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ABSTRACTS

TOWARDS AN EU CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE MODEL — THE NEED OF AN EFFICIENT LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE IN THE EU

Anselmo Del Moral Torres

International police cooperation in the EU, mainly police data exchange, has increasingly improved during recent years. However, EU legal instruments, largely reflecting the decisions of the Head of State and Government of Member States, highlight the need to implement an effective police data exchange concerning information generated within Member States. To achieve this commitment first it is considered necessary to set up cooperation structures at EU Member State level which could provide an efficient police data exchange at international level.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLICE OFFICERS PERSONALITY TRAITS, HEALTH AND COPING MECHANISMS

Ivana Glavina Jelaš, Dunja Korak and Joško Vukosav

The aim of this study was to examine the relationship between police officer’s personality traits, health and coping. One hundred and seventy-seven police officers participated in the study. The following questionnaires were used: Coping Inventory for Stressful Situations (CISS, Endler & Parker, 1990), Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ R/S, Eysenck, 1991) and SF-36 Health Survey (Ware et al, 2000). Results showed that extraversion positively correlated with task-oriented and avoidance-oriented coping. Neuroticism negatively correlated with task-oriented and positively with emotion-oriented coping. All health subscales were in negative correlation with emotion-oriented coping, while task-oriented coping was in positive correlation with all scales except general health and physical functioning.

HOLISTIC APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS AND STUDY OF TERRORISM

José María Blanco Navarro

Thirteen years after 9/11, the production of expertise about terrorism by members of the academic world and law enforcement agency (LEA) analysts has increased. Despite this fact, it has had no influence either on the methodologies used or in the need to integrate the huge amount of fragmented knowledge that already exists. This article proposes a new holistic approach for the prevention of and fight against terrorism.

VICTIMISATION AND FEAR OF CRIME

Andrea Tünde Barabás

This study presents the main results of ‘The Opinion of the Population of Budapest on Crime, Victimisation and Restorative Justice’, a research project funded by the EU and led by the author for the National Institute of Criminology (OKRI).

THE ACCREDITATION OF FORENSIC LABORATORIES AS A COMPONENT OF REALISING THE EUROPEAN FORENSIC SCIENCE 2020 CONCEPT

Gabor Kovacs and Mónika Nogel

The success of mutually recognising evidence, among others, is provided by the introduction of common standards. In the interest of the regulated and scheduled implementation of the harmonisation process, the Council of the European Union made a decision on the ideas of The Vision for European Forensic Science 2020 including the creation of a European Forensic Science Area and the development of forensic science infrastructure in Europe (hereafter: EFSA 2020). This paper analyses the effects of the EFSA 2020 decision on the accreditation of forensic laboratories.
STRENGTHENING THE CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR RESPONSE IN EUROPE BY ENHANCING ON-SITE COOPERATION BETWEEN SAFETY AND SECURITY ORGANISATIONS: A NEW ITALIAN PILOT PROJECT

Andrea de Guttry

This article has a two-fold goal. On one hand it aims at providing an overview of the ongoing project to increase the knowledge and experience exchange among researchers and practitioners. On the other hand it endeavours to disseminate the outcomes of both the desk-based research and the planned table top exercises.

COMMONALITY IN POLICE HIGHER EDUCATION IN EUROPE – RESEARCH PROJECT REPORT

Ilona Bodonyi, Andrea Kozáry and Judit Nagy

The aim of the project was to develop a joint EU teaching module with a high standard of quality and a correspondingly high transnational acceptance value. Each partner developed a sub-module with a chosen field of criminality that is prioritised by EU security policy: cross border crime; hate crime; virtual worlds and criminality; and child pornography.

LEARNING METHODS USED IN CEPOL COURSES – RESEARCH PROJECT REPORT

João Cabaço and Wolfgang Kokoska

This article describes the main results of a research project developed on behalf of the CEPOL Working Group on Learning during 2012. The objective was to make an inventory of learning and training methods used in CEPOL courses and to briefly discuss the didactical state of the art in such courses.
TOWARDS AN EU CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE MODEL — THE NEED OF AN EFFICIENT LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE IN THE EU

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Keywords: European Union; international police cooperation; law enforcement and police data information/intelligence exchange; criminal intelligence; intelligence led policing.

Abstract: International police cooperation in the EU, mainly police data exchange, has increasingly improved during recent years. However, EU legal instruments, largely reflecting the decisions of the Head of State and Government of Member States, highlight the need to implement an effective police data exchange concerning information generated in the Member States. To achieve this commitment first it is considered necessary to set up cooperation structures at EU Member State level which could provide an efficient police data exchange at international level.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT OF CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE

If, in the framework of an international meeting, we ask participants for the meaning of the concept ‘criminal intelligence’, we would probably receive several different definitions. Each participant would approach the concept dependant on their own understanding of security, as mentioned by Gariup (2013) or Button (2013), and it varies from country to country and, within the same country, from one law enforcement institution to another.

It could also be that some of the mentioned participants would refer to the concept of ‘Intelligence-led Policing’ (Ratcliffe, 2008) as the approach that helps police managers to better use crime related intelligence based on analysis to direct police resources aimed at disrupting organised networks and common criminality. This method used in EUROPOL (see House of Lords, 2008) and other law enforcement agencies has its origin in their British and North American counterparts, however, this concept is not new.

The application of the cycle of intelligence (Phytian, 2013) as a decision-making tool, is based on data collection, processing, verification and an interpretation processes to produce intelligence that could help managers to decide on how to fight threats, is historic. Generals have also used it in military theatres through the centuries. Perhaps we should consider an innovation; the application of the intelligence cycle to fight organised crime or terrorism and other asymmetric threats (Thornton, 2007). For example, this methodology has been used by the Spanish Guardia Civil to dismantle ETA terrorism in the second half of the 20th century.

As we see, the concept of criminal intelligence, the process to collect, process, verify and interpret data to produce intelligence that fights organised crime suffers from different interpretations depending on the security culture

(1) The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and not of other persons or institutions.
in each country and even distinct institutional approaches within a country. The EU Heads of Governments faced this conceptual problem with the incorporation of important definitions (2) in the Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union.

In these circumstances, Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA opens the possibility of information and/or intelligence exchange, between competent authorities of EU Member States, by any existing channels (including bilateral cooperation), in criminal investigations or criminal intelligence operations to prevent, detect and investigate concrete criminal acts committed or that may be committed in the future.

Since Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA, there is no place for interpretation by any competent law enforcement authority from any EU Member State to collect, and analyse information on crime or criminal activities before starting a criminal investigation in order to prevent criminal acts.

LAW ENFORCEMENT TASKS IN THE EU MEMBER STATES AND SECURITY THREATS

If we perform a deep analysis of the criminal intelligence models implemented in EU Member States, we could conclude that there is no standard way to deal with information and/or intelligence to counteract security threats. We believe that law enforcement agencies develop in a greater or lesser degree within each Member State, four types of functions systematised under the following topics:

- **Public security tasks** – The name of this task changes according to the EU Member State, and they refer primarily to classic police work in security prevention and reaction activities via uniformed patrolling in the territory;
- **Administrative law enforcement tasks** – These tasks refer to police forces carrying out specialised work at administrative level and complement public security, such as road safety, weapons and explosives control, immigration control, fiscal and border police, environmental police, etc.;
- **Criminal investigation tasks** – In this type of function we could incorporate police work specialising in criminal investigations at all levels;
- **Counter-terrorism tasks** – In many EU Member States depending on the type of terrorism, specialist counter-terrorism units or criminal investigation units specifically dedicated to the fight against terrorism, carry out investigations of terrorist offences.

All these tasks are interlinked and we could not consider them as isolated. For example, if a counter-terrorism unit is carrying out a criminal investigation on several suspects of a possible Jihadist cell (counter-terrorism tasks), the investigators would be very interested to know if these suspects are being investigated by a criminal investigation unit concerning a possible case of phone card fraud or drug trafficking (criminal investigation tasks). Additionally, if some of the suspects had been the consignee of a customs controlled container (administrative law enforcement tasks), or other

(2) ‘Competent law enforcement authority’ is a national police, customs or other authority that is authorised by national law to detect, prevent and investigate offences or criminal activities and to exercise authority and take coercive measures in the context of such activities. Agencies or units dealing especially with national security issues are not covered by the concept of competent law enforcement authority. ‘Criminal investigation’ is a procedural stage within which competent law enforcement or judicial authorities, including public prosecutors, with a view to establishing, take measures and identifying facts, suspects and circumstances regarding one or several identified concrete criminal acts. ‘Criminal intelligence operation’ is a procedural stage, not yet having reached the stage of a criminal investigation, within which a competent law enforcement authority is entitled by national law to collect, process and analyse information about crime or criminal activities with a view to establishing whether concrete criminal acts have been committed or may be committed in the future. ‘Information and/or intelligence’ is any type of information or data, which is held by law enforcement authorities, and any type of information or data, which is held by public authorities or by private entities and which is available to law enforcement authorities without the taking of coercive measures.
suspects from the same group were identified by a public security patrol (public safety tasks) when leaving a disco.

A criminal investigation team does not usually have the aforementioned information efficiently available. First, information normally obtained by customs officers in their daily tasks is not directly available to police forces and vice versa. Furthermore, in many cases, information and/or intelligence obtained by law enforcement officers working in the same Agency, but performing different tasks are subdivided into different information systems that are not usually interlinked.

THE COOPORATIVE TRIANGLE AGAINST SECURITY THREATS

The extended criminal intelligence model in the EU Member States, shown in Figure 1, could be defined as ‘The cooporative triangle against security threats’ or the organisational structure that is set up to handle public security threats, by law enforcement agencies at the EU Member State level as they are entitled to do.

In this generic model, we can first identify a ‘Supranational Political Level’ represented by the EU institutions developing the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) policies that are slowly crystallising into legal instruments implementing cooperation mechanisms such as channels and information systems at EU level (i.e. EUROPOL information system, Schengen Information System, VISA information system, etc).

In a second step we identify, the ‘National or Federal Political Level’ referred to as the application of the Public Security Policy at Member State level. A ‘National or Federal Strategic level’ represented by the Ministry of Interior or Department in the Ministry of Interior in each EU Member State; usually has the responsibility for management of the unique or various law enforcement agencies at national or federal level, and in some cases, coordination of regional police or local police forces.

At a ‘law enforcement agency operational level’, we find different information systems set up to collect, process and disseminate information and/or intelligence obtained from law enforcement units carrying out the various tasks (public security, administrative law enforcement, criminal investigation, and counterterrorism).

Figure 1: Cooporative triangle for security threats

Security threats: Terrorism, organized crime, robberies, etc
Finally, a ‘Law enforcement tactical level’ represented by police, border control or customs units dedicated to performing their tasks according to their legal competence. At this level, a law enforcement officer faces security threats (i.e. illicit traffic, robbery, terrorism etc) daily and collects information and/or intelligence which is then stored in the agency information systems.

Law enforcement agencies are trying to adapt their criminal intelligence model, shown in Figure 2. It does not create a unique information system at an operational level, but needs to collect information and process it to produce intelligence and be able to disseminate it in an efficient way to be used by front line units at tactical level.

The analysis shows that this model is not entirely effective because of a lack of confidence in the exchange of information. Firstly, each law enforcement agency develops its own triangle of the threat, or strategy to combat security threats such as terrorism and organised crime, with little regard of the cooporative triangle or structures developed by other agencies within the same EU Member State, or other EU Member States.

In general, each police body at Member State level develops its structure and information systems to combat security threats in their area or area of responsibility. However, it does not normally take into account that it is unable to cover all aspects of security threats, and that these security threats move from one police responsibility area to another.

**LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION/INFORMATION EXCHANGE WITHIN THE EU: FROM A BILATERAL TO STRUCTURED COOPERATION**

If we analyze how the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) within the European Union (EU) has influenced the daily law enforcement work at EU Member State level, and especially the use of information systems established by EU legal instruments, we can assert that there has been considerable evolution indeed. Thirty years ago police cooperation and the exchange of police information among police administrations in different EU Member States was almost limited to bilateral and inter-relationship channels.
In the mid 1990s cooperation mechanisms and structures were developed, and the AFSJ implemented new information systems (i.e. Schengen Information System, Europol Information System, Prüm System, Anti-fraud information system, Visa Information system, etc.) to facilitate the exchange of data related to law enforcement tasks among EU Member States. We have noted an evolution in the exchange of law enforcement information among EU Member States from a bilateral or regional cooperation to a structured cooperation through cooperation mechanisms such as information systems set up in the AFSJ. However there is still doubt, whether law enforcement data originated in an EU Member State efficiently reaches those who need it in another Member State.

According to the EU Treaty, there are no internal borders but only external ones in the EU. The EU’s internal market seeks to guarantee the free movement of goods, capital, services and people within the 28 EU Member States. However, as criminals also move easily from one EU Member State to another, it is increasingly necessary to have an efficient exchange of law enforcement information among the various law enforcement agencies within all Member States.

In the EU there are many different law enforcement agencies (police, customs, border guards, etc) working at federal, national, regional and local level within Member States. All of them use information systems under EU and national data protection regulations, to collect, process, and disseminate law enforcement information needed for prevention and investigative purposes. Nevertheless, is this information available in an efficient manner to other law enforcement bodies at national or other Member State level?

The EU AFSJ policy and especially police cooperation aspects are differently applied at Member State level. Police models in the EU range from the simplicity of the existence of a single police force in some Member States to cases such as the UK or Germany, where we find integral police forces at regional or state level working together with others with national or federal status. This scheme with some particularities is reproduced in other EU member states such as France, Italy, Portugal and Spain.

Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA of 18 December 2006 argues ‘Formal procedures, administrative structures and legal obstacles laid down in the legislation of Member States are seriously hampering rapid and efficient exchange of information and intelligence between security services. This situation is unacceptable for EU citizens, and therefore calls for greater security and more efficient policing, while human rights are protected’. This is an important statement, as for the first time an EU legal instrument highlights the obstacles to the development of an effective AFSJ within the EU and its unacceptability for EU citizens.

The Framework Decision regulates the cooperation mechanism, and sets deadlines for the exchange of information. For example, Member States shall have in place procedures that allow them to respond within a maximum of eight hours to urgent requests for information and intelligence relating types of crime, when the requested information or intelligence is held in a database directly accessible by a law enforcement authority.

Just on a commonsense level, if it is intended to comply with the above-mentioned clause, it is first necessary to consider the set up of a 24/7 service at EU Member State level in which law enforcement information systems from the different competent authorities is made available.

The lack of a real law enforcement information exchange as source of inefficiency in the area of freedom, security and justice in the EU

The need of an efficient EU criminal intelligence model

Thus, we need to overcome ‘formal procedures, administrative structures and legal obstacles laid down in legislation of the Member States’ that the Heads of State and Governments of all EU Member States recognise, via the Framework Decision, to be the source of inefficiency in the AFSJ. This could be resolved through the implementation
This office would be at a strategic level under supervision of an independent authority, and over the various law enforcement agencies. The NCIO would coordinate Member State law enforcement public information systems, private information systems, and international information systems (Interpol, Europol, SIS, VIS, EURODAC, etc) of interest, to develop the functions of criminal investigation and criminal intelligence to address the major security threats we all face.

Figure 3: Standard Criminal Intelligence Model at EU Member State level.

In the proposed model, figure 3, all information systems which might be of interest for law enforcement tasks at Member State Level, are shared with other agencies in the same country on a common platform or common table at the NCIO, as in previous steps to share them with other law enforcement agencies from the same and other EU member states. This new procedure would contribute to a more efficient process under The Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA.

Moreover, any authorised investigator from any police force or agency could request information from the NCIO-ONIC on a 24/7 basis. This procedure would assure that there is no overlapping of criminal investigations based on hit/no hit technology. This process would be computerised and transparent for the user. Investigators could use a Google type search engine on data stored in the various information systems available to the NCIOS. The Framework Decision applies to all EU Member States; however, it does not oblige Member States to develop a standard criminal intelligence system at national level in order to be able to interoperate in an efficient way with other Member State systems. At this point, I believe that The Framework Decision would be hugely instrumental in harmonising EU Member State criminal intelligence models, national structures or platforms sharing information and intelligence, and also comply with the statements of the Decision.
In particular, there is no doubt that each EU Member State has a sovereign right to organize their own criminal analytical structures. However, it is also obvious that the EU has developed policies in various areas, including the AFSJ which have established uniform definitions and procedures for compliance with the purposes set out in the Treaty. In these circumstances, the EU could try to support Member States to implement the Framework Decision by funding such standard platforms at Member State level to achieve harmonisation, simplification and efficiency in the exchange of information of interest to the police. In any case, it is considered that the approach of a homogeneous criminal intelligence model in the EU would result in improved police effectiveness within the AFSJ based on the following aspects:

- Integrate into a standard criminal intelligence homogeneous model, different law enforcement actors fighting against major EU security threats;
- Improving law enforcement cooperation and coordination, at local, regional, national/federal and international level, sharing information of common interests;
- Solving conflict situations, overlapping and duplication efforts among law enforcement agencies in the fight against security threats;
- Being transparent in data collection procedures of law enforcement interests. The model can be public, and would be subject to all the guarantees relating to national and international regulations concerning data protection.

This proposed EU criminal intelligence model is a theoretical and academic model, which does not contradict the European Criminal Intelligence Model advocated by EUROPOL, and highlights the necessity for law enforcement information/intelligence to be more efficiently shared through standard platforms (NCIOs). This scheme, configuring an EU neural network, would allow an efficient exchange of law enforcement information/intelligence under Council Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA.
REFERENCES


RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POLICE OFFICERS PERSONALITY TRAITS, HEALTH AND COPING MECHANISMS

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Keywords: police officers; personality; health; stress; coping mechanisms.

Abstract: The aim of this study was to examine the relationship between police officers personality traits, health and coping. One hundred and seventy-seven police officers participated in the study. The following questionnaires were used: Coping Inventory for Stressful Situations (CISS, Endler & Parker, 1990), Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ R/S, Eysenck, 1991) and SF-36 Health Survey (Ware et al, 2000). Results showed that extraversion positively correlated with task-oriented and avoidance-oriented coping. Neuroticism negatively correlated with task-oriented and positively with emotion-oriented coping. All health subscales were in negative correlation with emotion-oriented coping, while task-oriented coping was in positive correlation with all scales except general health and physical functioning.

INTRODUCTION

Coping is a crucial part of many different theories on stress. One of the most widely accepted definitions is that of Lazarus and Folkman (2004) who refer to coping as a constant changing of cognitive and behavioural efforts in attempt to manage specific demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the person. These authors represent the transactional approach, emphasizing situational influences on the selection of coping strategies (Lazarus & Folkman, 2004), opposed to a dispositional approach which focuses on the role of personality (Suls, David & Harvey, 2006). The authors of this research analyse coping as a stable disposition.

Stress literature mainly distinguishes between emotion focused coping, which deals with negative emotions arising from stressful situation, problem focused coping, aimed at altering sources of stress (Stanton et al, 2000) and avoidance coping, concerning the attempts of cognitive or behavioural avoidance of stressors. Generally, problem focused coping is related to lower distress and better health outcomes (Hudek – Kneževic´ & Kardum, 2005), although effectiveness of this strategy depends on situational factors such as control over the situation. Avoidance is mainly linked to poorer mental and physical health (Holahan et al, 2005).

Regarding personality, findings suggest that neuroticism is related to emotion-focused coping such as self-blame, wishful thinking, passivity and avoidance / escapism (Carver & Connor — Smith, 2010). On the other hand, extraverts tend to use problem-focused strategies in dealing with stress (Kardum & Krapić, 2001), while persons high on psychotism use emotional and avoidance strategies such as alcohol and wishful thinking (Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010).

Policing is one of the most stressful occupations (Anshel, 2000). Unfortunately, many studies imply that officers use maladaptive coping mechanisms (Patterson, 2003). Avoidance strategies like excessive alcohol consumption, social isolation and emotional detachment can lead to negative stress consequences, for example, mental and
physical illness, early retirement and absenteeism (Stinchcomb, 2004).

**METHODOLOGY**

**SAMPLE**

The respondent sample comprised of 177 police officers (140 males, 37 females) with an average age of M = 30.86 (SD = 5.41).

**MEASURES**

*Coping Inventory for Stressful Situations* (CISS, Endler & Parker, 1990) is a 48-item inventory which measures three major types of coping styles: Task-Orientated (n=16, \( \alpha = 0.84 \)), Emotion-Orientated (n=16, \( \alpha = 0.85 \)) and Avoidance Coping. Avoidance scale is divided in two subscales: Distraction (n=8, \( \alpha = 0.79 \)) and Social Diversion (n=5, \( \alpha = 0.75 \)). Participants answer on a 5-point Likert scale (1=absolutely not, 5=entirely true).

*Eysenck Personality Questionnaire* (EPQ R/S, Eysenck, 1991) contains 48 items from the full EPQ-R and measures three major personality traits and has four scales: Psychoticism, Extraversion, Neuroticism and Lie. On each question participants answered with YES or NO. Calculation of Cronbach \( \alpha \) was left out due to inability to retrieve data collected in 2012.

*SF-36 Health Survey* (Ware et al, 2000) is 36-item survey which measures 8 aspects of health: Physical Functioning (n=10, \( \alpha = 0.89 \)), Role-Physical (n=4, \( \alpha = 0.82 \)), Bodily Pain (n=2, \( \alpha = 0.85 \)), General Health (n=5, \( \alpha = 0.42 \)), Vitality (n=4, \( \alpha = 0.79 \)), Social Functioning (n=2, \( \alpha = 0.68 \)), Role-Emotional (n=3, \( \alpha = 0.82 \)), Mental Health (n=5, \( \alpha = 0.75 \)).

**RESULTS**

Police officers most often use task-oriented coping (M=57.72). They use avoidance (M=44.92) and emotion-oriented (M=45.33) mechanisms much less and almost equally (Table 1).

Table 2 shows that extraversion is in low positive correlation with task-oriented (r=0.24, p>0.01) and avoidance-oriented coping (r=0.28, p>0.01, rsoc.div.=0.34, p>0.01). Neuroticism is in low negative correlation with task-oriented (r=–0.26, p>0.01) and moderate to high positive correlation with emotion-oriented coping (r=0.58, p<0.01). Relationship between psychoticism and coping wasn’t confirmed.

Table 3 shows that all health subscales are in low to moderate negative correlation with emotion-oriented coping (rgh=–0.18, p>0.05; rv=–0.42, p>0.01; rrp=–0.28, p>0.01; rbp=–0.48, p>0.01; rmh=–0.52, p>0.01; rsf=–0.48, p>0.01; rre=–0.40, p>0.01; rpf=–0.22; p>0.01), while task-oriented coping is in low positive correlation with all scales (rv=0.17, p>0.05; rrp=0.17, p>0.05; rbp=0.16, p>0.05; rmh=0.17, p>0.05; rsf=0.25, p>0.01; rre=0.21, p<0.01) except general health and physical functioning.
### Table 2: Relationship between personality traits and coping.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Task-Oriented Coping</th>
<th>Emotion-Oriented Coping</th>
<th>Avoidance Coping</th>
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<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
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* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

### Table 3: Relationship between health and coping.

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Task-Oriented Coping</th>
<th>Emotion-Oriented Coping</th>
<th>Avoidance Coping</th>
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<tr>
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<td>–,426**</td>
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<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
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<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
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<td>–,074</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>,311</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>,330</td>
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* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
DISCUSSION

This research showed that police officers most frequently use task-oriented mechanisms in coping with police stress. The sample is mostly composed of males and studies suggest that they more often use problem focused coping (Ramya & Parthasarathy, 2009). Studies also suggest that officers often tend to use avoidance mechanisms (Patterson, 2003). Fortunately, these respondents used avoidance least and almost equally often as emotion-oriented coping.

As expected, extraversion was positively correlated with task-oriented coping. This is confirmed by many other studies (Kardum & Krapić, 2001). Surprisingly this trait was also correlated with avoidance. This was unexpected because studies indicate that traits like neuroticism (Carver & Connor-Smith, 2010) and psychoticism (Ferguson, 2001) are in positive relation with avoidance. Contrary, neuroticism wasn't correlated with avoidance, it positively correlated with emotion-oriented and negatively with task-oriented coping.

The two previous are in accordance with expectations. Individuals with high scores in neuroticism are tense, tend to worry and upset easily (Zuckerman, 2002). Under stress they are prone to negative reactions and withdrawal. The emotion-oriented scale implies those kinds of behaviour. Further analysis showed that social diversion, as avoidance subscale, was significantly positively correlated with extraversion. Items on that scale imply actions like talking with a friend or going to a party as ways of coping could explain why avoidance is correlated with extraversion and not with neuroticism, because extraverted behaviour includes enjoyment in company of other people. Generally, results suggest that police officers do not differ from rest of the population in relation to coping with stress depending on their personality.

All health subscales, except general health and physical functioning were in positive correlation with task-oriented coping. That is in accordance with findings of other studies (Hudek — Krapić & Kardum, 2005). As mentioned, the respondents were mostly males and studies suggest that males more often use problem focused coping that could contribute to the outcome. All health subscales were in negative correlation with emotion-oriented coping. This would be surprising if we didn't previously mention the content of the emotion-coping scale. Indeed, a great amount of research shows that emotional focused coping in context of seeking social support is a very significant protective factor regarding stress consequences (Ozbay et al, 2007).

Usually, emotional focused coping includes behaviours like emotional disclosure etc. but, the emotion scale the inventory used involved only negative aspects of emotional coping, which are clearly not helpful under stress. Regarding avoidance, interestingly, this study didn't find significant negative correlation between avoidance and health, although the majority of studies suggest so (Holahan et al, 2005). The fact that the avoidance scale includes social diversion, which implies socialising, could explain our findings.

For further research it would be interesting to examine moderator and mediator variables that could contribute to the relationship between an officer’s health, personality and coping mechanisms.

CONCLUSION

The results showed that extraversion positively correlated with task-oriented and avoidance-oriented coping. Neuroticism negatively correlated with task-oriented and positively with emotion-oriented coping. All health subscales were in negative correlation with emotion-oriented coping, while task-oriented coping was in positive correlation with all scales except general health and physical functioning.
REFERENCES


HOLISTIC APPROACH TO THE ANALYSIS AND STUDY OF TERRORISM

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Keywords: terrorism in Europe; prevention; holistic approach.

Abstract: Thirteen years after 9/11, the production of expertise about terrorism, by members of the academic world and law enforcement agency (LEA) analysts has increased. Despite this fact, it has had no influence either on the methodologies used or in the need to integrate the huge amount of fragmented knowledge that already exists. This article proposes a new holistic approach for the prevention of and fight against terrorism.

SITUATION ANALYSIS

Thirteen years after 9/11, the production of expertise about terrorism, by members of the academic world and law enforcement agency (LEA) analysts has increased. Despite this fact, it has had no influence either on the methodologies used or in the need to integrate the huge amount of fragmented knowledge that already exists. The same topics are studied over and over again, and they obey to opportunity criteria and to the interest to monitor current events. Moreover, the general ‘recipes’ to fight terrorism are always the same: international collaboration and cooperation, or fostering intelligence. Besides, counter-terrorist policies are not measured or assessed in more depth.

How can we move beyond? Is there any room for other approaches, or have we exhausted all our resources? How can we broaden our horizons?

Surveys about terrorism usually offer interesting perspectives, but they are partial. Although this issue is approached from different academic fields (history, philosophy, sociology, psychology or criminology), they do not offer a full picture that explains the whole phenomenon. Surveys only show parts of it, but not the so called ‘Big Picture’.

The philosopher Edgar Morin (2011) underlines the existence of a ‘cognitive blindness derived from a way to acquire knowledge which, by compartmentalising knowledge (and I would add, by compartmentalising ‘our actions’), disintegrates fundamental and global problems that require a multidisciplinary approach’. We are equally blinded by our ignorance and by our knowledge, because they are always partial. Morin goes further when he states that in our current world there is a conjunction of egocentrism (the horizon we perceive responds to our own interests and not to the general interest), specialisation (it moves us away from global things) and compartmentalisation (it isolates us in bureaucratised jobs).

Flaws can also be identified at methodological level, and they derive from the lack of creativity regarding new approaches, and from an excessive confidence in case study and terrorist profiles. Some authors highlight the obsession for details (Lowenthal, 2013; Sageman, 2013). The so called ‘Big Data’ is a revolution because it is a source of development that allows managing huge amounts of information and applying predictive techniques. When studying the phenomenon of terrorism or analysing intelligence, this obsession for details can let us know what is going on, but not its causes or the most appropriate measures to be implemented. In the best-case scenario, we can guess that some event will probably happen in the
future, or we can compare patterns, but it does not guarantee that the future will be that way (Taleb, 2012). In addition, if analysts get used to having every possible detail before making a diagnosis, this might result in an excessive dependence that might lead to paralysis (Lowenthal, 2013).

Stern & Horgan (2013) discuss Sageman’s conclusions about the relative stagnation in terrorism studies, as Bruce Hoffman had already done, providing significant and very interesting examples for analysis. This discussion continues in 2014, with several papers published in the journal ‘Terrorism and Political Violence’, by Sageman, Schmid, Taylor, Stern, and Schanzer.

Ranstorp (2009) also highlights this paralysis in research that requires new theoretical and methodological models. In 2000, before the events of 9/11, Martha Crenshaw (2000) stated that these new challenges are limited due to the lack of a commonly agreed definition of ‘terrorism’, the inability to build a comprehensive theoretical corpus, and the nature of those researches that follow every event taking place at a given moment, continuous in the case of terrorism.

The fragmentation of knowledge pertaining to terrorism (Ranstorp, 2009) points out the need to combine classical and critical approaches. The old debate about the need of generalists versus specialists is gaining momentum again. A global picture is critical to integrate and relate so much scattered knowledge. We consider that it would be necessary for generalists to specialise in this task.

**THE FUTURE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM**

Political decision-makers take counter-terrorist measures without objective analysis, mainly responding to opportunity or social alarm, triggered by some event and without designing future scenarios that will ever take place during their term of office.

The International Centre developed important research for Counter-Terrorism (Bakker, 2012), analysing the references to the future evolution of this phenomenon in 60 surveys conducted by well-known institutions and experts. This survey reaches a conclusion: most of them lack a methodological basis; in general, they do not even mention possible dynamics of change that allow establishing indicators to monitor the evolution of the phenomenon. At best these surveys are a goodwill gesture based on personal opinions and intuition based on experience or trend forecasting.

Lia (2005) points out that literature about the future of terrorism has lacked a systematic way of thinking on how social change creates new environments for terrorism. Normally individual events or cases are used and extrapolated, but no analysis is carried out about the evolution of those factors determining the environment where terrorism can increase or be tackled.

The report about 9/11 stressed in a chapter devoted to prospective analysis (‘Foresight and Hindsight’), that the lack of imagination was the major mistake when trying to prevent terrorist attacks.

**NEED FOR HOLISTIC APPROACHES**

New approaches are required, more predictive and based on structured analysis and forecasting methodologies and techniques, both quantitative and qualitative that include creativity in logical reasoning processes, combining intuition and critical thinking when studying a phenomenon, especially when resorting to it to make decisions in situations of uncertainty (Kahneman, 2011).

Among the different attempts to create such a model, Brynjar Lia’s deserves special attention. The main advantage of this proposal is that it defines a framework to analyse the environment regarding the potential socio-political changes enabling the evolution of terrorism.

Lia basically mentions that there are factors such as international relations (leadership, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, democratisation, fragile states, multilateralism, peace support interventions, non-governmental actions), economic factors (inequality, relationship between economy and politics, organised crime, energy), demographic factors (growth and migrations), ideologies and technologies, that would allow identifying the causes of terrorism and predicting the future (target patterns, terrorism level, deadliness, ideological motivations, geographical location, etc.).
Therefore, the model we propose, already used by the Centre of Analysis and Foresight, Guardia Civil (Centro de Análisis y Prospectivo), is based on the following main pillars:

1. The need to focus intelligence surveys, analyses and actions on answering to the question: ‘what for?’ Decision-making is the major goal, from the point of view of police forces, both at strategic (policies) and operational level.

2. Including a time perspective. We shape the future through the decisions we make in every moment. Expectations introduce causal factors. The past projects in our everyday life following our training and life experiences, but our future prospects also condition our decisions at present. Consequently, we can state that these three moments overlap.

3. The integration of every applicable methodology, from a holistic time-based perspective. From a methodological point of view, it would start from the scientific method and social sciences, incorporating the structured techniques of intelligence analysis, and even including Big Data or a rigorous prospective concept.

4. As regards strategic and operational aspects, the use of global systems and models that allow supporting early warning systems. The starting point would be using methodologies such as Environmental Scanning and Horizon Scanning.

5. Benefiting from the synergies among studies about intelligence and terrorism, with the involvement of police experts.

6. Creating a new intelligence cycle based on technology, modifying the classic one. Technology allows foreseeing the stages of such cycles and, as a result, after the scanning phase would already comprise functions such as information classification, source assessment, integration and relation, as well as pre-analysis (geo-location, patterns, etc.).

7. Continuous efforts aimed at training analysts in fields such as cognitive biases, critical thinking, analysis methodologies, information visualisation, drafting of reports, etc.

REFERENCES


VICTIMISATION AND FEAR OF CRIME

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Keywords: fear of crime; victimisation; latency; sense of security; crime prevention.

Abstract: This study presents the main results of ‘The Opinion of the Population of Budapest on Crime, Victimisation and Restorative Justice’, a research project funded by the EU and led by the author for the National Institute of Criminology (OKRI).

INTRODUCTION

An individual’s subjective sense of security may be significantly influenced by how they see the performance of law enforcement agencies, i.e. whether they are satisfied with their work or think that they are not able to protect him or her from the criminals. As such, police and investigating authorities lay great emphasis on the crime clean-up or investigation success rates. These figures in practice measure the effectiveness of crime control by indicating the number of offenders who have committed known criminal acts. At the same time the population’s fear of crime is very often not correlated with the actual criminal situation or even with the objective sense of security of those directly affected.

For the past few decades, an increasing number of people have shared the view that it is not enough to prevent crime but it is of equal importance that the fear of crime should be reduced. The subjective sense of security, in other words the perception of the crime rate, can be affected by several factors. It can be influenced to a great extent by the impression transmitted by the media, suggesting permanent violence and a steady increase in the number of criminal cases, by the utterances of politicians when they promise to fight against growing criminality, on the basis of their own experience in their neighbourhoods, by the criminal acts suffered by other people, and other problems.

LATENCY AND FEAR OF CRIME

The phenomenon of latency is scientifically accepted in criminology: a certain proportion of criminal acts are never discovered and they never become known to the authorities. By some estimates the number of these ‘hidden cases’ is at least twice or even four to five times and, according to some people, up to ten times higher than the number of registered crimes. The proportion of such cases is compared to the tip of the iceberg. In the absence of actual data one can only find out more about the cases that do not become known through empirical examinations.

Besides administrative problems the fact, that incidents remain hidden is mainly related to citizens’ willingness to report crimes as criminal acts are mostly (in approximately 70% of cases) discovered on the basis of the reports and notices filed with the police. This means that latency is basically due to the fact that for some reason those concerned fail to report crimes to the authorities.

There are several circumstances that may contribute to this fact. For instance, those concerned may have some negative experiences, gained either personally or through their immediate environment, regarding official procedures, and they come to the conclusion that it is not worth filing a report with the police (as they have been treated unfairly or they do not believe that the offender will actually be arrested).
Further reasons may be simple fear, physical (violence) or psychological (shame, blackmail) barriers, the relatively low value of the damage suffered, or the fact that the perpetrator is a relative or an acquaintance of the victim (Van Dijk et al., 2007).

Victim surveys, first conducted in the USA and the United Kingdom, were introduced in order to explore and understand the circumstances and the reasons of victimisation as well as the needs and fears of the victims. The primary purpose of these surveys was to find out what the rate of victimisation was in reality, how many and what kinds of incidents did not become known to the authorities and why, what circumstances were instrumental in victimisation, and how the lives of victims were influenced by suffering a crime (Irk, 2004).

Since the rapid development of victim studies, surveys regarding fear of crime have constituted one of the most essential features of these investigations. The question of whether victims exhibit more fear of crime than non-victims is still quite controversial. (Kury, 1998) The empirical evidence supporting a fear-criminal victimisation relationship is relatively weak and mixed (Winkel, 1998).

VICTIM STATISTIC AND THE REALITY IN HUNGARY

In the 1980s, before the democratic transformation of the political system in 1989, the crime rate in Hungary was relatively low (140,000 to 180,000 criminal cases per year) in contrast to the current level, and in 80% of these cases legal proceedings were launched against the offenders, i.e. they were ‘caught’ by the police. Currently, the corresponding figure is 50 to 55%, i.e. only half of the investigations are successful.

The effectiveness of crime clearance (or lack of it) directly affects the victims and, in the worst case, it may even shake public trust in the law enforcement agencies and lead to an increase in their fear of crime. (1) Besides, any negative outcome in the law enforcement process may reduce the victim’s inclination to file a report with the police next time, thus increasing the number of incidents going unreported. The authorities are therefore very interested in reinforcing public trust, for which purpose statistical ‘magic’ is sometimes also used in addition to effective criminal investigation activities.

The criminal cases registered in The Hungarian Unified Criminal Statistics of the Investigation Authorities and the Prosecution Service (Egységes Nyomozóhatósági és Ügyészségi Bűnügyi Statisztika) do not cover all the acts actually committed and suffered at a given place and time, and therefore they do not cover the number of victims either. These statistics provide information on high-priority criminal acts as well as on the offenders and the victims of such acts that have become known to the authorities.

RESEARCH RESULTS

Within the framework of the research entitled ‘The Opinion of the Citizens of Budapest on Crime and Restorative Justice’ (2), in 2009 we carried out a survey with a sample of 500 adult residents in Budapest and asked them questions related to crime, victimisation, fear of crime and latency. This survey was representative on the basis of both sex and age.

We found that the residents of Budapest do not have a realistic picture of crime and, they misjudge the relevant trends. Only 3% of those interviewed could roughly guess, while 55% greatly underestimated and one-third of the interviewees somewhat overestimated the number of criminal acts that became known in 2008.

(1) Citizens’ lack of trust often reflects their general perception about the weakness of the state itself and results in their doubting it. It is also representational of a community that lacked trust, moral consensus and informal social control. Because of the variety of its origins, fear of crime requires combined methodological tools and occasionally an interdisciplinary analysis (Zarafonitou, 2009).

(2) The survey, entitled ‘The Opinion of the Population of Budapest on Crime, Victimisation and Restorative Justice’, was conducted in the framework of the international research project ‘Mediation and Restorative Justice in Prison Settings’ subsidised under the Criminal Justice Programme of the European Commission (JLS/2008/JPEN015-30-CE-0245615/00-52).
As regards victimisation, the results of the previous surveys were confirmed. Contrary to the 2% victimisation rate, shown in the official statistics, approximately one-fifth (20%) of the respondents said, in the survey, that they had fallen victim to crime during the year directly preceding the interview. Altogether 50 respondents mentioned more than one criminal act. The 152 respondents who had become victims of crime suffered altogether 259 criminal acts in the year before the interview, of which 99 suffered only one act. This rate of victimisation is ten times higher than the official rate. Looking back on their lives, only 37% of those interviewed reported that they had never been victims of crime before.

The criminal acts suffered in 2008 were reported to the police in just over half of the cases (52%). The respondents preferred not to report the incidents they classified as theft, robbery, damage to property, bodily harm, vandalism or domestic violence, whereas in the incidents considered as harassment, car break-in, car theft, burglary or abuse of data they went to the police to report the crime (mainly because of the insurance regulations). This result confirmed the observations that latency varies by types of crime. As such, for incidents of minor importance, where reporting would only mean an additional burden for the victim, or those where the victim is defenceless, is afraid of the perpetrator or is ashamed or blames himself/herself (e.g. incidents of domestic violence or sexual assault), latency is significant (compared to the results of Van Dijk et al., 2007). We also found that the fear of crime and feeling of insecurity increases with the seriousness of the victimization. Fear of crime and the insecurity feeling increases with the seriousness of the victimisation and/or with the number of victimisations as well (Kury, 1998). At the same time, the low willingness to report crimes did not show any correlation with the respondent’s sex or age.

It became clear from the survey that those who have become victims of crime at some time in their lives regard their residential neighbourhood as much less safe. This is obviously related to their state of mind arising from victimisation. However, it should be also remembered that the most frequent answers given were burglary, car theft and theft from cars, which acts are often connected to people’s places of residence, and therefore the above correlation is logical.

**CONCLUSION**

The results of our research confirm that the issues of latency and the sense of fear, security and insecurity must be specifically addressed among the population affected, with particular regard to those who have already fallen victim to crime. Similar to the international trends, the actual rate of victimisation, which remains outside the range of vision of the authorities, is significantly higher in Hungary, than indicated by the official statistics. This is not enough for the development of a concept for successful crime prevention. (3)

The situation is not unique: feelings of unsafety in the streets are most widespread among inhabitants of many European countries. This finding wholly confirms the earlier research results (Zarafonitou, 2009; INSEC, 2005). (4) As it was found in the INSEC project, the crime rate and the extent of the fear of crime do not overlap at all.

We have to face the fact, that people are also aware of the causes of latency, as there is probably no family in Budapest today without at least one close or distant relative or acquaintance who has suffered a criminal act that remains hidden. With records being limited to registered criminal cases and the victims involved in officially instituted criminal procedures, the authorities do not have knowledge of all victims. (5)

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(3) As pointed out by the UN in the Vienna Declaration of 2000, when formulating a valid crime prevention concept it is not enough to rely on police records; the actual number and characteristics of the victims must also be known.

(4) The most important observation, which emerged from the Greek victimisation survey, was the relatively low levels of victimisation in comparison to the high levels of fear of crime revealed. The result of the INSEC project is clearly shown by the fact that crime was less feared in the research area of the worst area, which was permanently and strongly infested by crime, than best area, in which a crime rate was significantly lower (using the question of ‘How often do you leave your house or apartment after dark?’) (INSEC, 2005).

(5) It is confirmed by my earlier observation in the nationwide victim survey led by OKRI (Barabás, 2004).
There are many factors that play a part in the victims’ failure to report criminal acts to the police. One of the most important is the distrust of the authorities and the scepticism – arising from previous experience – concerning the success of the procedure or that the damage suffered will not exponentially increase during, although it may be recovered at the end of, the official procedure.

Such discernment may serve as a basis for the development of preventive measures. Crime prevention based on a strategic approach – including interventions which are aimed, in addition to mitigating the effects of crime-generating factors, at reinforcing society’s ability to defend itself and at reducing the detrimental financial and moral effects of crime – can only be effective with regard to the victims of crime if we correctly assess the circumstances of victimisation and the different target groups and determine the concrete actions to be taken on the basis of such assessment.

We should specifically remember that not only the punishment and rehabilitation of offenders but also preparation for appropriate self-defence of the people, with particular regard to those especially exposed to assault by criminals, can be effective tools to combat crime. The application of new techniques, i.e. the tools of situational crime prevention, will lead not only to a reduction in the number of criminal cases and potential criminal acts but also to the sense of security among the population being enhanced in the longer run.

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THE ACCREDITATION OF FORENSIC LABORATORIES AS COMPONENT OF REALIZING THE EUROPEAN FORENSIC SCIENCE 2020 CONCEPT

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Keywords: forensic sciences; EFSA 2020; accreditation; common standards.

Abstract: The success of mutually recognising evidence, among others, is provided by the introduction of common standards. In the interest of the regulated and scheduled implementation of the harmonisation process, the Council of the European Union made a decision on the ideas of ‘The Vision for European Forensic Science 2020’ including the creation of a European Forensic Science Area and the development of forensic science infrastructure in Europe (hereafter: EFSA 2020). This paper analyses the effects of the EFSA 2020 decision on the accreditation of forensic laboratories.

AIMS OF THE STUDY

Globalising cross-border crime has led European Union Member States to improve methods of fighting crime on an international level as well as to increase the mutual recognition of collecting and analysing evidence by one another. The unification and standardisation of forensic expert methods of analysis is of crucial significance. This also affects the system of criminal procedure guarantees. The success of mutually recognising evidence, among others, is provided by the introduction of common standards. In the interest of the regulated and scheduled implementation of the harmonisation process, the Council of the European Union made a decision on the ideas of ‘The Vision for European Forensic Science 2020’ including the creation of a European Forensic Science Area and the development of forensic science infrastructure in Europe (hereafter: EFSA 2020). This paper analyses the effects of the EFSA 2020 decision on the accreditation of forensic laboratories.

METHODS AND RESULTS

In this study we investigated regulations, decisions, and rules regarding national and international measures of the given area. The European Council’s programmes of Tampere and Hague have already put great emphasis on increasing the efficiency of information exchange between states. This is the declared objective of the Prüm Decision of 2005.

The decision’s two highlighted areas are the mutual exchange of DNA and fingerprint data. Information exchange can only achieve its objective if the provided data’s quality and compliance is ensured. Hence, every single effort is significant which assists the mutual recognition of evidences. In order to improve the data exchange implemented by the Prüm Decision, the Council issued decision 2008/616/JHA. In the decision they ordered the application of EN ISO/IEC 17025 standard regarding the operation of testing and calibration of laboratories in order to ensure the integrity of DNA profiles.
The standard covers the whole expert activity starting from the incoming of the case until issuing the opinion of the specialist. It establishes a wide documentation obligation which includes regular self-analysis and external review, as well.

In the area of forensic cooperation, Council Framework Decision 2009/905/JHA on the accreditation of judicial expert laboratories were a crucial step. According to this, the accreditation of DNA laboratories had to be done until 30th November 2013. Forensic fingerprint laboratories have to be accredited until 30th November 2015.

We shall mention that Council Framework Decision 2009/905/JHA is a pre-Lisbon Treaty instrument, meaning that although it is legally binding, the European Commission has no power of sanction if members fail to meet its obligations. That will change from 1st December 2014, when all pre-Lisbon EU polices and criminal law measures will be subject to the Commission’s enforcement powers and the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the EU.

An important stage of this process was the formation of Project Committee CEN/TC 419 in frames of the European Committee for Standardisation. The aim of the Project Committee is to ensure the integrity of forensic processes (as a single process). With this objective, the Project Committee should develop EU Standards which lay down the provisions for forensic science processes starting from the scene of the crime, through recognition, recording, recovery, transportation and storage of material followed by the examination, analysis of material, interpretation of results, reporting and data exchange.

In 2011, in the conclusions mentioned above, the EU Council (EFSA 2020) formed the ambition to create a European Forensic Science Area by 2020, in which routine forensic processes for the collection, processing, use and delivery of forensic data will be based on equivalent minimum forensic science standards, and in which forensic service providers will work on the basis of a common approach to implement these standards that foster closer cooperation between them and criminal justice systems.

The detailed aim of EFSA 2020 is to foster cooperation between the police and judicial authorities across the EU. The European Network of Forensic Institutes (ENFSI) will assist the European Commission to make progress in the following areas:

- accreditation of forensic science institutes and laboratories;
- respect for minimum competence criteria for forensic science personnel;
- establishment of common best practice manuals and their application in daily work of forensic laboratories and institutes;
- conduct proficiency tests/collaborative exercises in forensic science activities at international level;
- application of minimum quality standards for scene-of-crime investigations and evidence management from crime scene to court room;
- recognition of equivalence of law enforcement forensic activities with a view to avoid duplication of effort through cancellation of evidence owing to technical and qualitative differences and achieving significant reductions in time taken to process crimes with a cross-border component;
- identification of optimal and shared ways to create, update and use forensic databases;
- usage of advances in forensic science in fight against terrorism, organised crime and other criminal activities;
• forensic awareness, particularly through appropriate education and training of the law enforcement and justice community;

• research and development projects to promote further development of the forensic science infrastructure.

In order to achieve objectives formulated by the Council, the European Network of Forensic Institutes (ENFSI) also made significant steps. According to ENFSI's Strategic Plan 2011/2014 it is necessary to take further steps regarding the creation of a European Forensic Science Area 2020 and in particular the active involvement in developing suggestions according to the detailed action plan with regards to a vision for European Forensic Science 2020.

At the annual meeting in 2012, Members accepted an amendment to ENFSI strategic plan, in which they emphasised the need for active steps in this area. According to the 2013/2014 action plan, besides the mentioned actions by ENFSI, the strategic goals board will seek support from EUROPOL and EUROJUST in preparing an action plan with regards to a vision for European Forensic Science 2020.

In 2013/2014 the ENFIS Board together with the Standing Committees, will work towards the strategic goals and make steps forward by means of concrete actions. The achieved results will be presented at the 2014 Annual Meeting and finally, evaluated by the ENFSI membership meeting in Bratislava.

The EFSA 2020 programme goes beyond the accreditation of forensic laboratories. The harmonisation of forensic experts’ knowledge and training requirements is of significant importance. The regulations of EU countries are extremely varied, hence, this is a more complex task than the accreditation of forensic laboratories. The further objective of EFSA 2020 is determining the minimum conditions of crime scene investigation. The complexity of its realisation is indicated by the fact that, in the past fifteen years the application of the handbook of ISO/IEC 17020:1998 and ISO/IEC 17025 General requirements for the competence of testing and calibration laboratories, http://www.standards.org/standards/listing/iso_17025 has not been used.

CONCLUSION

The key of mutual recognition of evidence is the application of common expert guaranteed requirements. The Council of the EU declared the concept of EFSA 2020 to ensure the equivalence of professional forensic examinations. It aims at working out and accepting European standards. It is obvious that the accreditation of forensic laboratories is a corner stone of the above mentioned objectives. To develop further, it is essential for EU institutions and organisations to be thorough and cautious. To realise the whole concept by 2020 will be a tough challenge.

REFERENCES


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STRENGTHENING CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR RESPONSE IN EUROPE BY ENHANCING ON-SITE COOPERATION BETWEEN SAFETY AND SECURITY ORGANISATIONS: A NEW ITALIAN PILOT PROJECT

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Keywords: research project; chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear response; on-site European cooperation.

Abstract: This article has a two-fold goal. On one hand it aims at providing an overview of the ongoing project to increase the knowledge and experience exchange among researchers and practitioners. On the other hand it endeavours to disseminate the outcomes of both the desk-based research and the planned table top exercises.

CONTEXT

Aimed at implementing the 2009 EU CBRN Action Plan, the ISEC targeted call ‘Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear ("CBRN")’ bestows grants to projects aiming at improving the capabilities of Member States, alongside relevant International Organisations (IOs), to prepare for, detect and respond to CBRN incidents. In this framework, the EU has recently financed a specific project called ‘Strengthening CBRN-Response in Europe by Enhancing On-Site Cooperation between Safety and Security Organisations: an Italian pilot project’ (hereinafter ‘Strengthening CBRN-Response in Europe’) submitted by a partnership led by the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna (a leading public University located in Pisa, Italy) and including the University of Rome Tor Vergata and the Italian firefighters, i.e. Corpo Nazionale Vigili del Fuoco – Comando Provinciale di Pisa. (1)

PROJECT OBJECTIVES

Recent studies on CBRN, funded by the European Commission, and EU-exercises (i.e. Cremex-2011) show that there is a need to further enhance the interaction between safety (first responders) and security (law enforcement, security services) at the response level as well as to strengthen the procedures to deliver cross border assistance in case of CBRN-incidents. In line with the key objective ‘preparedness and response to CBRN incidents’ outlined by the EU CBRN Action Plan, the project Strengthening CBRN-Response in Europe aims to enhance the response capacity of Member States should a CBRN-incident occur.

To this end, the project will use the Italian response framework as a case study. Since the Italian case presents similarities with the situation in place in a number of other European countries, the issues emerged and the results achieved can easily pave

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(1) Associate partners of the project are the Scuola Interforze per la Difesa NCB of Rieti, the Special Unit of the Italian Carabinieri Corps for the Protection of the Environment, CRATI s.c.r.l. (Consorzio per la Ricerca e le Applicazioni di Tecnologie Innovative) and the Italian Department for Civil Protection.
the ground for a future European project. An upcoming transnational project would benefit tremendously from the activities carried out in this national project for the following reasons:

- many of the expected project outputs present a degree of relevance which goes beyond Italian national borders;
- the methodology which will be adopted to implement various project activities will be conceived and designed to be easily adaptable to a transnational project;
- during the implementation of the project, special attention will be constantly devoted to the adoption of a comparative European approach as this will be of crucial importance to properly identify best practices and lessons learned. Relying on the latter it will be possible to make sound, scientifically credible, politically sustainable and pragmatic guidelines to apply in different settings;
- the three project partners as well as the associate partners are part of wider networks of practitioners and renowned experts who will guarantee that the comparative approach is always taken into consideration.

The project, which started in 2013 and will last 24 months, aims at achieving the following specific objectives:

- Identify the existing national and cross border legal framework of response to CBRN security incidents (i.e. applicable rules at national (Italian), EU and international level, existing soft law instruments etc.). The final output of this analysis (a specific document outlining the legal framework) provides valuable input not only for Italy but also for all EU Member States; (2)
- Identify the existing national and cross border operational frameworks of fire fighters response to CBRN security incidents (i.e. standard operating procedures, plans, training curricula, exercise calendars). Also in this case the specific output of the project, although largely based on the Italian situation, will be useful and relevant to all EU Member States as well as to the EU;
- Identify critical issues discovered throughout the analysis of the Italian situation, in particular with regard to the coordination of law enforcement and security agencies for both national and cross border interventions;
- Define a sound approach to deal with cross border assistance and more specifically complement the existing EU-Host Nation Support Guidelines with a chapter on CBRN-assistance to security incidents. This specific activity might lead to the revision of the existing EU Host Nation Support Guidelines and therefore the project results could have an impact on a wider area of relevant actors; and,
- Draft the outline of a Common Training Curriculum for Italian actors involved in the response to CBRN events that can be used by the national training institutes of the different national actors involved in CBRN response. In order to foster and facilitate the interplay of the diverse stakeholders, this curriculum could be used, in the future, also by the Civil Protection Mechanism Training Programme and CEPOL.

**PROJECT ACTIVITIES**

The proposal will be implemented through the following set of activities, all of them aimed at achieving the above mentioned specific objectives:

- Analysis of the legal framework and of the rules regulating CBRN incidents and the delivery of international assistance;
- Mapping of practices at the national and regional level;

(2) The analysis of the legal framework carried out within the project is available at: http://cbrn.netseven.it/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/CBRN_Mapping_Report-FINAL.pdf
Mapping of existing technologies available to deal with CBRN related incidents;

Development of two scenarios / events for two table top exercises;

Development of the exercises’ evaluation;

Identification of the participants to the table top exercises and establishment of a solid network. In fact, it is expected that relevant expert teams from other EU Member States (and more specifically teams coming from Estonia, due to the knowledge gained through the CREMEX 2011 exercise, and teams from The Netherlands) will partake in the exercises alongside the core members of the partnership and the other associate partners;

Setting up the exercises’ organisation;

Table-Top Exercise 1;

Table-Top Exercise 2;

Workshop to review the results of the two exercises;

Identification of gaps based on the two exercises and on the mapping activities carried out in WP 2;

Defining and drafting procedures for CBRN assistance in HSN Guidelines;

Validating procedures with the European Commission/DG ECHO and CBRN expert group;

Drafting outline training curricula for HSN for CBRN incidents for Italian responders. This Curriculum could be used as well by CEPOL and by the Civil Protection Mechanism;

Validating the outline in meetings with ECHO and CEPOL and delivering the outline to these organisations for further implementation;

Presentations at Europol EOD-CBRN expert group meeting, EC CBRN expert group meeting and ECHO CBRN expert group meeting; and

Dissemination of the project’s results through the publication of articles in law enforcement and fire fighters’ magazines.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Considering the increasing need across Europe (and even worldwide) to improve cooperation among the different stakeholders involved in prevention, detection and management of CBRN related incidents, it is expected that this project will offer new ideas and refined tools to strengthen the capacity of Member States in responding effectively and professionally to CBRN-incidents.
COMMONALITY IN POLICE HIGHER EDUCATION IN EUROPE (COMPHEE) – RESEARCH PROJECT REPORT

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Keywords: research project; police education; cross border crime; hate crime; cybercrime; child pornography.

Abstract: The aim of the project was to develop a joint EU teaching module with a high standard of quality and a correspondingly high transnational acceptance value. Each partner developed a sub-module with a chosen field of criminality that is prioritised by EU security policy: cross border crime; hate crime; virtual worlds and criminality; and child pornography.

PROJECT BACKGROUND AND PARTICIPANTS

The European Union, represented by the European Commission decided to award a grant and signed a framework agreement with the Police Academy of Lower Saxony (Polizeiakademie Niedersachsen), on the CompHEE (Commonality in Police Higher Education in Europe) project. It was a joint project (a cross national training programme) for the promotion of police education and training at European level, according to the Bologna declaration and Stockholm Programme requirements. The project also aimed at creating a uniform college system and a common police culture in Europe. The project was funded by the European Commission as part of the ‘Prevention of and Fight against Crime’ programme.

A planning group prepared the project plan, found suitable project partners in Europe and made the project application. In May 2011 this application was approved. The official project launch was on 1 September 2011. The project was set to run for three years. The project partners are: Police Academy Lower Saxony, Germany, the Police Academy of the Netherlands, the Scottish Police College, and the National University of Public Service, Faculty of Law Enforcement, (former Police College) Hungary.

AIMS OF THE PROJECT

Major aims were the following:

- To develop a joint EU teaching module with a high standard of quality and a correspondingly high transnational acceptance value.
- To implement the module to as many European police educational establishments as possible in order to achieve the biggest European dimension possible.
- To introduce and permanently establish a joint European police understanding in the matter of education and training.
- To create a network of European police educational establishments.
• To create (social) networks among the European law enforcement students.

• To achieve a greater willingness to engage in ‘learning from each other’ as an example of best practice, in particular among all future law enforcement officials.

• To improve European police collaboration in all areas and at all levels as a long-term goal.

CONTENT AND METHODOLOGY

In formulating the learning objectives, the project group was guided by the description of competences of a senior police officer defined by CEPOL, that is, contextual, social, practical and individual competences that students should acquire through the module. All the partners presented relevant aspects of international mutual assistance and the legal basis for both international police work at EU level and cross-border cooperation.

In order to illustrate these aspects, each partner developed a sub-module with a chosen field of criminality that is prioritised by EU security policy. Mobile banditry (Netherlands), addressed tackling of itinerant crime groups operating across borders in the EU. Hate crime (Hungary) focused on different aspects of bias-motivated crimes and corresponding law in the EU. Virtual worlds and criminality – child pornography (Germany) concentrated on a specific phenomenon of crime in virtual worlds as a challenge for international police cooperation. Scotland was responsible for quality insurance of the project. The modules should also promote intercultural competence and the opportunity for networking. The module is targeted at students on BA/BSC level and in the case of postgraduate courses also police officers in middle/senior/special management functions.

PROJECT PROCESS
Within the project’s duration of three years, the content and structure of the module has been worked out by the partners jointly. During this time, homework phases alternated with joint workshop sessions, where the findings acquired were presented, coordinated and aligned with the aim of the project.

**RESULTS**

Each country formulated its ideas and ways of implementing a joint module. From this, common standards for the module have been elaborated in a workshop session. These standards defined the module, indicated the demands made on the existing and future partners, and should guarantee that mutual involvement in the exchange programme and recognition of achievements is assured. Once the standards had been determined, the module was developed with regard to the content and methodology. Each partner developed a detailed module description, a teachers’ manual and a study guide.

The project also allowed for a testing phase, in which the module is offered among the partners and students, and is exchanged between the partner establishments. It was scheduled as blended learning in two parts:

1. e-Learning – using an online learning platform;
2. Residential – each partner country to be attended by 12 students: 4 from Germany, 4 from Hungary and 4 from the Netherlands.

The applied learning activities and teaching methods were: computer-based self study, plenary session, group work, data collection, comparative analysis video, following structured discussion, case studies, workshop and practical work. Visiting law enforcement organisations and civil organisations to gain information from the real field work, and organising a workshop with presenters from civil organisations were also built into the teaching phase. The overall processes and goals of this module reflect the human rights-based approach as well. The human rights principles are:

- Universality and inalienability,
- Indivisibility,
- Inter-dependence and inter-relatedness,
- Equality and non-discrimination,
- Participation and inclusion,
- Accountability and the rule of law.

Special attention was given to:

- General police attitudes and duties,
- International and national legislations concerning the topic (comparative analyses of the different national approaches),
- Prevention, legislation,
- Investigation,
- Cooperation — Multi agency approach and effect on local society,
- Long term and situational problem solving.

The module has a value of four credit points.

The testing phase has been evaluated (internally and externally) and the module optimised accordingly. The project was evaluated during the testing phase (pilot phase). The formative and summative evaluation began in September 2012 and ended in June 2013.

The project partners, from the Netherlands, Hungary, and Germany, participated in this evaluation. Scotland didn’t take part in the testing phase and was not included in the evaluation of the testing phase because of its consultative role.

In the evaluation two perspectives were respected; the perspective of the participating students and the perspective of the teachers and coordinators. Students were asked to fill in an online questionnaire after the online learning period (March 2013) and after the residential period (April 2013). The evaluation of the whole testing phase from their perspective was conducted via an online questionnaire in May and June 2013.

**DISSEMINATION OF THE PROJECT RESULTS**

The project results will be disseminated as follows:

a) at the final conference event (in Hannover, Germany on 16-17 June 2014),
b) the implementation of the modules in the curricula of partner institutions in Europe and
c) in publications.
CONCLUSIONS

In the framework of the ComPHEE project the working teams of the Dutch, German and the Hungarian Police Academies/Colleges have the aim to produce a joint concept for an acceptable cross-border training module, ‘International police cooperation in the European Union’ to implement the project partners’ existing or intended Bachelor study courses as a model for other police training establishments in Europe. The design and implementation of this joint training module will make it possible to align and harmonise the legal and administrative rules on unifying how different Member States proceed as part of the Bologna process and create a cornerstone of a European internal security strategy to develop a common security culture (including the Stockholm Programme).
LEARNING METHODS USED IN CEPOL COURSES – RESEARCH PROJECT REPORT

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Keywords: Learning methods; training methods; objectives; evaluation; training needs; analysis of CEPOL courses; E-Learning; webinars.

Abstract: This article describes the main results of a research project developed on behalf of the CEPOL Working Group on Learning during 2012. The objective was to make an inventory of learning and training methods used in CEPOL courses and to briefly discuss the didactical state of the art in such courses.

INTRODUCTION

The ‘philosophy’ of CEPOL courses is to contribute to police cooperation through learning for senior police officers in EU Member States, by providing training sessions based on common learning (science) and professional standards which can help police officers to acquire new competences.

Taking into account theories of learning, some principles should be present in CEPOL courses. According to the state of educational sciences and taking a CEPOL policy document into consideration, we have pointed out at least eight constitutive elements:

- Active learning
- Learner-centred approach
- Contextual learning
- Learning from each other, resulting in a learning community
- Future-oriented learning, related to policing in Europe;
- Supporting self-directed, continuous learning
- Competence-based learning
- Learning, based on science and providing insight into science (see Brekelmans et al, 2010)

The main intention of the research was not to describe or explain all these elements, but to investigate their presence in these courses in detail. We tried to rate whether the didactical design of the courses reflected (some of) the principles. We especially looked for indicators pointing to a shifting from the ‘classical’ style of delivery (teachers’ activities) towards a learner-centred approach (learner activities), and also for a matching of methods and objectives. The theoretical basis of the analysis draws from authors like Bloom, Gagne, Ausubel, Coli, Kolb, Zabala, and Knowles, among others.

RESEARCH METHODS AND EXPLORATORY RESULTS

Before starting the inventory we had to define the empirical basis of the analysis. As it was not possible to provide an overview of all CEPOL courses ever organised, we decided to analyze a sample of CEPOL courses. As a sample basis we chose the 2010 courses. We assumed that the 2010 course bundle was not structurally different from any other years’ course bundles.
Furthermore, we assumed that the relevant information in these particular courses which was more complete than that of previous years, was widely available via the CEPOL secretariat. Another important and practical aspect was that the information concerning the 2010 data, could be made available via CEPOL’s web-based Learning Management System (LMS).

The basis of analysis was the information about CEPOL courses found in the LMS, mainly the course curriculum (or the course descriptor) and the draft programme. The list of 2010 courses contains 98 courses, seminars and conferences. Of these 98 events, we analyzed 47 courses. The reasons for that reduction are: some courses were cancelled; for a lot of courses there was no programme and/or curriculum available in the CEPOL LMS (for both we had no access to data); for some courses there was no explicit assignment between topics/content and methods (e.g. some language courses).

In the analysis we took over the denominations of methods used in the draft programme respectively in the course curriculum, or (if not named) we tried to identify the methods according to the programme context. By using this procedure we found the following applied methods, described in Table 1.

Table 1: Main learning methods.

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Lecture (given by an expert)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Participants’ presentation (mostly from a pre-course assignment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Group work or workshop</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Plenary discussion (mostly after group work or individual work)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Individual work (assignment)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Study visit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Demonstration (e.g. PC application, presentation of a case study)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Panel discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Exercise (incl. group exercise).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whether all method names are used in a unique sense is not totally clear. But the likelihood is, is that most of the labels used made sense to do so.

Relating to the quantitative dimension, we summarised the real time (hrs) spent in learning activities, structured according to the used methods. We only regarded activities in close relation to the title/topic of the course. For example: in course 17/2010 (the topic was ‘stolen arts’) we only registered a study visit to the Carabinieri Department for the Protection of Cultural Heritage, but not a field trip to Appia Antica and the Vatican Museums. That may be incorrect; but in this respect we cannot preclude some uncertainties in the research.

The absolute figures were then transposed to percentage figures. In this way we got an overview of methods proportion for every analysed course. The last step was to summarise the data to an absolute total and a proportional overview of the use of methods in the analysed courses, described in Table 2, Figure 1 and Figure 2.

Comments, in Table 3, mention the plausibility of accordance between the written planned objectives and the methods used in each course. There is no evaluation of the suitability of the objectives, as such (e.g. relation to training needs analysis, and alternatives). They are only exploratory comments and, therefore, not a judgment on the ‘internal reliability’ of the objectives-methods relation, that is, in what way was there an apparent accordance between those two didactical factors in the courses.
Table 2: Overview of the use of methods in the analysed courses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>Sum hours</th>
<th>Methods (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>654</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Methods used, by total learning hours.

Figure 2: Methods used (in proportion to total).
Table 3 – Accordance between learning objectives and learning methods.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2010 code</th>
<th>Courses (titles)</th>
<th>Duration training hours net</th>
<th>Duration training hours net</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>02 2010</td>
<td>Community Policing</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03 2010</td>
<td>Counter Terrorism</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Much information; not all objectives met</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05 2010</td>
<td>Forensic Sciences</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Objective n°2 not clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07 2010</td>
<td>Airport Security</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>09 2010</td>
<td>Fraud ag. EU bodies</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 2010</td>
<td>Fraud</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 2010</td>
<td>Traffic. stolen artwork</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Doubts about number of study visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 2010</td>
<td>OC SE Europe</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Some objectives not covered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 2010</td>
<td>Cr Contr + Traff. Safety</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 2010</td>
<td>Road Safety</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 2010</td>
<td>FSj CSDP</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33 2010</td>
<td>JIT</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 2010</td>
<td>PolCoop Schengen</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 2010</td>
<td>Pruem Treaty</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Excessive number of lectures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38 2010</td>
<td>SIRENE Basic</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39 2010</td>
<td>SIRENE Advanced</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 2010</td>
<td>PolCoop Neighb Cou</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 2010</td>
<td>EU P+J Systems</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46 2010</td>
<td>EU P+J Systems</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47 2010</td>
<td>KnowlEuropPolSyst</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49 2010</td>
<td>TOPSPOC</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 2010</td>
<td>TOPSPOC</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51 2010</td>
<td>TOPSPOC</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52 2010</td>
<td>TOPSPOC</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 2010</td>
<td>Large Scale Disast</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Doubts about sufficient space for exchange</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58 2010</td>
<td>Management Diversity</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63 2010</td>
<td>Crime victims</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64 2010</td>
<td>Cyber crime</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 2010</td>
<td>Domestic Violence</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Excessive number of objectives (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66 2010</td>
<td>HR</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67 2010</td>
<td>THB</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Too many lectures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76 2010</td>
<td>Bologn/ Cop Process</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77 2010</td>
<td>Pol Res+ Sc in Tr</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78 2010</td>
<td>Res SympMaj Event</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79 2010</td>
<td>Res+ScConf</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Unknown/ no clear objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85 2010</td>
<td>LMS Training</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86 2010</td>
<td>LMS Training</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Only exercises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89 2010</td>
<td>CC Dom Viol</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 2010</td>
<td>CC THB</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91 2010</td>
<td>CC Drug Traff</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92 2010</td>
<td>CC Europol</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93 2010</td>
<td>CC Pol Ethics</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94 2010</td>
<td>SIRENE Basic</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>No remarks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONCLUSIONS

Lectures had the highest frequency and proportion in the CEPOL learning environment, then followed by group work. If we assume that the method plenary discussion means mostly a presentation and discussion of a group work, and that exercise is also an involving method, we can assume about 40% of the net learning time was dedicated for activated learning opportunities in the analysed courses.

Based on different learning theories and different teaching strategies, developed for adult learners (Knowles, Holton, and Swanson 2005), we claim, as a main conclusion, that police officers need more learner-centred teaching ‘active learning strategies’, often referred to as ‘experiential learning’ — problems to solve, opportunities to discuss, hands-on projects, simulations, workshops, etc. i.e. learner-oriented learning — and less lectures. Also, within learner-centred teaching, a major emphasis should be to help students progress in their critical thinking skills. In Kolb’s model, reflection is one of the crucial steps of learning. Without reflection, learning doesn’t occur.

We also found most of the settings to be adequate and appropriate for the stated objectives. That does not mean that the setting was optimal in every case. Probably, there could have been alternative settings with higher learning attraction in some courses. But this is only a presumption that cannot be derived from the information at our disposal. We think results point to a rather reasonable, and perhaps to an improved picture, of the learning environments for CEPOL courses.

For us, there is no reason to assume that the reduced number of cases/courses in the net sample (a kind of missing values) has produced a bias in the findings of our research. We could not detect a systematic pattern in the reasons for these missing values. We consider the results valid and representative of the current method settings in CEPOL courses.

Future research should take a similar research approach regarding CEPOL e-Learning opportunities. e-Learning and webinars seem to have become more and more frequent in the CEPOL learning structure, as they represent a considerable part of learning opportunities within the CEPOL community. According to this obvious increase, it is important to undertake research about the methods and learning circumstances/situations in these events.

Questions of interest are, for example, in which way they (can) meet pedagogical standards (in course design and performance of training) or which competence profiles are requested for e-Learning ‘teachers’, organizers or facilitators. Additional questions may be which ‘CEPOL content’ is suitable for this kind of course, what its position is in relation to other CEPOL learning environments (especially conventional courses and seminars), and to what extent participants can accept and benefit from this new method of learning.

Assumptions are only assumptions, or could be guesses or suppositions, but assumptions based on educational research and the search for training needs, are more than a supposition. It is the way to build and promote quality around some educational key indicators, and for a sustainable future in the law enforcement training and educational aspects.

REFERENCES


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RESISTING THE DEMONISATION OF ‘THE OTHER’: STATE, NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL CONTROL IN A TIME OF CRISIS.
42nd Annual Conference of the European Group for the Study of Deviance and Social Control.
3-6 September 2014, John Moores University, Liverpool, United Kingdom.
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THIRD GERN DOCTORAL SUMMER SCHOOL ON CRIMINOLOGY, SECURITY AND JUSTICE: METHODOLOGICAL AND EPIDEMIOLOGICAL ISSUES.
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European Society of Criminology Annual Conference.
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EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW AND ECONOMICS CONFERENCE.
18-20 September 2014, Aix-en-Provence, France.
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