact, cameras may provide a form of capable guardianship which may discourage overt misconduct when the cameras are on.

There was less consensus as to who might be able to access to video and audio recording. The range of results between Criminal Justice Judge, Public Prosecutor, and person with access clearance suggested a lower common denominator of a "person granted with personnel security clearance".

Last but not least, the respondents felt that BWCs were cost effective. They considered that BWC, in the long run, could reduce the costs associated with administrative, corrective and legal processes. This matches the results obtained by Flight (2017) and in line with investigations in United Kingdom made by Moreton (2017). The studies showed that in post implementation there were fewer but stronger charges, an increase of severity of sentences, the reduction of offenders pleading guilty, and early pleas and swift and better justice. Miller et al. (2015: p. 3) points out that 'this quicker resolution [using body-worn camera footage to review and address the officer's actions] can help save agencies time and money that they would otherwise spend investigating complaints and defending against lawsuits'.

Summing it up, in the sense that the respondents agree with the utilization of BWC by law enforcement in Portugal they pointed out the main capabilities of this technological tool. The ultimate core capabilities are the feeling of security, that follows the path of

international literature and the main elements associated such as: crime and illicit behaviour prevention of potential offenders; deterrence of violent crime; crime and illicit behaviour prevention of police and law enforcement personnel; evidence in criminal proceeding and for the defence against unfair accusations; suspect identification.

There are some wider issues with regards to the implementation of the technology in the field: what to record (event, daily intervention, work shift, among other)? When is appropriate or relevant to record? Who decides what and when to record?

We also looked to see if there were any differences between the groups by gender, academic qualifications and knowledge of BWC. For this purpose, considering the types of variables, and that the assumptions of normality ( $p$ -value  $\leq 0,05$ ) and symmetry ( $AS > 0$ ) were not met, the Kruskal-Wallis (H test) and Mann-Whitney (U test) was applied (Norman, Randall, & Hornsby, 1990; Pestana & Gajero, 2014).

**Table 1** – Mann-Whitney (U test) and Kruskal-Wallis Test (H test)

Questions	Gender		Knowledge of BWC		Academic Qualifications	
	U	sig	U	sig	H	sig
Do you agree with the utilisation of police body-worn cameras?	385,500	,458	399,500	,434	4,577	,205
Do you agree that the police officer would decide what occurrence should be recorded, during the work shift?	343,000	,168	436,500	,843	1,053	,788
Do you feel safer with the implementation of this tool in the PSP?	402,000	,635	416,000	,603	,451	,929
Do you agree that this tool can contribute to prevent crimes or deviant behaviour of citizens?	431,000	,987	422,500	,669	,398	,941
Do you agree that this tool can contribute to prevent crimes or deviant behaviour of police?	399,000	,593	432,000	,781	,538	,911
Do you consider the present legal framework for video and audio recording by Police and Law enforcement adequate?	214,500	,001*	224,000	,001*	3,949	,267
Do you think that all work shift should be recorded?	317,000	,076	365,500	,203	7,267	,064
Do you remember of any police occurrence that the cameras would have helped in the evidence gathering?	344,000	,165	255,000	,003*	6,353	,096
In case of affirmative answer to the previous question, in which way do you consider the cameras would help to in fact finding?	195,000	,816	208,000	1,000	4,598	,204
In which areas do BWC may help?	358,000	,195	448,500	,987	,324	,955
Who should have access to the recordings?	403,500	,656	443,000	,921	7,021	,071

Note: \* statistical significant at 0,05

The respondents in the panel considered that, overall, BWCs are a good tool to be applied in Portugal: in particular, the black box functions such as prevention (before the action), real-time monitoring (during) and evidence (after) (Flight, 2017). As an evidence management system, in a world where crime and social deviance are as real and common as the forces at these variables intend to prevent and correct, BWCs may be an effective tool to implement correct and adequate control of the predictors of misconducts. It is also a tool for decision-making in terms of C2 purposes, adding transparency, positive control of police intervention, just decisions, improving patterns of use of force, and quality of police work (McCann & Pigeau, 1999).

As Rego and Cunha (2007) suggest, there is a significant requirement for leadership in the change process. As Smykla et al. (2015: p.440) state:

‘Further support by command staff could help with officers that are unsure or more negative toward the use of BWCs. Finally, having command support during policy development and the planning of implementation of BWCs could potentially ease concerns of officers. Command staff input on issues of privacy, footage use, data management, and when cameras should be used is important when attempting to balance officer and public concerns.’

## CONCLUSION

The ever-increasing growth of technology, the large amount of inputs influences on how State's should face its duty: guarantee citizen's safety. The foundations for BWC utility are rooted in the leverage of its dynamic capabilities to improve police action and social acceptance. Extrapolating European trends, the introduction of BWC might be expected to enhance trust in police and citizen interaction. The underpinning of this argument is that experiences in law enforcement across Europe, United States, presented positive results. The implementation of BWCs represents a step forward in Portuguese law enforcement. The add-value of BWC is sustained by its pervasive positive influence, enhanced by the core capabilities. The objective is that capabilities are not hampered by the rigidities (legal, operational) of the technology. The results fundaments the strategic power of introducing the technology, considering the experiences in other countries, alongside the expert's panel.

The findings of this study shed light on the benefits of BWC for law enforcement. The five hypotheses are attained conveying the exposed by international literature and the findings from the survey. We found that BWC are beneficial (Coudert et al., 2015; Ellis et al., 2015), improve transparency (Ellis et al., 2015; Farrar, 2014; Goodall, 2007; Miller et al., 2014; and White, 2014), allows evidence gathering or collection of evidence for proof (Ellis et al., 2015; Goodall,

2007; Katz, et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2014; Rankin, 2013; White, 2014), prevents deviant behavior or behavior that is off-course (Coudert et al., 2015; Goodall, 2007; Rankin, 2013; White, 2014). The suggestions mount up to a tier concept, Feeling safe! This paramount's to a idea presented by Tzu (2012) that mentions to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting.

Some limitations were encountered in the research. One of the limitations of this study involves the sample. Despite the experts were chosen by dimensions (legal, police, sociological, economic), the analysis is oblivious of that fact. Another issue relevant to this research is that there was only one round when it should have been at least two. However, the responses were consensual, allowing the researchers to use the data. Finally, it's difficult to isolate and overcome the legal hindrances of this topic.

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